560 U.S. 538 (2010)
On February 21, 2007, Wanda Krupski fractured her femur after tripping over a cable while aboard the cruise ship Costa Magica.1 Krupski’s passenger ticket identified the carrier as Costa Crociere S.p.A., an Italian corporation, along with all vessels it owned, chartered, operated, or marketed, and it separately identified Costa Cruise Lines N.V. as the sales and marketing agent for the carrier.2 The ticket required written notice of any claim within 185 days, filing of any lawsuit within one year, and service within 120 days after filing, with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida designated as the exclusive forum for claims exceeding $75,000.3
On July 2, 2007, Krupski’s counsel notified Costa Cruise Lines of her claims.4 On February 1, 2008, three weeks before the one-year limitations period expired, Krupski filed a negligence action against Costa Cruise in the Southern District of Florida, alleging that Costa Cruise owned, operated, managed, supervised, and controlled the ship.5 She served Costa Cruise on February 4, 2008.6 After the limitations period had expired, Costa Cruise filed its answer on February 25, 2008, stating it was merely the North American sales and marketing agent for Costa Crociere, the actual carrier and vessel operator; it listed Costa Crociere as an interested party in its corporate disclosure statement on March 20, 2008; and it moved for summary judgment on May 6, 2008, again identifying Costa Crociere as the proper defendant.7
On June 13, 2008, Krupski responded to Costa Cruise’s motion for summary judgment, arguing for limited discovery to determine whether Costa Cruise should be dismissed.8 With her response, Krupski simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to add Costa Crociere as a defendant.9 On July 2, 2008, the District Court denied Costa Cruise’s motion without prejudice and granted Krupski leave to amend, ordering service on Costa Crociere by September 16, 2008.10 Krupski filed the amended complaint on July 11, 2008, and served Costa Crociere on August 21, 2008; the same day the District Court dismissed Costa Cruise pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.11
Costa Crociere, represented by the same counsel, moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that it did not relate back.12 The District Court denied relation back.13 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) turns on what the plaintiff knew or should have known about the proper defendant’s identity or on what the prospective defendant knew or should have known?16
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) requires that, within the Rule 4(m) period, the party to be brought in by amendment knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.17 The inquiry focuses on the prospective defendant’s knowledge rather than the plaintiff’s knowledge.18
No. The Court of Appeals focused on Krupski’s knowledge derived from the passenger ticket and concluded she made a deliberate choice rather than a mistake.19 That approach selected the wrong starting point because the Rule inquires into what the prospective defendant Costa Crociere knew or should have known.20 The original complaint described the entity that owned, operated, managed, supervised, and controlled the ship and named Costa Cruise as that entity.21 Costa Crociere therefore should have understood that it was omitted only because of Krupski’s misunderstanding about which Costa entity performed those functions.22
The companies’ close corporate relationship and similar names further support the conclusion that Costa Crociere should have recognized the mistake.23
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) turns on the prospective defendant’s knowledge rather than the plaintiff’s knowledge, so the courts below erred in denying relation back.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion except for its reliance on the Notes of the Advisory Committee as establishing the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C).25 The Advisory Committee’s insights into the proper interpretation of a Rule’s text are useful to the same extent as any scholarly commentary.26 But the Committee’s intentions have no effect on the Rule’s meaning.27
Even assuming that we and the Congress that allowed the Rule to take effect read and agreed with those intentions, it is the text of the Rule that controls.28 This position diverges from the majority by declining to give any special weight to the advisory notes when interpreting the rule.29 Scalia’s bottom line is that he concurs in the judgment based solely on the text of the Rule.30
Whether a plaintiff’s delay in seeking or filing an amendment precludes relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)?31
Rule 15(c)(1) sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation back and mandates relation back once those requirements are satisfied. The amending party’s diligence is not among the listed requirements.32
No. The Rule contains no diligence requirement and leaves no room for equitable discretion once its three conditions are met.33 Krupski’s decision to wait until after receiving Costa Cruise’s summary judgment motion before moving to add Costa Crociere therefore supplies no basis for denying relation back.34 Although a plaintiff’s post-filing conduct may sometimes inform what the prospective defendant reasonably understood about the original mistake, the mere fact of delay does not itself defeat relation back.35
A plaintiff’s delay in seeking or filing an amendment does not preclude relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).36