22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961)
Six cases involving claims against tavern operators were consolidated in the superior court of Cook County.1 Each case raised questions of liability under the Liquor Control Act and common law, with three also involving the Wrongful Death Act.2 The trial court dismissed various counts for failure to state a cause of action and certified the matters for appeal due to constitutional questions presented.3
In the Knierim case, the complaint alleged that the defendant Izzo, while intoxicated, murdered the plaintiff's husband.4 The plaintiff further alleged that Izzo had threatened to kill her husband, causing her great mental anguish and nervous exhaustion without any resulting physical injury or disability.5 Counts in the Knierim complaint sought recovery under the Wrongful Death Act, for loss of consortium, and for the mental anguish.6
The other consolidated cases, including Thompson v. Baade, Lillie v. McNulty, Finley v. Dakin Liquors, Rogers v. The Tiffin Angler’s Club, and Coleman v. Albrecht, involved similar claims by plaintiffs against tavern operators for injuries or deaths related to intoxication.7 Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX and X of the Finley complaint, counts III and IV of the Coleman complaint, count II of the Rogers complaint, and count II of the Lillie complaint were dismissed by the trial court.8
The matters came before the Supreme Court of Illinois after the trial court's judgments of dismissal, with the court addressing the counts at issue across the consolidated appeals.9
Whether, in addition to the remedy provided in section 14 of article VI of the Liquor Control Act, there exists a civil action for violation of section 12 of article VI or a common-law action against tavern operators who supply intoxicating liquor?10
Section 14 of article VI of the Liquor Control Act provides the only civil remedy against tavern operators and owners of tavern premises for injuries to person, property or means of support by an intoxicated person or in consequence of intoxication.11 The original Dram Shop Act created a remedy unknown to the common law.12 The legislature's creation of a limited statutory remedy precludes recognition of additional actions under section 12 or at common law.13
No. The court held that section 14 supplies the exclusive remedy because the statute created a new cause of action unknown at common law and the constitution does not require recognition of additional remedies once the legislature has acted.14 The same exclusivity bars any attempt to plead a common-law action based on knowledge that the consumer lacked volition with respect to drinking.15 The six consolidated cases raised claims against tavern operators under both the Liquor Control Act and common law.16 The trial court dismissed counts I, II, III, IV and VI in Knierim, I and III in Thompson, II in Lillie, V through XII in Finley, II in Rogers, and III and IV in Coleman that purported to rely on section 12 or common-law liability.17
The Supreme Court affirmed those dismissals on the ground that section 14 alone governs such claims.18 The trial court certified the constitutional questions presented by these dismissals and the Supreme Court reviewed them directly.19
No additional civil action exists under section 12 or at common law; section 14 of the Liquor Control Act supplies the exclusive remedy against tavern operators.20
Whether an action can be maintained under the Wrongful Death Act against tavern operators and owners of tavern premises for death caused by an intoxicated person or in consequence of intoxication?21
The Liquor Control Act creates a distinct right of action in the personal representative for the exclusive benefit of persons injured in their means of support, with a $20,000 limit, different beneficiaries, and no presumption of loss.22 The Wrongful Death Act provides a new cause of action for pecuniary loss to the widow and next of kin with a $30,000 limit and a presumption of loss for lineal kin.23 Because the General Assembly carefully limited the dram-shop remedy, the Wrongful Death Act neither supplants nor supplements it.24
No. The court compared the two statutes and concluded that differences in beneficiaries, measure of damages, basis of liability, and maximum recovery demonstrate that the legislature did not intend the Wrongful Death Act to expand or replace the Liquor Control Act remedy.25 Count I of the Thompson complaint and count XII of the Finley complaint sought recovery under the Wrongful Death Act against tavern operators.26 The trial court dismissed those counts.2728 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissals.29
Counts I and II of the Knierim complaint were likewise properly dismissed as to the tavern operators on the same ground.30 Three of the six consolidated cases raised Wrongful Death Act questions.31 The court held that the Liquor Control Act alone governs death claims arising from intoxication.32
An action cannot be maintained under the Wrongful Death Act against tavern operators for death caused by an intoxicated person; the Liquor Control Act supplies the exclusive remedy.33
Whether mental disturbance not resulting in any physical injury or disability constitutes an injury to person within the meaning of section 14 of article VI of the Liquor Control Act?34
Mental anguish, disgrace, and loss of society do not constitute an injury to person within the meaning of section 14.35 The court cannot enlarge the classification of actionable injuries under the act through statutory construction when the legislature has not done so in numerous amendments since the early decisions holding such harms noncompensable.36
No. Early Illinois cases established that mental suffering alone falls outside the statutory term injury to person.37 Subsequent legislative silence confirms that the classification remains unchanged.38 Count VI of the Knierim complaint sought recovery under section 14 for mental disturbance without physical injury or disability arising from the murder of the plaintiff’s husband.39 The trial court dismissed the count.40
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.41 Recognition of mental disturbance as an injury to person would improperly expand the statute.42 The Knierim complaint specifically alleged great mental anguish and nervous exhaustion without physical consequences.43 The court refused to reinterpret the act to cover such harm.44
Mental disturbance not resulting in physical injury or disability does not constitute an injury to person under section 14 of the Liquor Control Act.45
Whether a widow can maintain an action for damage to her property under the Liquor Control Act because she has depleted her own funds to support herself and her daughter during a period when her husband was habitually intoxicated?46
When a widow depletes her own funds to support herself and her child because her husband failed to provide support while habitually intoxicated, the resulting damage to property is caused by the absence of support.47 The claim must be treated as an action for loss of support rather than damage to property under the Liquor Control Act.48
No. The court reasoned that the true gravamen of the claim is loss of support, not independent property damage.49 Therefore the count is merely duplicative of a pending loss-of-support count.50 Count XI of the Finley complaint alleged that the widow had depleted her own funds to support herself and her daughter while her husband was habitually intoxicated.51 The trial court dismissed the count as an improper property-damage claim.52
The Supreme Court affirmed.53 It recharacterized the claim as one for loss of support already covered by another pending count in the same complaint.54 The Finley case was one of the six consolidated appeals.55 The dismissal rested on this recharacterization.56
A widow cannot maintain a separate property-damage action under the Liquor Control Act for funds spent supporting herself and her child during the husband’s intoxication; the claim is properly treated as one for loss of support.57
Whether a widow can maintain an action for loss of consortium against a defendant who wrongfully caused the death of her husband?58
An action under the Wrongful Death Act is a new cause of action for pecuniary loss to the widow and next of kin that already protects the family unit through a presumption of loss for lineal kin.59 The differences between a loss-of-consortium claim and the statutory pecuniary-loss action are not sufficiently significant to warrant recognition of an additional common-law remedy.60
No. The court distinguished Dini v. Naiditch, where loss of consortium was allowed because the husband’s personal-injury action did not protect the marital relationship, from the death context where the Wrongful Death Act itself supplies that protection.61 In counts III and IV of the Knierim complaint the plaintiff sought damages for loss of consortium against Izzo after he murdered her husband while intoxicated.62 The trial court dismissed those counts. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal as to the consortium claim because the differences between such an action and the statutory remedy are not sufficiently significant to warrant recognition of an additional common-law remedy.63
The Wrongful Death Act already affords adequate relief.64 The Knierim complaint alleged the murder while intoxicated in counts I and II, which proceeded under the Wrongful Death Act.65 The court refused to add a separate consortium action.66
A widow cannot maintain a separate action for loss of consortium when the Wrongful Death Act provides a remedy for the death of her husband.67
Whether a widow can maintain an action against the murderer of her husband for great mental anguish and nervous exhaustion that resulted from the defendant’s threat to kill her husband and the fulfillment of the threat?68
One who intentionally causes severe emotional distress by conduct wholly lacking in social utility is liable for the resulting mental suffering and nervous exhaustion even without physical injury.69 Peace of mind is an interest the law protects against intentional invasion of this character.70 The reasons historically advanced for denying recovery have lost their force.71
Yes. The court examined the policy arguments against recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress.72 It rejected them in light of modern understanding of psychosomatic effects and jury competence.73 The court concluded that outrageous conduct calculated to cause severe distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities states a cause of action.74
Counts III and IV of the Knierim complaint alleged that Izzo threatened to murder the plaintiff’s husband.75 He fulfilled the threat while intoxicated.76 He thereby intentionally caused the plaintiff great mental anguish and nervous exhaustion without physical injury.77 The Supreme Court held that these allegations state a valid cause of action against Izzo.78
The Knierim complaint specifically pleaded the threat and its execution.79 The court reversed the dismissal of counts III and IV as to Izzo to the extent they sought compensatory damages for the emotional distress.80
A widow can maintain an action against the murderer of her husband for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress resulting from the threat and its fulfillment.81
Whether a request for punitive damages is proper in an action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress?82
Because the outrageous quality of the defendant’s conduct forms the very basis of the action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, an award of compensatory damages already serves a punitive function.83 Therefore punitive damages may not be recovered as an additional element of damages.84
No. The court reasoned that the conduct giving rise to liability is itself so extreme that compensatory damages suffice to punish and deter.85 A separate punitive award would be duplicative.86 Counts III and IV of the Knierim complaint sought punitive damages against Izzo for the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the threat and murder of the plaintiff’s husband.87 The Supreme Court held that the request for punitive damages must be stricken even though the compensatory claim survives.88
The trial court dismissed the counts in their entirety as to Izzo.89 The Supreme Court reversed only in part.90 It directed that the punitive-damages portions be stricken while allowing the compensatory emotional-distress claim to proceed.91
A request for punitive damages is not proper in an action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress because compensatory damages already serve a punitive purpose.92