405 U.S. 56 (1972)
In November 1969 the City Bureau of Buildings declared the single-family residence rented on a month-to-month basis for $100 per month by appellants Donald and Edna Lindsey and other tenants from appellee Normet unfit for habitation because of substandard conditions including rusted gutters, broken windows, broken plaster, missing rear steps, and improper sanitation.1 The tenants requested repairs which the landlord refused except for one minor item.2 After paying the November rent they withheld the December rent.3 On December 15 the landlord's attorney sent a letter threatening court action unless the accrued rent was paid immediately.4
On January 7, 1970, before any state eviction proceedings had begun, the tenants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-105.160, was unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its continued enforcement.5 A three-judge district court was convened.6 It issued a temporary restraining order and ordered the tenants to pay rent into an escrow account during the proceeding.7 The parties entered a lengthy stipulation of facts, submitted exhibits and depositions, and the district court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss the complaint.8
The Oregon statute established a summary procedure for resolving disputes over possession of real property.9 Service of the complaint on the tenant must be not less than two nor more than four days before the trial date.10 A tenant may obtain a two-day continuance, but grant of a longer continuance is conditioned on the tenant's posting security for the payment of any rent that may accrue if the plaintiff ultimately prevails.11 The suit may be tried to either a judge or a jury, and the only issue is whether the allegations of the complaint are true.12 A defendant who loses such a suit may appeal only if he obtains two sureties who will provide security for the payment to the plaintiff, if the defendant ultimately loses on appeal, of twice the rental value of the property from the time of commencement of the action to final judgment.13
The district court upheld the validity of the statutes under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 The tenants appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.15
Whether the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer statute's limitation of triable issues in eviction actions to the tenant's default violates the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?16
The Due Process Clause requires an opportunity to present every available defense.17 Yet a state may segregate possessory actions from other claims arising from the same facts and treat tenant and landlord covenants as independent rather than dependent.18 The Equal Protection Clause demands only that any classification of tenants for summary possessory proceedings be rationally related to the legitimate state interest in prompt and peaceful resolution of disputes over possession of real property.19
The limitation of triable issues does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented from the affirmance on this issue.23 He contended that the statute violates due process by denying tenants a meaningful opportunity to be heard on their property interest in the home.24 The summary procedure with sharply limited defenses effectively precludes assertion of habitability claims in the very action that determines continued possession.25
He argued that the tenant has a property interest in his home.26 Before he can be deprived of that interest, he must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.27 The statute deprives him of that opportunity by precluding him from raising a valid defense based on the landlord's breach of duty to maintain the premises.28
Douglas would have reversed the judgment of the District Court in its entirety.29
Whether the provision requiring a tenant who remains in possession after expiration of a lease to pay double the rental value during the period of unlawful detainer violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?30
The Equal Protection Clause requires only that a classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.31 Classifying tenants of real property differently from other tenants for purposes of possessory actions will offend equal protection only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
The double-rent provision does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34
Whether the requirement that a tenant appealing an adverse judgment in a forcible entry and wrongful detainer action post security for twice the rental value from commencement of the action until final judgment violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?35
When a state affords appellate review, the Equal Protection Clause forbids granting the right to some litigants while capriciously or arbitrarily denying it to others.36 An appeal bond requirement that bears no reasonable relationship to actual damages or costs and that uniquely burdens one class of appellants violates equal protection.37
Yes. The double-bond requirement for FED appeals imposes an additional surety obligation for twice the rental value that is unrelated to actual rent accrued or proven damages.38 It automatically forfeits the entire bond upon affirmance.39 It effectively forecloses appeals by tenants unable to post it while no comparable burden falls on other civil appellants in Oregon.40 These facts establish arbitrary discrimination against the class of FED defendants.41
The double-bond requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas concurred in the invalidation of the double-bond provision.43 He emphasized that the added requirement is landlord legislation that places a more onerous condition on tenants seeking to retain possession than on other litigants appealing possessory judgments.44 Such discrimination against the fundamental interest in the home requires a compelling justification that the statute lacks.45
The ordinary litigant who appeals must file a bond covering all damages, costs and disbursements.46 By contrast, a tenant in an FED action must give an additional undertaking for twice the rental value.47 The more onerous requirement cannot be justified as a guarantee of rent or protection against waste because the general appeal statute already provides that protection.
Douglas concluded that the double-rent bond is properly held unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.48
Joined by Justice Stewart And Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan concurred in the result that the double-bond requirement is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.49 He urged that the district court should have abstained on the remaining issues to permit Oregon courts to interpret the availability of defenses under state law before federal constitutional adjudication.50 Brennan noted that the Oregon law is susceptible of a construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the constitutional question.51
He would vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand with direction to the District Court to enter judgment declaring the double-bond requirement unconstitutional.52 The District Court should retain jurisdiction and reinstate the temporary restraining order conditioned on payment of rent into escrow, provided the tenants institute appropriate proceedings in the Oregon courts for an authoritative interpretation of the FED Statute with respect to available defenses.53