499 U.S. 439 (1991)
Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act imposes a 4% tax on receipts from the sale of all tangible personal property and specified services.1 The Act exempts receipts from subscription and over-the-counter newspaper sales and subscription magazine sales.2 Before 1987, the Act did not subject cable television or scrambled satellite broadcast television services to the tax.3
In 1987, Arkansas enacted Act 188, which amended the Gross Receipts Act to impose the sales tax on cable television.4 Daniel L. Medlock, a cable television subscriber, Community Communications Co., a cable television operator, and the Arkansas Cable Television Association, Inc., a trade organization composed of approximately 80 cable operators, brought a class action in the Arkansas Chancery Court challenging the extension of the sales tax to cable television services on First Amendment and equal protection grounds.5
The Chancery Court conducted a hearing and trial with extensive testimony and documentary evidence.6 It concluded that cable television's necessary use of public rights-of-way distinguished it for constitutional purposes from other media and upheld the constitutionality of Act 188.7 In 1989, Arkansas adopted Act 769, which extended the sales tax to all other distribution of television, video or radio services with or without the use of wires provided to subscribers or paying customers or users.8
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that cable television services and satellite broadcast services to home dish-antennae owners were substantially the same.9 It held that the sales tax was unconstitutional under the First Amendment for the period during which cable television, but not satellite broadcast services, were subject to the tax.10 Both cable petitioners and the Arkansas Commissioner of Revenues petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted to resolve whether the First Amendment prevents a State from imposing its sales tax on only selected segments of the media.11
Whether the First Amendment prevents a State from imposing its sales tax on only selected segments of the media?12
Differential taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. Absent a compelling justification, the government may not exercise its taxing power to single out the press. A tax is also suspect if it targets a small group of speakers or discriminates on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech.13
No. The Arkansas sales tax is one of general applicability to all tangible personal property and a broad range of services.1415 It does not single out the press or threaten its role as government watchdog.16 There is no indication that Arkansas targeted cable television in a purposeful attempt to interfere with its First Amendment activities.17 The tax reached approximately 100 cable systems then operating in the State, not a narrow group resembling a penalty.18 The statute makes no reference to the content of mass media communications, and cable programming does not differ systematically from that of other media.19
Applying these facts to the governing rule, the tax lacks the suspect features of targeting the press, a small group of speakers, or content-based distinctions.20 The State's extension of its generally applicable sales tax to cable television services alone, or to cable and satellite services, while exempting the print media, therefore does not violate the First Amendment.21
The State's extension of its generally applicable sales tax to cable television services alone, or to cable and satellite services, while exempting the print media, does not violate the First Amendment.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the First Amendment prohibits the State from singling out a particular information medium for heavier tax burdens than are borne by like-situated media.23 He argued that cable television provides information services comparable to those of newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters.24 The differential tax therefore presents the risk of covert censorship by distorting the marketplace of ideas.25
Marshall maintained that the State failed to justify the discrimination with any special characteristic of cable or a compelling interest beyond revenue enhancement.26 He criticized the majority's small-versus-large test as providing no meaningful guidance on the intermedia scope of the nondiscrimination principle and as ignoring the potential for abuse inherent in discriminating based on medium identity.27