528 U.S. 1623 (2006)
Michael Lee Marsh II broke into the home of Marry Ane Pusch and lay in wait for her to return.1 When Marry Ane entered her home with her nineteen-month-old daughter, M.P., Marsh repeatedly shot Marry Ane, stabbed her, and slashed her throat.2 The home was set on fire with the toddler inside, and M.P. burned to death.3
The jury convicted Marsh of the capital murder of M.P., the first-degree premeditated murder of Marry Ane, aggravated arson, and aggravated burglary.4 The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of three aggravating circumstances and that those circumstances were not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.5 On the basis of those findings, the jury sentenced Marsh to death for the capital murder of M.P.6
The jury also sentenced Marsh to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for forty years for the first-degree murder of Marry Ane.7 It imposed consecutive sentences of fifty-one months' imprisonment for aggravated arson and thirty-four months' imprisonment for aggravated burglary.8
On direct appeal, Marsh challenged Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4624(e).9 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Kansas death penalty statute is facially unconstitutional.10 The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Marsh's conviction and sentence for aggravated burglary and premeditated murder of Marry Ane, and reversed and remanded for new trial Marsh's convictions for capital murder of M.P. and aggravated arson.11
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment holding the state death penalty statute facially unconstitutional?13
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 authorizes this Court to review, by writ of certiorari, the final judgment of the highest court of a State when the validity of a state statute is questioned on federal constitutional grounds.14 This Court has determined that the foregoing authorization permits review of the judgment of the highest court of a State, even though the state-court proceedings are not yet complete, where the federal claim has been finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case.15
Yes. Although Marsh will be retried on the capital murder and aggravated arson charges, the Kansas Supreme Court's determination that Kansas' death penalty statute is facially unconstitutional is final and binding on the lower state courts.16 Thus, the State will be unable to obtain further review of its death penalty law later in this case.17 If Marsh is acquitted of capital murder, double jeopardy and state law will preclude the State from appealing.18
If he is reconvicted, the State will be prohibited under the Kansas Supreme Court's decision from seeking the death penalty, and there would be no opportunity for the State to seek further review of that prohibition.19
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment holding the state death penalty statute facially unconstitutional.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's principal responsibility is to ensure the integrity and uniformity of federal law.21 He argued that when state courts erroneously invalidate state actions on federal constitutional grounds, review by this Court is the only way to vindicate state autonomy.22 He rejected the notion that the Court should show restraint when the state court has granted more protection to a defendant than the Constitution requires.23
Such an approach would turn the uniform law of the land into a crazy quilt.24
Whether the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment rests on adequate and independent state grounds?25
No. The Kansas Supreme Court clearly rested its decision on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.28 In rendering its determination here, the Kansas Supreme Court observed that Kleypas held that the weighing equation in K. S. A.
21-4624(e) as written was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to cases in which aggravating evidence and mitigating evidence are equally balanced.29 The court squarely held that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and overruled the portion of Kleypas upholding the statute through the constitutional avoidance doctrine.30
The Kansas Supreme Court's judgment does not rest on adequate and independent state grounds.31
Whether the Kansas capital sentencing statute that requires imposition of the death penalty when aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances violates the Constitution?32
This case is controlled by Walton v. Arizona.33 So long as a State's method of allocating the burdens of proof does not lessen the State's burden to prove every element of the offense charged, or in this case to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances, a defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by placing on him the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.34 The Kansas statute is consistent with the Constitution because it may direct imposition of the death penalty when the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigators do not outweigh aggravators, including where the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.35
No. The reasoning of Walton requires approval of the Kansas death penalty statute.3637 At bottom, in Walton, the Court held that a state death penalty statute may place the burden on the defendant to prove that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances.38 A fortiori, Kansas' death penalty statute, consistent with the Constitution, may direct imposition of the death penalty when the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigators do not outweigh aggravators, including where the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.39 The Kansas death penalty statute satisfies the constitutional mandates of Furman and its progeny because it rationally narrows the class of death-eligible defendants and permits a jury to consider any mitigating evidence relevant to its sentencing determination.40
It does not interfere, in a constitutionally significant way, with a jury's ability to give independent weight to evidence offered in mitigation.41
The Kansas capital sentencing statute does not violate the Constitution.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's principal responsibility is to ensure the integrity and uniformity of federal law. He argued that when state courts erroneously invalidate state actions on federal constitutional grounds, review by this Court is the only way to vindicate state autonomy. He rejected the notion that the Court should show restraint when the state court has granted more protection to a defendant than the Constitution requires.
Such an approach would turn the uniform law of the land into a crazy quilt.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the grant of certiorari was a misuse of discretion because the case involved a state court granting more protection than the Federal Constitution required.43 He noted that a policy of judicial restraint would allow the highest court of the State to be the final decisionmaker.44 He also explained that Walton is not controlling because the plurality did not confront the equipoise issue, and agreement with Justice Blackmun's dissent in Walton is consistent with refusing to read Walton as controlling here.45
Joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, And Breyer
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented on the ground that the Constitution forbids a mandatory death penalty in doubtful cases when aggravating and mitigating factors are of equal weight.46 He argued that the tiebreaker in favor of death fails to produce a reasoned moral response and that new empirical evidence of exonerations requires accounting for the risk of error in capital cases.47 The statute produces a death sentence exactly when a sentencing impasse demonstrates that the jury does not see the evidence as showing the worst sort of crime committed by the worst sort of criminal.48