8 Ala. 131
The plaintiff, widow of the defendant's brother and mother of several children, resided in 1840 on public land under a lease which she had held over.1 She was comfortably settled there and would have attempted to secure the land she lived on.2 The defendant resided in Talladega County, some sixty or seventy miles away.3
On October 10, 1840, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff expressing sympathy over the death of his brother and one of the children.4 In the letter he advised her to obtain her preference on the place she lived on, sell the land, and quit the country because it was unhealthy and society was bad.5 He stated that if she would come down and see him he would let her have a place to raise her family, noting he had more open land than he could tend.6
Within a month or two after receiving the letter the plaintiff abandoned her possession without disposing of it and removed with her family to the defendant's residence.7 The defendant put her in comfortable houses and gave her land to cultivate for two years.8
At the end of the two years the defendant notified her to remove, put her in a house not comfortable in the woods, and afterwards required her to leave.9
A verdict was found for the plaintiff for two hundred dollars.10 The facts were agreed and the parties stipulated that if the facts would sustain the action the judgment was to be affirmed, otherwise it was to be reversed.11
Whether the defendant's promise to provide the plaintiff with a place to raise her family was supported by consideration arising from her move and abandonment of her prior possession?12
A promise constitutes an enforceable contract only when supported by consideration, which requires a bargained-for exchange in which the promisee incurs a detriment or the promisor receives a benefit at the instance of the promisor.13
No. The established facts demonstrate that the defendant extended an offer to the plaintiff to let her have a place to raise her family after learning of his brother's death.14 The plaintiff, who had been residing on public land under a lease, abandoned that possession without disposing of it and moved with her family to the defendant's residence some sixty or seventy miles away.15 This relocation occurred within a month or two of receiving the letter.16 It was followed by the defendant providing comfortable houses and land to cultivate for two years.17 The defendant then notified her to remove to a less comfortable house and ultimately required her to leave.18 The court concluded that these facts revealed only a gratuitous promise rather than a contract because the plaintiff's actions were not induced as part of a mutual bargain but instead represented her acceptance of a conditional gift.19
The absence of any request by the defendant for the plaintiff to abandon her land in exchange for the promise further supports the determination that no consideration existed.20 The parties' stipulation that the judgment would be affirmed if the facts sustained the action or reversed otherwise led directly to the reversal of the verdict for the plaintiff.21
The defendant's promise was a mere gratuity and the facts do not sustain the action for its breach.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ormond dissented from the majority.23 The inclination of his mind was that the loss and inconvenience which the plaintiff sustained in breaking up and moving to the defendant's, a distance of sixty miles, is a sufficient consideration to support the promise to furnish her with a house and land to cultivate until she could raise her family.24 Ormond thereby recognized the plaintiff's relocation and resulting detriment as supplying the consideration that rendered the promise enforceable, diverging from the majority's conclusion that the promise amounted only to an unenforceable gratuity.25