456 U.S. 228 (1982)
In 1961 Minnesota enacted the Charitable Solicitations Act requiring charitable organizations to register with the Department of Commerce and file annual reports detailing total receipts, management and fundraising costs, and transfers of funds before soliciting contributions from the public.1 From enactment until 1978 the Act exempted all religious organizations from these requirements.2
Effective March 29, 1978 the legislature amended the exemption provision to limit it to religious organizations that received more than half their contributions from members or affiliated organizations.3 Appellees, members of the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in March 1977 against appellants, the Commissioner of Securities and the Attorney General responsible for enforcing the Act.4
The initial complaint alleged that the registration and reporting requirements violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.5 After the 1978 amendment took effect, appellees amended their complaint in November 1978 to allege that the fifty-percent rule, both on its face and as applied to the Unification Church, violated the Establishment Clause.6
Shortly after the amendment's enactment the Department of Commerce notified the Unification Church that it was required to register because it received less than half its funds from members.7 Appellees submitted a declaration from member Haft describing the Church's origin, religious principles, and practices including door-to-door and public-place proselytizing and solicitation of funds.8 The Church had not been required to register prior to the amendment.9
The District Court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment.10 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the fifty-percent rule violated the Establishment Clause on its face, that the exemption should apply to all religious organizations subject to proof of status, and that further proceedings were needed on the as-applied claim.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether appellees have standing to raise their Establishment Clause claim?13
Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a distinct and palpable injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.14
Yes. Appellees alleged they are members of the Unification Church which solicits funds from the public and receives less than half its contributions from members.15 This status rendered the Church subject to the 1978 amendment's registration and reporting requirements.16 Appellees further alleged that they and the Church are currently violating those requirements.17
They have been threatened with civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.18 These allegations establish a credible threat of prosecution that chills constitutional rights and therefore constitute injury in fact sufficient for standing.19
Appellees have standing to raise their Establishment Clause claim.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on standing.21 He explained that invalidation of the fifty-percent rule would require the State to shoulder the considerable burden of demonstrating that the Unification Church is not a religious organization if it persists in seeking registration.22 That burden is made heavier by the prima facie evidence already in the record establishing the Church's religious character, together with the disfavor shown toward strict construction of statutory exemptions for religious organizations.23
He therefore agreed that appellees had demonstrated the requisite injury in fact.24 Stevens further observed that reaching the merits was consistent with the orderly administration of justice and the policy of strict necessity in constitutional adjudication, given that a constitutional decision was inevitable regardless of the sequence of issues.25
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice White, And Justice O'connor
Justice Rehnquist dissented on standing.26 He maintained that the injury arises from the general charitable-organization registration requirement of section 309.52 rather than the fifty-percent rule itself.27 Because appellees have never proved that the Unification Church qualifies as a religious organization entitled to any exemption, invalidation of the rule would not redress any injury.28
The enforcement complaint pending in state court relies solely on the Church's status as a charitable organization, and the fifty-percent rule plays no role in that action.29 He concluded that the Court should remand for a determination of the Church's status before addressing the constitutional question, lest it render an advisory opinion in violation of Article III.30
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice White concurred in the judgment on standing while dissenting on the merits.31 He accepted that appellees had alleged sufficient injury from the threatened application of the fifty-percent rule.32 He joined the dissent's view that the rule's invalidation would not ultimately relieve the Church of registration obligations because the State could still proceed under other provisions of the Act.33
White emphasized that the lower courts had applied the overbreadth doctrine and that the factual predicate for standing under the new standard adopted by the majority had not been established below.34
Whether the 1978 amendment to the Minnesota Charitable Solicitations Act, on its face, violates the Establishment Clause?35
When a statute facially differentiates among religious organizations it constitutes a denominational preference that is subject to strict scrutiny and survives only if justified by a compelling governmental interest and closely fitted to further that interest.36
Yes. The 1978 amendment limits the religious-organization exemption to those groups receiving more than half their funds from members or affiliated organizations.37 This draws an explicit distinction among religious organizations based on the source of their contributions.38 That distinction rests on a criterion inherently tied to religious status rather than any neutral secular principle.39
The State failed to demonstrate that the distinction is closely fitted to its interest in preventing abusive solicitation practices.40 It offered no evidence that organizations receiving most funds from nonmembers are more likely to engage in fraud than those funded primarily by members.41
The 1978 amendment violates the Establishment Clause on its face.42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice White concurred in the judgment that the amendment violates the Establishment Clause.43 He would have invalidated the provision because its legislative history revealed a purpose to single out the Unification Church for special regulatory burdens.44 He did not rely on the fifty-percent line failing strict scrutiny.45
Instead, White focused on the legislators' explicit intention to target particular religious organizations, as shown by statements during debate that the rule was designed to reach groups soliciting on streets and in airports.46 He nevertheless agreed that the State's interest in preventing fraud did not justify the denominational preference and therefore concurred in the judgment.47
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice White, And Justice O'connor
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the merits.48 He argued that the fifty-percent rule is a neutral, secular criterion based on the source of funds.49 The rule applies equally to all religious organizations and is rationally related to the State's interest in preventing fraud.50
Rehnquist maintained that the distinction between member-funded and publicly funded organizations reflects a legitimate legislative judgment that member oversight provides built-in safeguards against abuse.51 He concluded that even if the rule created a preference it would survive strict scrutiny because the interest in protecting the public from abusive solicitations is compelling and the registration requirements are closely fitted to that interest.52
Whether the Court of Appeals properly remanded the case for further proceedings on appellees' claim that the 1978 amendment, as applied to them, violated the Establishment Clause?53
When a facial challenge to a statute is resolved, a court may properly remand for consideration of remaining as-applied claims that were not decided below.54
Yes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the facial invalidity of the fifty-percent rule. It remanded for further proceedings on appellees' separate claim that the rule as applied to the Unification Church violated the Establishment Clause.55 The Supreme Court agreed that this as-applied claim should be considered on remand.56 It expressed no view on the merits of that claim.57
The Court of Appeals properly remanded the case for further proceedings on the as-applied claim.58