452 U.S. 18 (1981)
In late spring of 1975, the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina, adjudicated William Everett Lassiter, born in 1975 to petitioner Abby Gail Lassiter, a neglected child after evidence that she had not provided proper medical care, and transferred custody to the respondent Durham County Department of Social Services.1 A year later, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder and began serving a sentence of 25 to 40 years.2 In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights, alleging she had not had contact with the child since December 1975 and had willfully left the child in foster care for more than two years without substantial progress.3
Ms. Lassiter was served with the petition and notice of the August 31, 1978 hearing. Although her mother had retained counsel for her in connection with challenging the murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter did not mention the termination hearing to him.4 At the hearing, the court discussed whether she should have more time to find counsel but concluded she had ample opportunity and proceeded without appointing counsel or inquiring about indigency.5 A social worker testified about the child's medical issues in 1975, lack of contact since then, and that the grandmother was not able to care for the child.6 Ms. Lassiter cross-examined the witness, testified herself, and her mother also testified.7
The court found that Ms. Lassiter had not contacted the Department since December 1975, had not expressed concern for the child's welfare, and had willfully failed to maintain responsibility, and terminated her parental rights.8 On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that appointment of counsel for indigent parents was not constitutionally mandated, and the North Carolina Supreme Court summarily denied review.9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding?11
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding.12 The analytical framework from Mathews v. Eldridge requires balancing the private interest at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government's interest, measured against the presumption that appointed counsel is required only when physical liberty may be lost.13
No. In late spring of 1975, the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina, adjudicated William Everett Lassiter, born in 1975 to petitioner Abby Gail Lassiter, a neglected child after evidence that she had not provided proper medical care, and transferred custody to the respondent Durham County Department of Social Services.14
A year later, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder and began serving a sentence of 25 to 40 years. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights, alleging she had not had contact with the child since December 1975 and had willfully left the child in foster care for more than two years without substantial progress. Ms. Lassiter was served with the petition and notice of the August 31, 1978 hearing.
Although her mother had retained counsel for her in connection with challenging the murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter did not mention the termination hearing to him. At the hearing, the court discussed whether she should have more time to find counsel but concluded she had ample opportunity and proceeded without appointing counsel or inquiring about indigency.
A social worker testified about the child's medical issues in 1975, lack of contact since then, and that the grandmother was not able to care for the child. Ms. Lassiter cross-examined the witness, testified herself, and her mother also testified. The court found that Ms. Lassiter had not contacted the Department since December 1975, had not expressed concern for the child's welfare, and had willfully failed to maintain responsibility, and terminated her parental rights.
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that appointment of counsel for indigent parents was not constitutionally mandated, and the North Carolina Supreme Court summarily denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge factors to these facts shows that the parent's interest is commanding yet the case was not complex, the petitioner had expressly declined assistance of counsel, and the weight of the evidence was such that counsel would not have altered the outcome.15
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding.
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger joined the Court's opinion.16 He wrote separately to emphasize that the decision does not preclude appointment of counsel in every termination proceeding.17 Burger stressed that the purpose of the proceeding was protective of the child's best interests rather than punitive.18
He noted that in cases where the issues are complex or the evidence conflicting, the assistance of counsel may be necessary to ensure fundamental fairness. The trial court should appoint counsel in those circumstances.19 On the facts presented here, however, involving a mother serving a lengthy sentence for murder who showed little interest in her son, the trial court did not err in failing to appoint counsel.20
Burger agreed that the case-by-case determination is the appropriate standard.21
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Blackmun dissented.22 He argued that the termination of parental rights constitutes a drastic and irrevocable deprivation equivalent to a death sentence for the parent-child relationship.23 The private interest at stake is fundamental and commands the highest protection under the Due Process Clause.24
Blackmun contended that the risk of error is great because of the gross imbalance of resources between the State and the uncounseled indigent parent.25 The Mathews v. Eldridge factors therefore require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every termination proceeding.26 He rejected the majority's revival of a case-by-case approach that had been discredited in Gideon v. Wainwright.27
Justice Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.28 He wrote separately to emphasize that the right to counsel in termination proceedings is of constitutional dimension.29 Marshall stressed that the termination of parental rights is a final and irrevocable step that severs the parent-child bond forever.30
The parent possesses a fundamental right to the companionship of her child.31 The State cannot deprive her of that right without due process of law.32 Due process therefore requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every termination proceeding.33
Marshall concluded that the Court's decision denies counsel to those who need it most.34
Justice Stevens dissented.35 He maintained that the reasons supporting the right to counsel in criminal cases apply with equal force to termination proceedings.36 Stevens explained that the deprivation of parental rights is often more grievous than loss of liberty alone because it involves both liberty and property interests.37
The plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment requires due process for both deprivations.38 Fundamental fairness therefore demands appointed counsel regardless of the pecuniary costs to the State.39 He would have held that the value of protecting liberty from deprivation without due process is priceless.40