96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984)
On the evening of January 9, 1980, defendant Donald Gwinnell spent an hour or two at the home of codefendant Joseph Zak after driving him home.1 During that time, Gwinnell consumed alcoholic beverages.2 Zak knew that Gwinnell was becoming intoxicated but continued to serve him.3 Zak also knew that Gwinnell was going to drive home and watched as Gwinnell drove off.4
About twenty-five minutes later, Zak telephoned Gwinnell's home and learned from Mrs. Gwinnell that Gwinnell had been involved in a head-on collision with an automobile operated by plaintiff Marie Kelly, who was seriously injured.5 After the accident, Gwinnell was subjected to a blood test indicating a blood alcohol concentration of 0.286 percent.6 Kelly's expert concluded from that reading that Gwinnell had consumed the equivalent of thirteen drinks and that he must have been showing unmistakable signs of intoxication while at Zak's home.7
Kelly sued Gwinnell and his employer. Those defendants sued the Zaks in a third-party action, and plaintiff amended her complaint to include the Zaks as direct defendants.8 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Zak.9 The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for trial. The Supreme Court granted certification.10
Whether a social host who serves liquor to a visibly intoxicated adult guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, may be held liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation of the vehicle by the guest?11
A social host who serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, is liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation of the vehicle by the guest.12 Liability rests on ordinary negligence principles under which the host owes a duty to refrain from creating an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm when the host controls the liquor supply and knows the guest will drive.13
Yes. Zak continued to serve alcohol to Gwinnell after knowing he was becoming intoxicated and would drive home, thereby creating a foreseeable risk of harm to other motorists.14 The blood alcohol concentration of 0.286 percent and the expert determination that Gwinnell showed unmistakable signs of intoxication while at Zak's home confirm that the risk was both created and foreseeable.15 This conduct satisfies the elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages because the collision with Kelly was a direct and ordinary consequence of the intoxication Zak helped produce.16
The social host may be held liable for the injuries to the third party.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Garibaldi dissents on the ground that the legislature is better equipped to balance competing interests and fashion a remedy that reduces drunk-driving injuries without imposing grave burdens on ordinary citizens.18 She emphasizes that commercial licensees possess expertise and cost-spreading ability that social hosts lack, that determining visible intoxication is difficult in a home setting, and that no other jurisdiction currently imposes this liability on hosts serving adults.19 Garibaldi concludes that the issue should remain with the legislature after hearings and investigation rather than be resolved by judicial imposition of unlimited liability.20
Whether the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the social host should be affirmed?21
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.22
No. The established facts demonstrate that Zak knew Gwinnell was becoming intoxicated, continued serving him, and knew he would drive, while expert evidence confirms visible intoxication occurred at the residence.23 These facts create a triable issue under the negligence standard governing social-host liability, so the host is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.24
The trial court's grant of summary judgment should not be affirmed.25