395 U.S. 621, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 23 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1969)
In 1965, Morris Kramer, a 31-year-old college-educated stockbroker, lived in his parents' home in Union Free School District No. 15.1 He attempted to register to vote in the district's annual school board election but was rejected.2 New York Education Law § 2012 applies only in districts that elect school boards at annual meetings.3 It restricts eligibility to otherwise qualified residents who either own or lease taxable real property located in the district, are the spouse of such a person, or are the parent or guardian of a child enrolled for a specified time in a local district school.4
The district maintains significant local control over school operations.5 This control includes prescribing courses of study, determining textbooks, approving the school budget submitted by the board, and authorizing taxes for teachers' salaries and other expenses.6 New York law provides three basic methods of school board selection.7 In some large city districts the board is appointed by the mayor or city council.8 In some cities, primarily those with less than 125,000 residents, the board is elected at general or municipal elections open to all qualified city voters.9 In primarily rural and suburban districts such as Union Free School District No. 15, the board is elected at an annual meeting of qualified school district voters, and those voters also pass directly on other matters such as the school budget and taxes for school purposes.10
After the school district rejected his application, Kramer filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging the constitutionality of the voter eligibility requirements.11 The district court denied his request for a three-judge court and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.12 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for convening of a three-judge court.13 On remand the three-judge court upheld the statute and dismissed the complaint.14 Kramer filed a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.15
Whether New York Education Law § 2012 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying the franchise in school district elections to otherwise qualified residents who neither own nor lease taxable real property in the district and have no children enrolled in the local public schools?16
When a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.17 Statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of representative society.18 Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs undermines the legitimacy of representative government.19 The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given rational classifications in other types of enactments are not applicable to statutes which deny some residents the right to vote.20
Yes. Kramer, a 31-year-old college-educated stockbroker who lived in his parents' home in Union Free School District No. 15, attempted to register to vote in the district's annual school board election but was rejected under New York Education Law § 2012 despite meeting the unchallenged requirements of citizenship, age, and residency.21 The statute restricts eligibility to otherwise qualified residents who own or lease taxable real property, are the spouse of such a person, or are the parent or guardian of a child enrolled in a local district school.22 The state asserts an interest in limiting the franchise to those primarily interested in school affairs, specifically property taxpayers and parents of enrolled children, because the district maintains significant local control over operations including prescribing courses of study, determining textbooks, approving the school budget, and authorizing taxes for teachers' salaries and other expenses.23
Yet the classifications permit inclusion of many persons who have at best a remote and indirect interest in school affairs.24 They exclude others such as Kramer who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions.25 The requirements of § 2012 are not sufficiently tailored to limiting the franchise to those primarily interested in school affairs to justify the denial of the franchise to Kramer and members of his class.26 The need for exacting judicial scrutiny arises because the statute selectively distributes the franchise among residents otherwise qualified by age and citizenship.27 The deference usually given to legislative judgment does not extend to decisions concerning which resident citizens may participate in the election of public officials.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that the traditional rational basis test governs this limited-purpose election rather than any exacting scrutiny standard.31 He reasoned that New York may rationally conclude that parents of school children and owners or lessees of taxable real property possess the most direct stake in school district fiscal decisions funded by property taxes.32 Stewart stressed that the appellant remains free to vote in all general elections for the state legislature that enacted the voting qualifications, so no self-perpetuating exclusion from the political process exists.33
He concluded that the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and therefore satisfies equal protection under any standard short of mandating universal suffrage in every special-purpose election.34