141 U.S.App.D.C. 370, 439 F.2d 477
Sarah B. Kline moved into the apartment building at 1500 Massachusetts Avenue in October 1959.1 The building contained approximately 585 individual apartment units and featured a main entrance on Massachusetts Avenue along with side entrances on 15th and 16th Streets.2
At the time Kline signed her initial lease, a doorman was stationed at the main entrance twenty-four hours a day, an employee manned a desk in the lobby at all times, two garage attendants observed the 15th Street entrance, and the 16th Street entrance was locked after 9:00 P.M.3
By mid-1966 the security measures had been reduced substantially.4 The main entrance no longer had a doorman, the lobby desk was left unattended much of the time, the 15th Street entrance was generally unguarded, and the 16th Street entrance was often left unlocked throughout the night.5
During this period the number of assaults, larcenies, and robberies committed against tenants in the common hallways increased.6 The landlord received notice of these incidents, and Kline herself had urged the landlord to improve security before the events at issue.7
On November 17, 1966, at approximately 10:15 P.M., Kline was criminally assaulted and robbed by an intruder in the common hallway just outside her first-floor apartment.8 This attack occurred only two months after another female tenant, Leona Sullivan, had been similarly assaulted in the same area.9
The District Court ruled as a matter of law that the landlord owed no duty to protect tenants from criminal acts by third parties.10 Kline appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which heard argument on April 10, 1970.11
Whether a landlord owes a duty to take steps to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts committed by third parties?12
In this jurisdiction a landlord owes a duty to take reasonable steps to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts committed by third parties in common areas under the landlord's exclusive control, arising from the landlord's control of the premises, the implied obligation in the modern urban lease contract, and the analogy to the innkeeper-guest relationship.13
Yes. The common hallways of the 1500 Massachusetts Avenue building were under the exclusive control of the appellee landlord.14 The risk of criminal assault and robbery in those hallways was entirely predictable because assaults, larcenies, and robberies had been occurring with mounting frequency over several months immediately prior to the incident, and the landlord had both actual and constructive notice of these crimes.15 Kline herself had urged the landlord to take steps to secure the building.16
Prevention or minimization of this risk lay almost entirely within the power of the landlord, as no individual tenant could guard garage entrances, patrol common hallways and elevators, or install building-wide security systems.17
The landlord owed a duty of protection to the tenant in this urban multiple unit apartment dwelling.18
Related opinions on this issue
Circuit Judge MacKinnon dissents because the record fails to establish repeated assaults and robberies in the hallways or landlord notice of assaults.19 Of the twenty police reports, only one involved an assault and robbery.20 That single incident occurred two months earlier on September 6, 1966.21
The plaintiff failed to prove actual or constructive notice to the landlord of the assault.22 MacKinnon also finds no proof that any alleged deficiency in security was the proximate cause of Kline's assault, since the evidence did not negate the possibility that a tenant or guest committed the offense.23 He concludes that the majority overstates the facts favorable to the tenant and applies too strict a standard of responsibility to the landlord.24
Whether the standard of care in judging a landlord's fulfillment of any duty of protection is the relative degree of security the landlord provided when the tenant first became a resident?25
The standard of care is reasonable care in all the circumstances, measured by the degree of protection the landlord himself was employing when the tenant first became a resident on the premises.26
Yes. The tenant was led to expect that she could rely upon the degree of protection in place in October 1959 when she signed her initial lease.27 The landlord drastically reduced those protective measures by mid-1966 while the risk of criminal attack increased.28 Evidence of the custom among landlords of similar buildings was improperly excluded at trial, but the landlord's own prior practice supplies the benchmark for reasonable care.29
The standard of care is the relative degree of security the landlord provided in 1959.30
Related opinions on this issue
Circuit Judge MacKinnon further dissents that the plaintiff failed to prove the prevailing security standard for similar apartments in the community at the time of the assault.31 The transcript shows that proffered testimony on custom was largely hearsay and that appellant's counsel waived further efforts after court guidance.32 MacKinnon notes that Kline was her only witness on the point and had personal knowledge of practices at only one other building.33
He also rejects any contractual basis for expecting the 1959 level of protection because the original lease had ended and the 1966 tenancy was month to month with no evidence of altered security during the current month.34
Whether the landlord breached any applicable duty of protection toward the tenant in this case?35
A landlord breaches the duty of protection when it reduces security measures despite notice of an increasing and predictable risk of criminal assault in areas under its exclusive control, and that risk materializes to the tenant's injury.36
Yes. The landlord reduced security at the main entrance, lobby desk, 15th Street entrance, and 16th Street entrance despite mounting crimes in the common hallways of which it had notice.37 The predictable risk materialized when Kline was assaulted and robbed in the hallway just outside her apartment.38 The landlord therefore breached the duty measured by the 1959 standard of care.39
The landlord breached its duty of protection toward the tenant.40