456 U.S. 461, 481-482 (1982)
Rubin Kremer emigrated from Poland in 1970 and was hired in 1973 by Chemical Construction Corp. as an engineer.1 Two years later he was laid off along with several other employees.2 Some of those employees were later rehired, but Kremer was not despite making several applications.3
In May 1976 Kremer filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission asserting that his discharge and failure to be rehired were due to his national origin and Jewish faith.4 Because the EEOC may not consider a claim until a state agency has had at least sixty days to resolve the matter, the Commission referred Kremer's charge to the New York State Division of Human Rights.5 After investigating the complaint the NYHRD concluded that there was no probable cause to believe that Chemico had engaged in the discriminatory practices complained of, explicitly basing its determination on findings that Kremer was not rehired because one employee who was rehired had greater seniority, that another employee who was rehired filled a lesser position, and that neither Kremer's creed nor age was a factor.6
The NYHRD's determination was upheld by its Appeal Board as not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.7 On December 6, 1977 Kremer filed a petition with the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court to set aside the adverse administrative determination.8 On February 27, 1978 five justices of the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Appeal Board's order.9 Kremer could have sought but did not seek review by the New York Court of Appeals.10
Subsequently a District Director of the EEOC ruled that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the charge of discrimination was true and issued a right-to-sue notice.11 Kremer then brought this Title VII action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York claiming discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion.12 Chemico moved to dismiss on res judicata grounds.13 The District Court initially denied the motion but later dismissed the complaint after the Second Circuit extended its precedent to Title VII cases.14 The Court of Appeals refused to depart from the Sinicropi precedent and rejected petitioner's claim that Sinicropi should not be applied retroactively.15 A motion for rehearing en banc was denied.16
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals on whether a state court judgment affirming an administrative finding of no discrimination bars a subsequent federal Title VII action.17
Whether a federal court in a Title VII employment discrimination action must give preclusive effect to a state court judgment affirming an administrative agency's determination that an employer did not discriminate against the complainant?18
Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged.19 Title VII does not create an exception to this rule because neither its text nor its legislative history manifests a clear congressional intent to repeal the statute.20
Yes. The Appellate Division's affirmance of the NYHRD determination constitutes a final judgment under New York law that would preclude relitigation of the same claim in New York courts.21 The established facts show that Kremer filed his complaint with the NYHRD, received an investigation and no-probable-cause determination based on specific findings about seniority and lack of discriminatory motive, obtained affirmance by the Appeals Board, and then secured unanimous affirmance by five justices of the Appellate Division after filing a petition for review.22 These proceedings produced a judgment entitled to preclusive effect in New York.23
Title VII supplies no express or implied repeal of section 1738.24 Therefore the federal district court was required to dismiss the subsequent Title VII action on res judicata grounds.25
A federal court must give preclusive effect to the state court judgment affirming the administrative finding of no discrimination.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun dissented on the ground that Title VII's text and history demonstrate that state proceedings receive only substantial weight rather than preclusive effect.27 He emphasized that the statute expressly contemplates federal de novo suits after termination of state proceedings.28 The deferential arbitrary-and-capricious review performed by the New York Appellate Division does not constitute a merits adjudication capable of barring a later federal claim.29
Congress made clear that state agency findings would not prevent a Title VII complainant from filing suit in federal court.30 The majority's rule effectively nullifies this statutory design by treating judicial affirmance of an agency decision as preclusive.31
Justice Stevens dissented separately.32 He stressed that New York judicial review under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard merely confirms that a rational agency could have reached either result.33 Therefore the review does not resolve the underlying discrimination issue in a manner that triggers section 1738 preclusion for a subsequent de novo Title VII trial.34
The character of the judicial review determines whether preclusion applies.35 Because the review is not equivalent to a de novo trial on the merits, the state judgment cannot bar the federal claim.36
Whether Congress intended Title VII to create an exception to the full faith and credit requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738?37
An exception to section 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal.38 The intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.39 The relationship of Title VII to section 1738 does not fall within either category of implied repeal. The statutes are not in irreconcilable conflict, and Title VII does not cover the whole subject of the earlier statute.40
No. The established facts reveal that Congress structured Title VII to require initial deferral to state agencies for sixty days and directed the EEOC to give substantial weight to state findings.41 Yet the statute nowhere states that a final state court judgment loses its ordinary preclusive force.42 Legislative history from both 1964 and 1972 confirms that Congress was aware of existing state fair-employment schemes, including New York's, and chose to integrate rather than displace them.43 Statements by Senators Javits and Williams expressly invoked res judicata principles to avoid repetitive litigation.44
No clear and manifest intent to repeal section 1738 appears in the text or history.45 The general full-faith-and-credit command continues to apply to state court judgments reviewing employment-discrimination claims.46
Congress did not intend Title VII to create an exception to the full faith and credit requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.47
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun dissented, contending that the legislative history of both the 1964 Act and the 1972 amendments shows Congress repeatedly rejected proposals that would have made state remedies exclusive.48 Congress instead preserved an independent federal cause of action even after state proceedings concluded.49 He argued that the majority's reading effectively nullifies the statutory command that state findings receive only substantial weight.50
The plain language of sections 706(b) and 706(c) contemplates that termination of state proceedings does not foreclose a federal suit.51 The Court should accept that all state proceedings receive substantial weight, not preclusive effect.52
Whether the state administrative and judicial proceedings satisfied the minimum procedural requirements of due process so as to qualify for preclusive effect?53
State proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law.54 The New York procedures, which afford a full opportunity to present evidence, obtain subpoenas, rebut opposing submissions, and obtain judicial review to ensure the agency determination was not arbitrary or capricious, satisfy due process.55
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Kremer received notice and participated in an investigation in which he could submit exhibits and testimony under oath, had an opportunity to rebut the employer's evidence, received assistance of counsel, held the right to subpoena witnesses, obtained review by the Appeals Board after the no-probable-cause finding, and then obtained review by the Appellate Division, which unanimously affirmed.56 These safeguards meet the flexible requirements of due process by providing Kremer a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim before a neutral decision-maker, and the resulting judgment therefore qualifies for preclusive effect under section 1738.57
The state administrative and judicial proceedings satisfied the minimum procedural requirements of due process and therefore qualify for preclusive effect.58
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the New York procedures satisfy bare due process.59 He maintained that Congress intended more robust protection for Title VII claimants than minimal constitutional sufficiency.60 He argued that the limited investigative process and deferential judicial review fall short of the vigorous federal remedy Congress envisioned.61
The Court usurps the role Congress reserved to the EEOC when it decides whether state procedures are adequate.62 Congress wanted discrimination victims to have more than bare due process.63 It wanted the benefit of a vigorous effort to eliminate discrimination.64
Justice Stevens agreed that the procedures were constitutionally adequate.65 He concluded that the narrow scope of New York judicial review prevents the state judgment from carrying preclusive effect on the merits of a federal Title VII claim.66 The judicial review is simply a part of the proceedings that are entitled to substantial weight under Title VII.67
It is entirely consistent with section 1738 for a federal district court to accept the New York judgment as having settled only that a rational adjudicator might have resolved the issue either way.68 The court may then proceed to resolve the discrimination issue in a de novo trial.69