237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 305, 424 P.3d 290 (2018)
In April 2010, William Jae Kim was driving his 2005 Toyota Tundra pickup truck on the Angeles Forest Highway.1 He lost control during a sequence of steering maneuvers on a right-hand curve at 45 to 50 miles per hour and drove off an embankment.2 He suffered neck and spinal cord injuries that rendered him a quadriplegic.3
Kim and his wife Hee Joon Kim sued Toyota Motor Corporation and related entities.4 They alleged that the Tundra was defectively designed because vehicle stability control should have been included as standard equipment rather than offered only as part of an optional package.5
Before trial the Kims filed a motion in limine to preclude any argument or evidence comparing the Tundra to competitors' vehicles or claiming the design was not defective because it matched industry practices.6 The trial court denied the motion but invited the Kims to prepare a limiting instruction.7
At trial the Kims called Toyota product planning manager Sandy Lobenstein as an adverse witness and elicited testimony that Toyota had made VSC standard on some SUVs in 2001 and 2004, that an engineer had recommended making it standard on the 2005 Tundra, that market research showed pickup buyers were price-sensitive, and that no competitor offered VSC as standard or optional equipment on 2005 pickup models.8 The Kims also presented expert testimony that VSC would have prevented the accident and that adding it would have cost Toyota approximately $300 to $350 per vehicle.9
Toyota presented expert testimony that Kim caused the accident by driving above the speed limit in poor conditions, that VSC could not have prevented it, and that the Tundra already had features to address control problems.10 The jury received the risk-benefit instruction for design defect, returned a verdict for Toyota, and the trial court denied the Kims' motion for a new trial that challenged the admission of industry custom evidence.11
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.12
The Supreme Court granted review limited to the question of whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of industry custom and practice as relevant to the risk-benefit test.13
Whether the trial court committed reversible error in admitting, as relevant to the risk-benefit test for design defect, evidence of industry custom and practice related to the alleged defect?14
Evidence of industry custom and practice is admissible in a strict products liability design defect case under the risk-benefit test when it is relevant to one or more of the Barker factors.15 It may illuminate the complexity of design decisions and the trade-offs between safety, cost, and functionality.16 However, such evidence is not admissible to show that the manufacturer acted reasonably or that the product is not defective merely because it conforms to industry practice.17
No. The trial court did not commit reversible error because the evidence of industry custom and practice was properly admitted for the limited purpose of aiding the jury's evaluation of the Barker factors in the risk-benefit test.18 The Kims themselves introduced evidence through Lobenstein that no competitor offered VSC as standard or optional equipment on 2005 pickup models.19 Market research showed price sensitivity among buyers.20 The Kims used this evidence to argue that Toyota knowingly disregarded loss-of-control risks for competitive advantage.21
This directly bears on the feasibility and consequences of an alternative design.22 Toyota's additional testimony on cross-examination about the industry practice of phasing in new safety technologies further illuminated the relative complexity of design decisions and trade-offs implicit in adopting alternative designs under the risk-benefit test.23 The jury was instructed solely on the risk-benefit theory.24 The evidence was not offered or used to establish a standard of care or to show that Toyota acted reasonably.25
The trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting evidence of industry custom and practice as relevant to the risk-benefit test for design defect.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Liu, J.
Justice Dato concurred in the affirmance but stressed that industry custom and practice evidence offered by a defendant to prove the absence of a design defect remains generally inadmissible.27 It improperly shifts focus from the condition of the product to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct.28 He would have required the trial court to give a limiting instruction explaining that the evidence could be considered only to evaluate whether risks and benefits were appropriately balanced.29
It could not be used to show there was no defect merely because other manufacturers followed the same practice.30 Justice Dato nevertheless concluded that any instructional error was harmless because the Kims had introduced most of the custom evidence themselves to show competitive motivations.31 The parties' closing arguments centered on causation rather than industry practice.32
The evidence was not the defense's principal focus.33