404 U.S. 477 (1972)
In 1961 petitioner Lego was convicted of armed robbery following a jury trial in Superior Court, Cook County, Illinois.1 The court sentenced him to prison for twenty-five to fifty years.2 The evidence introduced against him at trial included a confession he had made to police after arrest and while in custody at the station house.3
Prior to trial Lego sought to have the confession suppressed on the ground that he had not made it voluntarily.4 At the suppression hearing conducted out of the presence of the jury, Lego testified that police had beaten him about the head and neck with a gun butt.5 His explanation was that the local police chief, a neighbor and former classmate of the robbery victim, had sought revenge upon him.6 Lego introduced into evidence a photograph taken of him at the county jail on the day after his arrest that showed his face swollen with traces of blood.7
The police chief and four officers also testified.8 They denied either beating or threatening Lego or knowing that any other officer had done so.9 The trial judge resolved this credibility problem in favor of the police and ruled the confession admissible.10 At trial Lego testified in his own behalf.11 He told his version of the events at the police station although he did not dispute the truth of the confession directly.12
The trial judge instructed the jury as to the prosecution's burden of proving guilt.13 He did not instruct that the jury was required to find the confession voluntary before it could be used in judging guilt or innocence.14 On direct appeal the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.15 Four years later Lego challenged his conviction by seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.16
He maintained that the trial judge should have found the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before admitting it into evidence.17 In the alternative he argued that the voluntariness question should also have been submitted to the jury for its separate consideration.18 After first denying the writ for failure to exhaust state remedies, the District Court granted a rehearing motion, concluded that Lego had no state remedy then available to him, and denied relief on the merits.19 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of the standard of proof required at a voluntariness hearing.21
Whether the prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt before the confession may be admitted into evidence at trial?22
When a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against a criminal defendant at his trial, he is entitled to a reliable and clear-cut determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily rendered.23 The prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.24
No. The purpose of a voluntariness hearing is to safeguard the right of an individual not to be compelled to condemn himself by his own utterances, entirely apart from his guilt or innocence.2526 It is not designed to implement the presumption of innocence or enhance the reliability of jury verdicts under In re Winship.27 Lego challenged his confession at a suppression hearing.28 He testified that police had beaten him and introduced a photograph showing his swollen face with traces of blood.29
The police chief and four officers denied any beating or threat.30 The trial judge resolved this credibility problem in favor of the police and ruled the confession admissible under Illinois law requiring only a preponderance finding.31 The confession was then introduced at Lego's armed robbery trial.32
The Constitution does not require that the voluntariness of a confession be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before it may be admitted into evidence.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the rationale of Jackson v. Denno requires the reasonable-doubt standard at a voluntariness hearing.34 The factual nature of the typical credibility conflict between defendant and officers makes the standard of persuasion controlling in many instances.35 When the question before the factfinder is whether to believe one or the other of two self-serving accounts of what has happened, the standard of persuasion will in many instances be of controlling significance.36
The Fifth Amendment command against compelled self-incrimination reflects society's determination that it is worse to permit involuntary self-condemnation than to deprive a jury of probative evidence.37
Whether the Constitution requires that the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional grounds, including confessions, be determined beyond a reasonable doubt?38
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment has long been excluded.39 No substantial evidence has accumulated that federal rights have suffered from determining admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.40 The values served by exclusionary rules do not themselves require a stricter standard of proof for admissibility.41
No. Although exclusionary rules serve independent values apart from enhancing verdict reliability, such as deterring lawless police conduct, merely emphasizing those values is insufficient to demonstrate that the Constitution requires admissibility to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.4243 Experience over many years shows that preponderance rulings have not rendered admissibility determinations unreliable.44 Lego's habeas petition argued that the trial judge should have found the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before admitting it.45 The District Court and Seventh Circuit denied relief on the merits after the state trial judge had already applied the preponderance standard at the suppression hearing where conflicting testimony about the alleged beating was presented.46
The Constitution does not require that the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional grounds be determined beyond a reasonable doubt.47
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that permitting proof by a preponderance of the evidence will necessarily result in the admission of more involuntary confessions than would occur under a higher standard.48 The same considerations that demand the reasonable-doubt standard when guilt or innocence is at stake also demand that standard when the question is the admissibility of an allegedly involuntary confession.49 Compelled self-incrimination is so alien to the American sense of justice that society must insist the prosecution prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.50
Whether a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury decide the voluntariness of his confession even after the trial judge has ruled the confession admissible?51
No. The trial judge's determination after a full hearing provides the reliable and clear-cut determination required by Jackson v. Denno.5455 The orthodox rule under which the judge solely and finally determines voluntariness remains constitutionally valid.56 The trial judge conducted the suppression hearing outside the jury's presence.57 He resolved the credibility dispute between Lego's testimony and the officers' denials in favor of the police.58
He ruled the confession admissible.59 The judge instructed the jury only on the prosecution's burden of proving guilt without requiring the jury to find the confession voluntary before using it.60 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal.61
A criminal defendant is not entitled to have the jury decide the voluntariness of his confession after the trial judge has ruled the confession admissible.62