647 N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. 1995)
In 1963, Boston University commenced plans to expand its library’s special collections.1 The newly appointed director of special collections began efforts to obtain Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s papers as one of the first individuals sought for deposits in the archives.2
Around the same time, Dr. King was approached by other universities including Morehouse College.3 Nevertheless, in July 1964 he sent a letter to the Boston University Library naming it the repository of his correspondence, manuscripts and other papers along with a few awards.4 He authorized removal of most papers through 1961 at once with intention to send additional files each year.5 The letter stated that all papers remain his legal property until otherwise indicated according to the statements below.6 It also stated that he intended each year to indicate a portion to become the absolute property of Boston University as an outright gift until all shall have been thus given.7 Finally, it stated that in the event of his death all materials deposited with the University shall become from that date the absolute property of Boston University.8
Dr. King delivered papers to BU pursuant to the letter and subsequently delivered additional papers as promised.9 Boston University undertook indexing of the papers, made the papers available to researchers, provided trained staff to care for the papers and assist researchers, and held a convocation to commemorate receipt of the papers at which Dr. King spoke explaining why he chose BU as the repository.10
After Dr. King's death, Coretta Scott King in her capacity as administratrix of the estate and in her individual capacity sued the Trustees of Boston University for conversion. She alleged that the estate and not BU held title to the papers which have been housed in BU’s library’s special collection since delivery in July 1964.11
The case was submitted to the jury on theories of contract, charitable pledge, statute of limitations, and laches.12 In response to special questions the jury determined that the letter set forth a promise by Dr. King to transfer ownership of his papers to BU.13 The jury also determined that BU took action in reliance on that promise or the promise was supported by consideration.14 The jury determined that the letter was not a contract.15 Therefore the jury did not reach the statute of limitations and laches defenses.16
The trial judge denied the plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.17 The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted the plaintiff’s application for direct appellate review.18
Whether the July 16, 1964 letter from Dr. King to Boston University contained a promise to transfer ownership of his papers?19
A charitable subscription is an oral or written promise to do acts or to give real or personal property to a charity or for a charitable purpose.20 To enforce such a pledge in Massachusetts, a party must establish both a promise to give property to a charitable institution and that the promise was supported by consideration or reliance.21 In ascertaining donative intent from a letter, the court examines the language in its entirety together with the circumstances and relationship of the parties, giving effect to that intent to the extent possible without abandoning basic contractual principles such as specificity of the donor’s promise.22
Yes.232425 The July 16, 1964 letter contains two sentences that a rational factfinder could construe as a promise to give personal property to a charity.26 The first statement sets forth Dr. King’s intention each year to indicate a portion of the deposited materials to become the absolute property of Boston University as an outright gift until all shall have been thus given.27 The second statement provides that in the event of Dr. King’s death all materials deposited with the University shall become from that date the absolute property of Boston University.28 These statements are read together with the bailor-bailee relationship the letter establishes, under which the papers were delivered into BU’s custody yet remained Dr. King’s legal property until otherwise indicated, and under which BU assumed the duty of scrupulous care.29 The bailment supplies evidence that the statements were not mere expressions of future intent but a promise for which the bailment itself served as security.30 The jury therefore could properly find that the letter set forth a promise to transfer ownership of the papers.31
The plaintiff contended that the retention of legal title until otherwise indicated rendered the statements unenforceable and that the first statement was only a unilateral mechanism for future gifts.32 That argument fails because the bailor-bailee relationship, combined with the explicit language of transfer, supplies the requisite specificity and intent to be bound.33 The circumstances surrounding the deposit, including Dr. King’s delivery of additional papers after the initial shipment, further support the conclusion that the letter expressed a binding promise rather than a revocable statement of hope.34
The evidence was sufficient to submit to the jury the question whether the letter contained a promise to transfer ownership of the papers to Boston University as part of an enforceable charitable pledge.35
Whether Boston University took action in reliance on any such promise or whether any such promise was supported by consideration?36
Consideration or reliance sufficient to enforce a charitable pledge may be found where the charity performs actions that go beyond the minimal duties assumed under a bailment, such as indexing deposited materials, making them available to researchers, providing trained staff for their care and use, and holding commemorative events.37 An actual benefit to the promisor or an actual loss or disadvantage to the promisee constitutes sufficient consideration to uphold a deliberately made promise.38
Yes. Boston University indexed the papers, made them available to researchers, provided trained staff to care for the papers and assist researchers, and held a convocation to commemorate receipt of the papers at which Dr. King spoke.39 These actions exceeded the obligations BU assumed as bailee to exercise only scrupulous care and thereby supplied either consideration for or reasonable reliance on Dr. King’s promise to transfer ownership.40 The jury could conclude that the indexing and research facilitation constituted a detriment to BU undertaken in response to the promise and a benefit to Dr. King through preservation and scholarly access to his papers.41
Boston University’s actions supplied consideration for or reliance on the promise, and the case was properly submitted to the jury on the charitable-pledge theory.42
Whether the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding the definition of a promise and the elements of a charitable pledge were proper?43
The primary purpose of jury instructions in a civil case is to assist the jurors in finding the facts at issue and applying the rules of law so that they may render a proper verdict.44 The instructions must be full, fair, and clear as to the issues to be decided, the rules to be followed in deciding the facts, and the law to be applied to the facts found.45 A judge presiding over a jury trial is not permitted to charge the jury with respect to matters of fact.46
Yes. The trial judge instructed the jury that a charitable pledge is a promise to give specified property to a charitable institution that must be supported either by consideration or by reliance on the part of the pledgee.47 The judge further clarified, in response to a jury question, that a statement of intention binds the maker to forbear from doing something or to do a specific thing and gives the person to whom the promise is made a right to expect or claim performance.48 The instructions defining a promise were not legally incorrect.49
The plaintiff contended that the instructions improperly blurred the line between intent and promise and that the judge should have directed the jury’s attention to specific passages in the letter.50 The instructions as a whole, however, correctly stated that a promise made with the understood intention that it is not legally binding is not a contract, and the judge properly refrained from characterizing particular passages of the letter for the jury.
The trial judge’s instructions on the definition of a promise and the elements of a charitable pledge were proper and did not constitute error.51