463 U.S. 248 (1983)
Jessica M. was born out of wedlock on November 9, 1976.1 Her mother, Lorraine Robertson, married Richard Robertson eight months later.2 Jonathan Lehr, who claims to be Jessica's natural father, visited Lorraine and Jessica in the hospital at the time of the birth but did not live with them afterward, did not provide financial support, and is not named on the birth certificate.3 On December 21, 1978, when Jessica was over two years old, the Robertsons filed an adoption petition in the Family Court of Ulster County, New York.4
The Ulster County Family Court examined the state's putative father registry before entering the adoption order and found that Lehr had not registered.5 The court also determined that Lehr did not fall into any of the other categories of putative fathers entitled to notice under New York law, such as those adjudicated as fathers or identified on the birth certificate.6 On March 7, 1979, the court entered the order of adoption.7
One month after the adoption proceeding began, on January 30, 1979, Lehr filed a petition for paternity, support, and visitation in the Westchester County Family Court.8 Notice of this petition was served on Lorraine on February 22, 1979.9 Lehr first learned of the pending adoption on March 3, 1979, when he received notice of a motion to change venue of his paternity proceeding to Ulster County.10 His attorney contacted the Ulster County judge on March 7, 1979, but learned that the adoption order had already been signed that day.11
Lehr's paternity petition was later dismissed by the Westchester court.12 On June 22, 1979, he filed a petition to vacate the adoption order, which the Ulster County Family Court denied after receiving argument.13 The Appellate Division affirmed the denial, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote.14 The Supreme Court of the United States granted review of Lehr's constitutional claims.15
Whether New York has sufficiently protected an unmarried father's inchoate relationship with a child whom he has never supported and rarely seen in the two years since her birth?16
The Due Process Clause protects developed parent-child relationships but requires only that states provide adequate procedures to safeguard a putative father's opportunity to develop such a relationship when the biological link remains inchoate.17 New York's registry and categorical notice provisions satisfy due process when the father has not established a substantial relationship and the opportunity to register lies entirely within his control.18
Yes. Jessica M. was born out of wedlock on November 9, 1976. Her mother, Lorraine Robertson, married Richard Robertson eight months later. Jonathan Lehr, who claims to be Jessica's natural father, visited Lorraine and Jessica in the hospital at the time of the birth but did not live with them afterward, did not provide financial support, and is not named on the birth certificate. On December 21, 1978, when Jessica was over two years old, the Robertsons filed an adoption petition in the Family Court of Ulster County, New York.
The Ulster County Family Court examined the state's putative father registry before entering the adoption order and found that Lehr had not registered. The court also determined that Lehr did not fall into any of the other categories of putative fathers entitled to notice under New York law, such as those adjudicated as fathers or identified on the birth certificate. On March 7, 1979, the court entered the order of adoption.
One month after the adoption proceeding began, on January 30, 1979, Lehr filed a petition for paternity, support, and visitation in the Westchester County Family Court. Notice of this petition was served on Lorraine on February 22, 1979. Lehr first learned of the pending adoption on March 3, 1979, when he received notice of a motion to change venue of his paternity proceeding to Ulster County. His attorney contacted the Ulster County judge on March 7, 1979, but learned that the adoption order had already been signed that day. Lehr's paternity petition was later dismissed by the Westchester court. On June 22, 1979, he filed a petition to vacate the adoption order, which the Ulster County Family Court denied after receiving argument. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review of Lehr's constitutional claims. The statutory scheme adequately protected Lehr's opportunity because registration was fully within his control and he established no developed relationship with Jessica.19
New York has sufficiently protected the unmarried father's inchoate relationship through its statutory scheme.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall And Blackmun
Justice White dissented on the ground that when the state possesses actual knowledge of a putative father's identity, location, and interest through a pending paternity petition, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before an adoption order may be entered.21 He emphasized that Lehr had filed such a petition and that the adoption court knew of it prior to signing the order, rendering the registry requirement formalistic and insufficient under the circumstances.
Whether a putative father's actual or potential relationship with a child born out of wedlock is an interest in liberty which may not be destroyed without due process of law?22
A mere biological link between father and child does not by itself create a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.23 Constitutional protection attaches only when the father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by developing an actual custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child.24
No. The established facts demonstrate that Lehr had never had any significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with Jessica and did not seek to establish a legal tie until after she was two years old.25 Because no developed relationship existed, the biological connection alone did not constitute a liberty interest that the state was required to protect through prior notice of the adoption proceeding.26
A putative father's potential relationship with a child born out of wedlock is not a protected liberty interest that may not be destroyed without due process when no actual relationship has been established.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall And Blackmun
Justice White dissented. He contended that the biological connection itself creates a protected interest in the parent-child relationship. The nature of the interest, rather than its weight or degree of development, triggers due process protections. The majority's approach of examining the quality of the actual relationship before deciding whether any liberty interest exists was rejected. It is inconsistent with prior cases holding that the nature of the interest, not its weight, determines constitutional protection. He maintained that Lehr was entitled to notice because the state knew his identity and interest. The failure to provide it violated the fundamental requirement of an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.28
Because the adoption court had actual knowledge of Lehr's pending paternity petition, the statutory scheme's failure to require notice was constitutionally inadequate.29
Whether the gender-based classification in the statute, which both denied him the right to consent to Jessica's adoption and accorded him fewer procedural rights than her mother, violated the Equal Protection Clause?30
Gender-based distinctions in adoption consent and notice statutes are consistent with the Equal Protection Clause when the mother and father are not similarly situated with respect to their relationship with the child.31 A father who has never established a custodial or financial relationship may constitutionally be treated differently from a mother who has maintained continuous custodial responsibility.32
No. The facts establish that the mother had continuous custodial responsibility for Jessica while Lehr never established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship with her.33 Because the parents were not similarly situated, the statutory distinction granting the mother greater rights did not deny Lehr equal protection of the laws.34
The gender-based classification in the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.35