83 Cal.App.2d 210, 188 P.2d 513
The accident out of which this action arose occurred on Y-J Day, August 14, 1945.1 Plaintiff, while walking on the sidewalk on Post Street adjoining the St. Francis Hotel just after stepping out from under the marquee, was struck on the head by a heavy, overstuffed armchair.2 She was knocked unconscious and received injuries for which she asked damages from the owners of the hotel.3
Although there were several persons in the immediate vicinity, no one appears to have seen from whence the chair came nor to have seen it before it was within a few feet of plaintiff's head.4 There was no identification of the chair as belonging to the hotel.5 However, it is a reasonable inference that the chair came from some portion of the hotel.6
At the trial, plaintiff, after proving the foregoing facts and the extent of her injuries, rested, relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.7 On motion of defendant the court granted a nonsuit.8 Plaintiff appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal.9
The appeal was heard by Bray, J., with Peters, P.J., and Ward, J., concurring.10
Whether under the circumstances shown, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies?11
For a plaintiff to make out a case entitling him to the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, he must prove three elements.12 First, there was an accident.13 Second, the thing or instrumentality which caused the accident was at the time and prior thereto under the exclusive control and management of the defendant.14 Third, the accident was such that in the ordinary course of events, the defendant using ordinary care, the accident would not have happened.15 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only where the cause of the injury is shown to be under the exclusive control and management of the defendant.16 It can have no application to a case having a divided responsibility where an unexplained accident may have been attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant is not responsible.17
No. Plaintiff proved that she was struck on the head by a heavy, overstuffed armchair.18 This occurred while walking on the sidewalk on Post Street adjoining the St. Francis Hotel just after stepping out from under the marquee on Y-J Day.19 However, the chair was not under the exclusive control of the hotel because guests have at least partial control of the furniture.20 The accident was such that it would quite as likely be due to the fault of a guest or other person as to that of defendants.21 The most logical inference from the circumstances shown is that the chair was thrown by some such person from a window.22
Keeping guests from throwing furniture out windows would require a guard to be placed in every room in the hotel.23 No rule of law requires a hotel to do that.24
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply under the circumstances shown.25
Whether the motion for nonsuit pointed out the precise grounds upon which it was made?26
A motion for a nonsuit must point the attention of the court and counsel to the precise grounds upon which it is made.27
Yes. The motion for nonsuit was made on the ground that there is no evidence from which it might be inferred that the hotel was guilty of any negligence which caused the chair to hit plaintiff.28 It further pointed out that the only evidence attempting to connect the hotel with the accident is the fact that it occurred in the proximity of the hotel, and that such proof is not sufficient to establish liability.29 The motion was therefore sufficient.
The motion for nonsuit pointed out the precise grounds upon which it was made.30
Whether the defendants' answer admitted that they had exclusive control and management of the hotel furniture?31
No. In her complaint plaintiff alleged in paragraph III that the defendant had the right of control and management of the premises described therein.34 In its answer defendants denied all of the allegations of paragraph III.35 Defendants then stated that they operated the St. Francis Hotel at said time as co-partners.36 It is obvious that such an answer does not admit exclusive control and management of the furniture so as to warrant the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.37
The defendants' answer did not admit that they had exclusive control and management of the hotel furniture.38