528 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1976)
On August 30, 1972, a truck shipment of beef arrived at the receiving dock of Armour & Co.'s Syracuse plant where Lambertson, an employee of Armour & Co., was assigned to unload the truck.1 While Lambertson was so engaged, William Boslet, a meat inspector for the United States Department of Agriculture who was on duty at the time, suddenly and without warning jumped him, screaming “boo”, pulled his wool stocking hat over his eyes, and climbed on his back to ride him piggyback.2 As a result, Lambertson fell forward and struck his face on meat hooks located on the receiving dock, which were no more than six inches away from his head, suffering severe injuries to his mouth and teeth.3
It is agreed by all witnesses that the mishap was the result of one-sided horseplay with no intention on Boslet’s part to injure Lambertson.4 Immediately after the incident, Boslet apologized to Lambertson, telling him that he was only playing around and meant no harm.5
Seeking redress for his injuries, Lambertson commenced an action against the United States in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.6 The district court, with Judge Edmund Port presiding, dismissed the action as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).7 Lambertson appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.8
Whether the conduct of the government employee constituted a battery under New York law?9
For the ordinary common-law torts which were uppermost in the collective mind of Congress when the Tort Claims Act was enacted, the law of the place where the act occurred is controlling.10 Under New York law, the intent which is an essential element of the action for battery is the intent to make contact, not to do injury.11 A plaintiff in an action to recover damages for an assault founded on bodily contact must prove only that there was bodily contact, that such contact was offensive, and that the defendant intended to make the contact.12 The plaintiff is not required to prove that defendant intended physically to injure him.13 It is a battery for a man to play a joke upon another which involves a harmful or offensive contact.14
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Boslet intended to make contact with Lambertson.15
Since there is not the remotest suggestion that Boslet’s leap onto plaintiff’s back, his piggy back ride and his use of plaintiff’s hat as a blindfold might have been accidental, the District Court correctly determined that it was a battery under New York law.16
The conduct of the government employee constituted a battery under New York law.17
Whether the plaintiff's claim arises out of an assault or battery so as to fall within the exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)?18
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) excepts from the Federal Tort Claims Act any claims arising out of an assault or battery.19 In determining the applicability of the § 2680(h) exception, a court must look, not to the theory upon which the plaintiff elects to proceed, but rather to the substance of the claim which he asserts.20 To permit plaintiff to recover by dressing up the substance of battery in the garments of negligence would be to judicially admit at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the front door.21
Yes. Lambertson commenced an action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, but the district court dismissed the action as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).22 The substance of the claim is the battery committed by Boslet, as the facts establish the elements of battery under New York law.23 Although the plaintiff alleged that Boslet negligently and/or wrongfully injured him, the court looks to the substance, which is the battery.24
Therefore the claim arises out of a battery and falls within the exception.25
The plaintiff's claim arises out of an assault or battery so as to fall within the exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).26
Related opinions on this issue
Were we writing on a clean slate, a good argument could be made for the proposition that the “battery” exclusion in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) was intended to apply only to cases where bodily harm was intended and not to cases involving a “technical battery.”27 The legislative history of the Federal Tort Claims Act is most unclear.28 We are not bound by any so-called rule of “strict” or “liberal” construction.29
But the weight of authority in our own court as elsewhere is, as Judge Van Graafeiland’s opinion suggests, to the effect that the exclusions in § 2680(h) of the so-called “intentional torts” are to be read in their usual, legalistic sense which in the case of “battery” quite clearly contemplates an “intention of inflicting upon another an offensive but not a harmful bodily contact. . . . ”30 Our own Klein v. United States, 268 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (false arrest not actionable though plaintiff negligently exposed to the elements in course thereof), impels me to the narrow view of governmental liability taken in Judge Van Graafeiland’s opinion.31 Accordingly I concur.32