459 U.S. 116 (1982)
In 1977, Grendel's Den, Inc., which operates a restaurant in the Harvard Square area of Cambridge, Massachusetts, applied to the Cambridge License Commission for an alcoholic beverages license.1 The Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Parish is located adjacent to the restaurant, with the back walls of the two buildings ten feet apart.2
Section 16C of Chapter 138 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides that premises located within a radius of five hundred feet of a church or school shall not be licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages if the governing body of such church or school files written objection thereto.3 Holy Cross Church objected to the application, expressing concern over having so many licenses so near the church.4 The License Commission denied the application, citing only the church's objection.5
On appeal, the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission upheld the denial, finding that the church's objection under Section 16C was the only basis for the denial.6 Grendel's Den then sued the License Commission and the Beverages Control Commission in United States District Court, seeking relief on grounds that Section 16C violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and the Sherman Act.7
The suit was continued pending the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, which upheld the statute.8 The District Court later denied a motion to dismiss and, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held Section 16C unconstitutional on its face under the Due Process and Establishment Clauses while rejecting equal protection claims but finding no antitrust immunity.9
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the District Court on the Due Process and Establishment Clause claims but affirmed the antitrust analysis.10 Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment on Establishment Clause grounds without reaching the due process or antitrust claims.11 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.12
Whether a Massachusetts statute vesting in the governing bodies of churches and schools the power effectively to veto applications for liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?13
A statute withstands Establishment Clause scrutiny only if it satisfies the three-part test requiring a secular legislative purpose, a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and no excessive government entanglement with religion.14 Delegation of discretionary governmental power over liquor licensing to religious institutions breaches the required separation because such power is ordinarily exercised by public agencies guided by standards and evidence.15
Yes. The statute satisfies the first Lemon criterion because its purpose is to protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the hurly-burly associated with liquor outlets, a goal the District Court identified and the Court accepted as valid.16 Yet the second criterion fails when the statute's primary effect is examined against the established facts. Holy Cross Church's written objection alone caused the Cambridge License Commission to deny Grendel's Den's 1977 application.17 The Beverages Control Commission confirmed that the church objection under Section 16C was the sole basis for denial.18 This standardless veto, which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Arno characterized as delegating decisive power to churches, allows religious bodies to determine which applicants receive licenses and thereby confers a direct and substantial benefit on religion within roughly one million square feet of commercially valuable land.19
The third criterion is likewise violated.20 The statute enmeshes churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers by substituting unilateral church decisions for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public body.21 This creates the danger of political fragmentation along religious lines that Lemon condemned.22 The Twenty-first Amendment supplies no shelter, for the State may not exercise its liquor powers in a manner that impinges on the Establishment Clause.23
The statute therefore violates the Establishment Clause on its face, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that Section 16C represents a sensible legislative refinement of an originally absolute ban on liquor outlets near churches and schools, a ban the majority concedes would be constitutional.25 He maintained that the statute does not sponsor or subsidize religious activity, does not compel participation in religion, and cannot fairly be said to advance religion merely because churches may object to incompatible neighboring uses; the same protection could be extended against fire or noise without constitutional difficulty.26 In his view the majority's reliance on the label veto wrenches a single term from the Arno decision and mischaracterizes a practical zoning accommodation as an unconstitutional fusion of governmental and religious functions.27
Whether such a statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?28
A statute that delegates standardless governmental power to private parties may raise due process concerns when it allows arbitrary or unreviewable decisionmaking affecting property interests such as liquor licenses.29
The Court did not reach the question whether the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment solely on Establishment Clause grounds without reaching the due process claim.31 The Supreme Court likewise did not address the due process issue because the Establishment Clause holding fully resolved the case.32
Because the Establishment Clause disposition fully resolves the case, the due process issue remains unaddressed by the Supreme Court.33