408 U.S. 1 (1972)
In 1967, following civil disorders in Detroit, Michigan, and disturbances after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, President Johnson ordered federal troops to assist local authorities.1 The Army expanded its contingency planning for such assistance, leading to a data-gathering system that collected information about public activities thought to have potential for civil disorder.2 Information came principally from the news media and publications in general circulation, from Army Intelligence agents who attended meetings open to the public and prepared field reports on sponsoring organizations, speakers, attendance, and any disorder, and from civilian law enforcement agencies.3 Reports went to Army Intelligence headquarters at Fort Holabird, Maryland, were disseminated to major Army posts, and were stored in a computer data bank at Fort Holabird.4
The system operated with field offices staffed by approximately 1,000 agents, 94 percent of whose time was devoted to the organization's principal mission unrelated to domestic surveillance.5 By early 1970 Congress held hearings on the scope of the system before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.6 The Army then reviewed the system and ordered a significant reduction, destroying the records referred to as the "blacklist" and the computer data bank contents along with other related records, while retaining one copy of material relevant to the litigation.7
Respondents filed a class action in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Department of the Army's surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity invaded their rights.8 Petitioners described the activity as gathering by lawful means and maintaining information relating to potential or actual civil disturbances.9 After a combined hearing on respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction and petitioners' motion to dismiss, supported by affidavits and oral argument, the district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding there was no justiciable claim for relief.10
On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered remand for further proceedings.11 It noted that respondents complained of no specific action by the Army against them. The information gathered was no more than a good newspaper reporter could obtain at public meetings and from publications on any newsstand.12 The court identified the issue as whether the present existence of the system of gathering and distributing information constituted an impermissible burden exercising a present inhibiting effect on respondents' First Amendment rights.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether respondents had presented a justiciable controversy.14
Whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity alleged to be broader in scope than reasonably necessary for a valid governmental purpose?15
To entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action.16 Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.17
No. Respondents do not meet this test because their claim is simply that they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the Army needs. The very existence of the Army's data-gathering system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment rights.18 The established facts show that respondents complained of no specific action of the Army against them. The information gathered came from public sources such as news media and open meetings.19
The system was significantly reduced after congressional hearings with the blacklist and computer data bank destroyed. No realistic threats to respondents' rights were alleged beyond speculative apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information.20
The jurisdiction of a federal court may not be invoked by a complainant who alleges only a subjective chilling effect from the mere existence of the governmental investigative and data-gathering activity; the controversy is not justiciable.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that Army surveillance of civilians is none of the Army's constitutional business.22 He argued that the Constitution contains no authority for the military to conduct surveillance over civilians.23 The authority to provide rules governing the Armed Services means the grant of authority to the Armed Services to govern themselves, not the authority to govern civilians.24
Respondents have standing because the surveillance exercises a present inhibiting effect on their First Amendment rights.25 The system involved massive and comprehensive collection through undercover agents infiltrating civilian groups. Reports were regularly circulated to other agencies and stored in data banks.26
This creates a deterrent effect that marks an unconstitutional intrusion.27 One need not wait to sue until losing a job or suffering defamation.28
Joined by Justices Stewart And Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented and agreed with the Court of Appeals that a justiciable controversy exists.29 He concluded that the present existence of the system of gathering and distributing information constitutes an impermissible burden exercising a present inhibiting effect on respondents' First Amendment rights of free speech.30 The case is ripe for adjudication because the evil alleged is overbreadth in collecting information not reasonably relevant to the Army's mission.31
Respondents have standing as they were the subject of Army surveillance reports.32 Respondents are entitled to try to prove their case at trial.33