450 U.S. 455 (1981)
In 1974, Joan Feenstra filed a criminal complaint against her husband Harold Feenstra charging him with molesting their minor daughter.1 While incarcerated on that charge, Harold retained attorney Karl Kirchberg to represent him and signed a $3,000 promissory note for legal services.2 To secure the note, Harold executed a mortgage on the couple's jointly owned home without informing his wife or obtaining her consent, relying on former Article 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code.3
After Joan dropped the charge, Harold obtained a legal separation and moved out of state.4 Joan first learned of the mortgage in 1976 when Kirchberg threatened foreclosure unless she paid the outstanding amount on the note.5 Upon her refusal to pay, Kirchberg obtained an order of executory process directing the local sheriff to seize and sell the home.6
Kirchberg filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not liable under the Truth in Lending Act for nondisclosures regarding the mortgage.7 In her answer, Joan asserted counterclaims including one challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme allowing her husband to execute the mortgage unilaterally.8 The State of Louisiana and its Governor were joined as third-party defendants on the constitutional counterclaim.9
The District Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional counterclaim.10 While Joan's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was pending, the Louisiana Legislature revised its community property laws to grant spouses equal control over the disposition of such property, with the changes effective January 1, 1980. The Court of Appeals held that Article 2404 violated the Equal Protection Clause but limited its decision to prospective application.11 Only Kirchberg appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.12
Whether former Article 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which granted a husband as head and master the unilateral right to dispose of community property without his wife's consent, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?13
Gender-based discrimination is unconstitutional absent a showing that the classification substantially furthers an important governmental interest.14 The absence of an insurmountable barrier will not redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory law.15 The burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an exceedingly persuasive justification for the challenged classification.16
Yes. Article 2404 explicitly discriminated on the basis of gender by granting husbands exclusive control over the disposition of community property.17 In 1974 Joan Feenstra filed a criminal complaint against her husband Harold Feenstra charging him with molesting their minor daughter.18 While incarcerated on that charge, Harold retained attorney Karl Kirchberg to represent him.19
He signed a $3,000 promissory note for legal services.20 To secure the note Harold executed a mortgage on the couple's jointly owned home without informing Joan or obtaining her consent relying on former Article 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code.21 After Joan dropped the charge Harold obtained a legal separation and moved out of state.22 Joan first learned of the mortgage in 1976 when Kirchberg threatened foreclosure unless she paid the outstanding amount on the note.
Upon her refusal Kirchberg obtained an order of executory process directing the local sheriff to seize and sell the home.23 Kirchberg filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not liable under the Truth in Lending Act for nondisclosures regarding the mortgage. In her answer Joan asserted counterclaims including one challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme allowing her husband to execute the mortgage unilaterally.24 The State of Louisiana and its Governor were joined as third-party defendants on the constitutional counterclaim.
The District Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional counterclaim. While Joan's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was pending the Louisiana Legislature revised its community property laws to grant spouses equal control over the disposition of such property with the changes effective January 1 1980. The Court of Appeals held that Article 2404 violated the Equal Protection Clause but limited its decision to prospective application. Only Kirchberg appealed to the Supreme Court which noted probable jurisdiction.25
Appellant Kirchberg offered no justification for the classification.26 The State by declining to appeal abandoned any claim that an important governmental interest was served by the statute.27 The facts show Harold Feenstra executed the mortgage on the jointly owned home without Joan's knowledge or consent pursuant to the statute.28 Because the classification was not shown to substantially further an important governmental objective the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.29
Former Article 2404 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stewart concurred in the result.31 He agreed that men and women were similarly situated for all relevant purposes with respect to the management and disposition of community property.32 Therefore Article 2404 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33
He noted that while the judgment of the Court of Appeals applied to the particular mortgage executed by Mr. Feenstra, the court's explicit announcement that its holding was to apply only prospectively means that no other mortgage executed before the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals is invalid by reason of its decision.34
Whether the Court of Appeals' prospective ruling on the constitutionality of Article 2404 applied to the mortgage executed by Harold Feenstra in 1974?35
The only question properly before the Court is whether the decision of the Court of Appeals applies to the mortgage in this case and on that issue there is no ambiguity.36 The dispute between the parties at its core involves the validity of a single mortgage and in passing on the constitutionality of Article 2404 the Court of Appeals clearly intended to resolve that controversy adversely to appellant.37
Yes. The dispute between the parties arose from appellant's attempt to foreclose on the mortgage he held on the Feenstra home.38 The counterclaim asserted by Mrs. Feenstra specifically sought declaratory judgment that the mortgage executed on her home by her husband is void as having been executed and recorded without her consent pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute.39 The Court of Appeals' prospective language addressed other mortgages but the ruling was intended to resolve the validity of the 1974 mortgage in this case adversely to Kirchberg.40
The Court of Appeals' prospective ruling applies to the mortgage executed by Harold Feenstra in 1974.41