441 F. Supp. 3d 238 (E.D. Va. 2020)
Before the Court is Svetlana Lokhova's ("Lokhova" or "plaintiff") three-count Amended Complaint brought against Dow Jones & Company, Inc. d/b/a the Wall Street Journal ("the Journal"), the New York Times Company ("the New York Times"), WP Company, LLC d/b/a the Washington Post ("the Post"), and NBCUniversal Media, LLC d/b/a MSNBC ("NBCUniversal") (collectively, "the media defendants"), Stefan A. Halper ("Halper"), and MSNBC contributor Malcolm Nance ("Nance"), alleging defamation (Count I); common law conspiracy (Count II); and tortious interference with contracts and business expectancies (Count III). Halper and the media defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and Halper has filed a motion for sanctions and a motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum in support of sanctions. Plaintiff has responded to the motions, defendants have filed reply briefs, and oral argument has been held. For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss will be granted, and Halper's motion for sanctions and motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum in support of sanctions will be denied without prejudice.
On May 23, 2019, Lokhova filed her initial complaint. On August 8, 2019, all served defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and Halper filed a motion for sanctions. In response, Plaintiff filed the pending Amended Complaint, which among other changes added Nance as a defendant. In response, the first round of motions to dismiss were denied as moot. All defendants, except for Nance, subsequently filed new motions to dismiss.
The 73-page Amended Complaint ("complaint") alleges a wide-ranging conspiracy among the defendants to defame and injure Lokhova and others. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Halper colluded with the media defendants and others to "leak false statements about Plaintiff as part of a nefarious effort to smear General [Michael] Flynn and fuel and further the now debunked and dead narrative that the Trump campaign colluded with Russia." The complaint asserts that Halper intentionally misrepresented that Lokhova was a "Russian spy" who "had an affair with General Flynn on the orders of Russian intelligence" and "compromised General Flynn." The complaint further alleges that "Halper, with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the media [d]efendants," used the media defendants' platforms and "massive public followings" "as a bullhorn and an echo chamber to amplify and republish the defamation to an unprecedented and unimaginable degree," and that all defendants acted with actual malice.
Lokhova is a United Kingdom citizen who was born in Russia. The complaint asserts that Lokhova "is not and never has been a Russian spy or an agent of Russian intelligence or any branch or agency of the Russian government." She began studying at Cambridge University in 1998, where she earned a Bachelor of Arts degree and a Masters' degree in history. Her Masters dissertation focused on the founder of the Soviet intelligence service. As part of her studies, Lokhova "was instructed to travel to Moscow, where she obtained declassified documents from RGASPI, the former Communist Party archive."
In 2004, Lokhova began a doctoral program in Soviet Intelligence Studies at Cambridge, but she left the program later that year to pursue a career in finance. Among other entities, Lokhova worked for what appears to be a Russian bank, Troika Dialog UK Ltd. She returned to Cambridge sometime around 2012 and began participating in the Cambridge Intelligence Seminar ("the Seminar"), an academic forum focusing on intelligence issues. Halper, whom the complaint refers to as a "counterintelligence operative"; a spy; and a "ratf***er," was also a member of the Seminar.
In January 2014, Richard Dearlove, the former director of British intelligence, and Christopher Andrew, Lokhova's then-mentor, invited Lokhova to a dinner at Dearlove's house on February 28, 2014, which General Flynn, who was then the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA"), was also expected to attend. The "purpose of the dinner was to promote the program that was to become the Cambridge Security Initiative' (CSI), a group chaired by Dearlove." Plaintiff claims that all guests were "pre-cleared in advance with the DIA." Approximately twenty people attended the dinner. At the beginning of the dinner, Flynn briefly introduced himself to Lokhova and another Cambridge fellow. Lokhova did not sit next to Flynn or approach him. At the end of the dinner, "Andrew invited Lokhova to address General Flynn," which led to a "brief, public group exchange with General Flynn and Dearlove." Lokhova "showed Flynn, Dearlove, and others in the group a discovery from the official Stalin Archive," namely a postcard from Stalin displaying "a photograph of an erotic statue'" and containing words that "are very un Stalin like," which "makes people re-examine how they think about `Uncle Joe.'" Lokhova told a reporter from the New York Times that the conversation lasted "ten mins tops," while her partner David North told the Journal that it was a "twenty-minute public conversation." The complaint alleges that "[n]o one expressed any concerns of any kind" about the events of this dinner, which Halper did not attend, and that Halper knew that nothing concerning occurred at the dinner because a Cambridge colleague told him as much. The complaint further asserts that Dearlove "would never have allowed Lokhova to attend an event with General Flynn ... if Dearlove had had any concerns with Lokhova," and that Lokhova and Dearlove continued to engage professionally without issue in the years following the dinner. The complaint includes a photo of Dearlove shaking hands with Flynn at the dinner.
After the dinner, "Andrew asked Lokhova to stay in occasional contact with General Flynn," in the hopes that "Flynn might speak again at the Seminar or do business with CSI." Lokhova "had occasional email contact with General Flynn after February 2014," and "Andrew was copied or saw all the email exchanges, which were general in nature." The complaint states that Flynn did not sign any of these emails "General Misha," did not invite Lokhova to Moscow, and did not ask Lokhova to serve as a translator. Apart from the 2014 dinner and these emails, Lokhova has not spoken to or met with Flynn.
In December 2015, Flynn traveled to Moscow. Lokhova "never discussed going to Moscow with General Flynn" and "did not even know about" the trip. In "late 2015, General Flynn informally became an advisor to the Trump presidential campaign." "Sometime in early 2016, the FBI began to investigate Flynn `based on his relationship with the Russian government.'"
In January 2016, Andrew invited Lokhova and her partner to have dinner with Halper and his wife. The complaint alleges that Halper wanted to "probe [Lokhova] for information relating to Flynn." Lokhova declined the invitation, which "outraged" Andrew, after which "relations deteriorated" between the two, resulting in Andrew "walk[ing] away from [a] lucrative publishing contract" he and Lokhova had with Basic Books and Penguin. Later that year, Lokhova obtained other publishing contracts with Norton US and Harper Collins for her book "The Spy Who Changed History," which was ultimately published in June 2018.
The complaint alleges that in July 2016, Halper resigned from his role as co-convener of the Seminar "to assist the FBI in its covert investigation of the Trump campaign." The complaint further alleges that after the November 2016 election, "Halper seeded" media outlets "with false and defamatory statements about Lokhova and General Flynn — statements that were eagerly republished with no evidentiary support and for the sole purpose of advancing the sensational and false narrative." In December 2016, non-defendant the Financial Times published an article titled "Intelligence Experts Accuse Cambridge Forum of Kremlin Links." The article stated, in part, that Dearlove and Halper stepped down from the Seminar due to perceived Russian influence on the group. The complaint claims that the alleged "Russian influence" was intended to refer to Lokhova, and that neither Halper nor Dearlove genuinely had any concern about any such influence. Instead, Halper's "misrepresentations and propaganda ... were designed to seed the false narrative about Lokhova."
In January 2017, Flynn was appointed National Security Advisor, but he resigned less than a month later. The complaint alleges that Halper was the source for, or conspired with the source for, a variety of articles discussing Flynn published between 2016 and 2017 by non-defendant British media outlets, and that these articles stated or implied false and defamatory information concerning Lokhova, including, but not limited to, that Flynn asked Lokhova to travel with him as a translator to Moscow; that Flynn signed an email to Lokhova as "General Misha," that United States intelligence officials were concerned about Flynn's appointment as National Security Advisor because of his encounter with a "woman who had trusted access to Russian spy agency records"; that Flynn's resignation from his National Security Advisor position was linked to his "meeting with an Anglo-Russian banker once falsely dubbed Crazy Miss Cokehead"; and that Flynn had "struck up a friendship at a Cambridge dinner with a Russian banker turned academic."
On April 1, 2017, in response to one of these articles, defendant Nance tweeted "BREAKING: There it is. Flynn poss caught in FSB honeypot w/female Russian Intel asset. Nance's Law dude! reporting!" In defining "Nance's Law," Nance tweeted "Nance's Law of Intelligence Kismet: Coincidence Takes a Lot of Planning! Like incidentally running into a Lovely lady with all GRU's secrets." The next day, MSNBC contributor Joy Reid retweeted Nance's first tweet. Nance also appeared on an MSNBC program on May 6, 2017, on which he stated, among other things, that Flynn may have had contact with a "Russian intelligence officer" at Cambridge. The complaint asserts that in issuing these tweets and appearing on this program, Nance was acting as an "authorized agent[ ]" of NBCUniversal, and that NBCUniversal is liable for his statements through the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The complaint claims that after Halper gave the Journal, the New York Times, and the Post false information about Lokhova's "relationship[ ]" with Flynn, these defendants contacted Lokhova and other Cambridge academics in February and March 2017 and were told that any allegations about her "relationship" with Flynn were false. The complaint alleges that in response to this information, David Ignatius, a Post columnist, "represented that he had no interest in publishing anything, as there was nothing to publish."
The Journal published an article on March 17, 2017 titled "Michael Flynn Didn't Report 2014 Interaction with Russian-British National." The complaint claims that the article was "intentionally laden with false facts," and that the "gist and defamatory implication ... was that Lokhova engaged in unlawful or suspicious interactions with General Flynn on behalf of the Russia[n] government that should have been reported to the DIA." The complaint alleges that the article was "republished thousands of times on Twitter," and relied upon by other media outlets, and that the Journal has refused to retract or correct the article, in spite of repeated requests.
On May 12, 2017, the BBC published an interview with Lokhova "in which Lokhova explained the truth about what happened at the Cambridge dinner in February 2014 and her limited and infrequent interactions with General Flynn." Lokhova sent this story to a reporter at the New York Times, and also provided written statements explaining her side of the story. After this interaction, the New York Times "shelved [a planned] story."
The complaint goes on to allege that in May 2017, "the FBI opened an investigation into whether President Trump was secretly working on behalf of Russia against American interests." That month, John O. Brennan, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified before Congress that he was "worried by a number of the contacts that the Russians had with U.S. persons," because he "[knew] what the Russians try to do. They try to suborn individuals and they try to get individuals, including U.S. persons, to act on their behalf either wittingly or unwittingly." Although Brennan did not refer to Lokhova by name, the complaint theorizes that he "was expressly referring to Flynn and Lokhova," and that Halper was the source of Brennan's information. The Post published an article on May 23, 2017, discussing Brennan's testimony.
On May 18, 2018, the New York Times published an article entitled "FBI Used Informant to Investigate Russia Ties to Campaign, Not to Spy, as Trump Claims," for which the complaint claims Halper was the source. The article was 1,357 words long, of which only the following 164-word discussion is relevant to this litigation:
The informant also had contacts with Mr. Flynn, the retired Army general who was Mr. Trump's first national security adviser. The two met in February 2014, when Mr. Flynn was running the Defense Intelligence Agency and attended the Cambridge Intelligence Seminar, an academic forum for former spies and researchers that meets a few times a year. According to people familiar with Mr. Flynn's visit to the intelligence seminar, the source was alarmed by the general's apparent closeness with a Russian woman who was also in attendance. The concern was strong enough that it prompted another person to pass on a warning to the American authorities that Mr. Flynn could be compromised by Russian intelligence, according to two people familiar with the matter. Two years later, in late 2016, the seminar itself was embroiled in a scandal about Russian spying. A number of its organizers resigned over what they said was a Kremlin-backed attempt to take control of the group.
The New York Times tweeted links to the article on May 18 and 19, 2018, and others have linked and referred to the article since then. The New York Times also hyperlinked to this article in an April 9, 2019 article it published.
On May 18, 2018, one of the authors of the New York Times article appeared on MSNBC's Rachel Maddow Show and discussed with Maddow the allegations in the article. That same day, Post reporter Robert Costa appeared on MSNBC's The 11th Hour with Brian Williams. During the broadcast, Williams discussed the allegations in the New York Times article, and another guest stated that it "raises red flags" "when you have a Russian woman getting close to" Flynn and "people worried that he could be compromised."
On June 5, 2018, the Post published a 2,262-word story titled "Cambridge University Perch Gave FBI Source Access to Top Intelligence Figures — and a Cover as he Reached Out to Trump Associates." The complaint quotes the following excerpt from this article:
During this period, Halper formed a close bond with Dearlove, the now-retired head of MI6.
Together, they launched the Cambridge Security Initiative, which produced research for governments and other clients, modeled in part after the Rand Corporation.
Together, the two also became active in the Cambridge Intelligence Seminar, established by another Cambridge professor, Christopher Andrew, formerly an official historian for the British domestic intelligence service, MI5.
All three were present for a 2014 visit by Flynn, then head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who had agreed to speak to the Intelligence Seminar while traveling for Defense Department-related activities. During a dinner Flynn attended, Halper and Dearlove were disconcerted by the attention the then-DIA chief showed to a Russian-born graduate student who regularly attended the seminars, according to people familiar with the episode. Both the student and a Defense Department official traveling with Flynn have denied that anything inappropriate occurred.
The complaint describes two "falsehoods" in the article: (1) that Halper "attended" the February 2014 dinner, and (2) that Halper and Dearlove were "disconcerted" by the attention Flynn paid a Russian-born graduate student who regularly attended the seminars. Lokhova claims that the Post knew these statements were false because she told them so and shared a copy of a May 2018 interview she had done with the Times of London setting out her side of the story, and because a Post reporter had previously investigated and "determined there was nothing to the story." The Post article has been retweeted after its initial publication, including by Post reporter Costa and the Post itself.
The complaint alleges that MSNBC contributor Nance issued additional tweets concerning Lokhova in 2018. On July 16, 2018, Nance tweeted: "NRA-Russia liaison agent Maria Butina arrested. I wrote half a chapter about her in @Plot2Destroy moving fm Siberian furniture salesgirl to Russian gun rights@ director in America overnight. #SpyHard." One response to this tweet asked: "A Sparrow?" Nance responded: "No. The technical name for sexy women Agents is a Svetlana'. Smart ones are `Natashas.'"
On July 18, 2018, Nance posted a tweet in response to an article about Maria Butina, stating: "The technical term for Butina is that she could have been a Honeypot'. Her access tools were exotic charms' & ability to `handle a gun'. #MataHari #NationalRussian Association." A response to this tweet asked: "Flynn and Lokhova?" to which Nance responded the next day, "Very likely."
As a result of defendants' actions, Lokhova claims she has suffered damages including, but not limited to, humiliation, mental suffering, reputational injury, lost income, lost academic and professional opportunities, as well as lost book contracts. She seeks $25 million in compensatory damages, $350,000 in punitive damages, pre-and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and a jury trial.
All served defendants have filed motions to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under this rule, a complaint "must be dismissed when a plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."
In addressing a motion to dismiss, a court must assume the facts alleged in the complaint are true and construe the factual allegations in the plaintiff's favor; however, a court "is not bound by the complaint's legal conclusions" or conjectures. Without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider the attachments to the complaint, documents incorporated in the complaint by reference, and documents "attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic." Courts may also take judicial notice of items in the public record.
Defendants first argue that most of Lokhova's claims are time-barred. Because this civil action is one of the "relatively rare" ones in which facts sufficient to rule on the affirmative statute of limitations defense are alleged on the face of the complaint or are apparent on the face of documents integral to the pleadings and incorporated by reference into the complaint, it is appropriate to reach this issue on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The parties agree that the statute of limitations for defamation in Virginia is one year. "Any cause of action that a plaintiff has for defamation accrues on the date that the defamatory acts occurred," which in this case would be the date the allegedly defamatory statements were published. Therefore, because this lawsuit was first filed on May 23, 2019, only materials published between May 23, 2018 and the present can be the basis for liability. Accordingly, defamation claims based on the following original publications are time-barred: the March 17, 2017 Journal article; the April 2017 Nance tweets; the May 2017 MSNBC program; the May 18, 2018 Times article; the May 18 and 19, 2018 tweets by the New York Times; the statements made during the May 18, 2018 Rachel Maddow Show and The 11th Hour with Brian Williams; and all statements Halper allegedly made to any media outlets when serving as a source for articles published before May 23, 2018.
Lokhova does not contest that these original publications of the allegedly defamatory materials occurred before May 23, 2018. Instead, she argues that each time the allegedly offending articles have been tweeted, retweeted, hyperlinked, referenced, or otherwise relied upon (hereinafter, "electronic references"), the statute of limitations begins anew. This argument is unpersuasive.
Defendants argue that even to the extent there have been electronic references to, or distribution of, the allegedly defamatory materials since May 22, 2018, those occurrences did not retrigger the statute of limitations under the single publication rule, "which permits only one cause of action to be maintained for any single publication, even if heard or read by two or more third persons." "Although subsequent distribution of a defamatory statement may continue to increase plaintiff's compensable damages, it does not create independent actions or start the statute of limitations running anew." The rule applies to "defamatory forms of mass communication or aggregate publication." Under the rule, a single publication includes "[a]ny one edition of a book or a newspaper." "Jurisdictions that have adopted the single publication rule are nearly unanimous in applying it to internet publications," and a court in this district has suggested that the rule "applies ... to ... the distribution of newspapers [and] ... internet posts...." The rule was designed "to avoid the overwhelming multiplicity of lawsuits that could result from defamatory statements contained in mass publications such as newspapers and magazines." Although the Virginia Supreme Court does not appear to have formally addressed this issue, the Fourth Circuit has determined that Virginia would follow "[t]he great majority of states [that] now follow the single publication rule." Because this civil action involves publications by major media organizations about matters of public concern, the application of the single publication rule has significant First Amendment implications.
Despite the single publication rule, Lokhova argues that the post-May 22, 2018 electronic references to otherwise time-barred articles bring those earlier publications within the statute of limitations under the republication doctrine, which provides that "where the same defamer communicates a defamatory statement on several different occasions to the same or different audience, each of those statements constitutes a separate publication" triggering a new the statute of limitations. Some courts have described this doctrine as an exception to the single publication rule. Republication includes instances where the publisher has "affirmatively reiterated" the statement. Although it is "less clear how the republication exception to the single publication rule applies in the context of electronic media," courts outside Virginia have held that "a statement on a website is not republished unless the statement itself is substantively altered or added to, or the website is directed to a new audience." For the reasons discussed below, Lokhova's argument that the republication doctrine should apply fails.
The republication exception typically applies to republication by the defendant itself. Here, the only timely alleged republication by a defendant of an otherwise time-barred article was the online version of the April 9, 2019 New York Times article, which referenced and included a hyperlink to its May 18, 2018 article. Lokhova does not contend that the April 9, 2019 article was itself defamatory; instead, she appears to be arguing that because the article contains a link to the May 18, 2018 article, it constitutes a republication of that earlier article, which Lokhova does allege was defamatory. The 1,357-word May 18, 2018 article, in turn, briefly mentions Flynn's "apparent closeness with a Russian woman" in attendance at the February 2014 event, and states that concerns about this closeness "prompted another person to pass on a warning to the American authorities that Mr. Flynn could be compromised by Russian intelligence." The May 2018 article also states that in late 2016, a "number of [the Seminar's] organizers resigned over what they said was a Kremlin-backed attempt to take control of the group." Even if these May 2018 statements were themselves defamatory of Lokhova, which is extremely dubious, they were published more than a year before Lokhova's complaint was filed. The April 9, 2019 article does nothing to bring these statements within the statute of limitations period.
As persuasive case law from other circuits suggests, although "creating hypertext links to previously published statements" may technically direct audiences' attention to the prior dissemination of those statements, such links do not constitute republication. There is good reason for this rule. As the Third Circuit has observed,
[w]ebsites are constantly linked.... If each link ... were an act of republication, the statute of limitations would be retriggered endlessly and its effectiveness essentially eliminated. A publisher would remain subject to suit for statements made many years prior, and ultimately could be sued repeatedly for a single tortious act the prohibition of which was the genesis of the single publication rule.
Therefore, the New York Times' 2019 hyperlink is insufficient to retrigger the statute of limitations.
Lokhova nevertheless argues that there is a factual question whether the alleged republication included additional content beyond a hyperlink that would constitute republication, and that the Court must therefore deny the motion to dismiss at this stage of the litigation. Although this argument might be meritorious in other contexts, it fails here. The New York Times' April 9, 2019 article, titled "Justice Dept. Watchdog's Review of Russia Inquiry Is Nearly Done, Barr Says," does not mention or concern Lokhova; instead it focuses on the Inspector General's investigation "into aspects of the Russia inquiry, including whether law enforcement officials abused their powers in surveilling a former Trump campaign aide." The article's discussion of Halper includes a sentence containing a hyperlink to the May 18, 2018 article. This statement does not substantively alter or add to the portion of the May 18, 2018 article that allegedly defamed Lokhova. "[U]nder traditional principles of republication, a mere reference to an article, regardless how favorable it is as long as it does not restate the defamatory material, does not republish the material." This is because "[w]hile [a reference] may call the existence of the article to the attention of a new audience, it does not present the defamatory contents of the article to the audience." Under this persuasive case law, the New York Times' 2019 article does not retrigger the statute of limitations for the May 18, 2018 article.
Further, none of the case law cited by Lokhova supports reaching a different conclusion. Some of the cases Lokhova cites discuss the republication issue only in passing or in a different context and are therefore of limited utility. Most of the cited cases in which courts have found that a defendant's later statement could constitute a republication are readily distinguishable, and Lokhova's reliance on them is therefore misplaced. In Eramo, for example, a court found at the motion for summary judgment stage that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether an Editor's Note appended to an allegedly defamatory article constituted a republication, and that the question therefore needed to be submitted to a jury. In sharp contrast to the New York Times' passing reference to a general conclusion in the original article, the entire Editor's Note in Eramo focused on the content of the original allegedly defamatory article, and the Note restated allegedly defamatory statements from the original article at length. Similarly, in Doe and Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Bleeping Computer LLC, the courts concluded that where a defendant had made multiple different allegedly defamatory statements, each statement could constitute a republication. And in League of United Latin Am. Citizens — Richmond Region Council 4614 v. Pub. Interest Legal Found., the court found that a document the defendants issued as a "sequel" to an allegedly defamatory original document was a republication, where the sequel document repeated the allegedly defamatory statements. In those cases, unlike this one, the defendants' subsequent statements themselves included allegedly defamatory content, and were not mere references to portions of their initial statement that had nothing to do with the plaintiff. For these reasons, the April 2019 New York Times article did not restart the statute of limitations for its May 18, 2018 article.
Lokhova's argument does not stop there. She asserts that the media defendants are not only liable for their own republications, but also for third parties' electronic references to their allegedly defamatory statements. Lokhova cites to third-party tweets posted on or after May 23, 2018 that link to and discuss the media defendants' allegedly defamatory articles.
This argument is similarly unpersuasive. Lokhova has not cited any case holding that a media organization is liable in perpetuity for third-party tweets of its allegedly defamatory materials. Indeed, Lokhova's argument is inconsistent with persuasive case law from other courts, which "have concluded that statements posted to a generally accessible website are not republished by" "a third party's posting the statement elsewhere on the internet." This rule is sensible; if a defendant's own hyperlink or reference to the alleged defamatory material does not constitute republication that creates additional liability for the defendant, it would be bizarre to conclude that an unrelated third party's independent hyperlink, tweet, or other electronic reference does so.
Further, even to the extent the third-party electronic references include new comments on the allegedly defamatory materials, those comments do not constitute republication for which the original publisher can be held liable. "[T]he ability of third parties to comment on articles is a unique advantage of the internet, and thus application of the republication concept" to third-party comments would be inappropriate. In fact, the availability of forums like Twitter can sometimes enable people who believe they have been defamed to be able to debunk the statements they believe are defamatory. Indeed, Lokhova herself has used Twitter to dispute some of the allegations in defendants' articles.
In support of her republication argument, Lokhova relies on Weaver v. Beneficial Finance Co., a Virginia Supreme Court decision issued over 60 years ago, well before the advent of the internet and Twitter. Weaver did not involve publication by a media defendant. Instead, it involved an allegedly defamatory letter sent by the defendants to the plaintiff's employer stating that the plaintiff owed the defendants money and effectively asking for the employer's assistance in ensuring that the debt be paid. Although any claim based on the original publication of the letter was time-barred, the letter was subsequently republished before a promotion board convened to consider the plaintiff's record. In that context, the court observed that "the author or originator of a defamation is liable for a republication or repetition thereof by third persons, provided it is the natural and probable consequence of his act, or he has presumptively or actually authorized or directed its republication." The court determined that "[t]he jury could conclude from [defendants'] statement [in the letter] that [they] were requesting that the letter be republished to [plaintiff's] superiors at a future date or that the republication was the natural and probable consequence of their act," which would retrigger the statute of limitations. The Weaver court quoted a secondary source stating that "where the words declared on are slanderous per se their repetition by others is the natural and probable result of the original slander"; however, the court made clear that "the original author is not responsible if the republication or repetition is not the natural and probable consequence of his act, but is the independent and unauthorized act of a third party." Lokhova argues that republication by third parties was the natural and probable result of defendants' statements, because those statements were defamatory per se, and defendants "knew or should have known that their defamatory statements would be republished over and over by third-parties to Lokhova's detriment."
Contrary to Lokhova's assertions, Weaver does not support her position, and in fact undermines it by recognizing special rules "applicable to newspapers and magazines," as articulated in Hartmann v. Time. Inc. In Hartmann, the Third Circuit observed that the single publication rule
is the preferable one and is recommended both by logic and by public policy. Public policy must regard the freedom of the press and while the law must exact penalties for libel the instruments of free and effective expression, newspapers and magazines which are published on a nationwide basis, should not be subjected to the harassment of repeated law suits.
The Weaver court also quoted a secondary source stating that "the publisher of a newspaper or magazine has been held not responsible for the acts of third persons who, after the original publication, sell copies of the newspaper or magazine to others." The principles underlying this rule are doubly important in the age of the internet, because holding the media defendants liable for subsequent third-party distribution via Twitter or other forms of electronic distribution "would implicate an even greater potential for endless retriggering of the statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of defendants," which would create "a serious inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over the [i]ntemet, which is, of course, its greatest beneficial promise."
Lokhova cites cases confirming that republication by third parties may under some circumstances trigger a new cause of action; however, she has cited no case holding that it is appropriate to hold media defendants liable in perpetuity for third-party tweets of their publications. In fact, some of the cited cases support the proposition that subsequent independent and unauthorized publication by unrelated third parties does not create liability for the original publisher. For example, in Doe, the court held that an individual's own publication of multiple different allegedly defamatory statements retriggered the statute of limitations, but observed that the "result might well have been different" if, as here, the defendant's original statement had subsequently "been distributed to various individuals ... without [defendant] affirmatively republishing [the] story." Likewise, in Dragulescu v. Virginia Union Univ., the court observed that under the republication doctrine, "each successive publication of an old or preexisting defamatory statement gives rise to a new cause of action," but confirmed that when the single publication rule applies, "subsequent viewings of one allegedly defamatory document do not constitute successive publications." The court in Dragulescu also held that a defendant was not liable for rumors circulated among third parties about the plaintiff, because those rumors could not be "attributed" to defendant. Similarly here, defendants are not liable for third-party tweets and other postings because those statements cannot be attributed to them.
Some of the case law cited by Lokhova's counsel suggests that third-party re-publishers themselves ought to be liable when they adopt a defamatory statement as their own, and that may be appropriate in some instances. But Lokhova has not sued any third-party re-publishers here. Instead, she seeks to hold the original mass media publishers liable for third-parties reposting and commenting on their articles. Adopting Lokhova's argument with respect to the media defendants, in the age of the internet, would violate the single publication rule, render the statute of limitations meaningless, and undermine First Amendment protections of the press. For these reasons, it is rejected by the Court.
For similar reasons, the Court finds that the alleged third-party republication of statements allegedly made by Halper did not retrigger the statute of limitations for those statements. In addition to the electronic references to the media defendants' articles discussed above, the complaint also mentions various electronic references to articles published by non-defendant media outlets, for which the complaint alleges Halper was the original source. The link between Halper and these subsequent electronic references is even more attenuated than it is for the media defendants. To survive a motion to dismiss, Lokhova must sufficiently allege facts, not conclusions, which adequately identify Halper as the source of the allegedly defamatory statements given to the various media outlets in the first place, as well as establish that Halper is somehow responsible in perpetuity for independent third parties subsequently tweeting or writing about the articles in which his alleged statements appeared. Halper persuasively argues that Lokhova has not even established the first link in this chain, because she has not provided sufficient information about his alleged defamatory statements to the various media outlets to satisfy Rule 8. As to the link between the allegedly defamatory articles and the third-party republications, the arguments about the dangers of a multiple publication rule in the context of the internet apply not only to the media defendants, but also to individuals who are alleged to have been the source for articles published by the media. Protecting media defendants from never-ending liability for third-party electronic republications would mean little if the protection did not also extend to their sources.
The parties' briefing references cases in which courts have held sources of information liable for subsequent republication of their information. These cases are of limited value as they were decided more than 30 years ago, before the ubiquity of the internet, and their discussion of the republication issue is sparse. In Moore, for example, the court held that the statute of limitations for a defamation claim could be retriggered upon the republication by third-party media outlets of the defendant's otherwise time-barred statements about the plaintiff's involvement in a chemical disaster. Even in the era when Moore was issued, its approach was "far from universally accepted." Moreover, because of the age of the decision, the Moore court did not consider the nature of the internet in developing its theory of liability.
Blue Ridge is easily distinguishable. In that case, the defendant, a financial reporting service, created a report containing inaccurate information about the plaintiff bank, and sent that report upon request to a newspaper columnist. In exchange for providing the report, the defendant reporting service "expected to be cited as the source of the information." The court therefore held that the defendant could not credibly argue that the subsequent publication of information from the report by the newspapers carrying the journalist's column was an "improbable or unnatural result" of its actions under Weaver. Blue Ridge's holding is uncontroversial. It stands for the principle that when a source intentionally provides defamatory information to a media professional with the expectation of being cited as a source of the information, that source cannot later escape liability by claiming that the publication of that information was not a natural or probable consequence. Blue Ridge does not stand for the proposition that unnamed sources who provide information to media outlets are liable in perpetuity for any subsequent discussions of that information by third parties, let alone liable for all later online chatter stemming from that information. For these reasons, Halper, like the media defendants, is not liable for the third-party electronic references alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, all of Lokhova's defamation claims, but for those arising out of statements made by defendants themselves on or after May 23, 2018, are time-barred.
The only two allegedly defamatory written materials not time-barred are the June 5, 2018 Post article and the July 2018 tweets issued by Nance. To state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must plead, among other things, the publication of an actionable statement. "A pleading for defamation must [also] allege or otherwise make apparent on the face of the pleading that the alleged defamatory statements are `of and concerning' the plaintiff." Statements that do not facially refer to the plaintiff may nonetheless be "of and concerning" the plaintiff "if the allegations and supporting contemporaneous facts connect the libelous words to the plaintiff, if those who know or know of the plaintiff would believe that the [statement] was intended to refer to him, or if the statement contains a description or reference to him."
"Whether a statement is actionable is a matter of law to be determined by the court." "To be actionable, the statement must be both false and defamatory." At the 12(b)(6) stage, the Court "must accept as false any statements which the Complaint alleges to be false," "unless the allegation of falsity is vague and conclusory or contradicts an external document incorporated into the complaint." Therefore, "the key actionability question in deciding a motion to dismiss is whether the statements referenced in the Complaint are defamatory," or "tend[ ] so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." Defamatory words include those that "make the plaintiff appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous." Although a plaintiff may allege defamation based on implication or innuendo arising out of statements that are otherwise non-actionable on their face, those statements must "be reasonably read to impart the false innuendo."
The complaint identifies only two statements in the entire 2,262-word Post article that are allegedly false and defamatory of Lokhova: (1) that Halper "attended" the February 2014 dinner, and (2) that "Halper and Dearlove were disconcerted by the attention the then-DIA chief showed to a Russian-born graduate student who regularly attended the seminars, according to people familiar with the episode." Even assuming the first statement to be false, the statement does not defame anyone, and clearly is not "of and concerning" Lokhova; it relates to Halper alone. The second statement does not name Lokhova and simply includes a generic reference to a "Russian-born graduate student who regularly attended the seminars." Even assuming that the statement is "of and concerning" Lokhova and is false, it does not defame her. At most, the second statement suggests there were concerns about Flynn's behavior towards Lokhova, without stating or implying that Lokhova herself did anything improper. The same conclusion applies when the two statements are considered together, and in the context of the other statements in the article as a whole, particularly because the sentence immediately following the second quote provides a clear disclaimer of any wrongdoing: "the student and a Defense Department official traveling with Flynn have denied that anything inappropriate occurred." In short, there is nothing in this article that defames the plaintiff.
This conclusion is supported by recent case law. In Deripaska v. Associated Press, the plaintiff was a Russian businessman who allegedly had interactions with President Trump's former campaign manager Paul Manafort. He argued that the Associated Press defamed him in an article by, among other things, suggesting that Manafort illegally lobbied on Deripaska's behalf. The court rejected this argument, explaining that "[d]efamation is personal," and pointing out that if the article "implies that anyone broke the law, the subject of that implication is limited to Manafort only." Similarly, in Webb v. Virginian-Pilot Media Companies, LLC, the plaintiff, an assistant school principal, sued a newspaper for publishing a statement allegedly insinuating that he "had engaged in unethical conduct by obtaining preferential treatment for his son." The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that although the article "insinuates that [the plaintiff's son] may have benefited from special treatment," "[it] does not create a reasonable implication that [the plaintiff] solicited or procured the insinuated special treatment." Here too, the Post article could be read to insinuate that a non-party, Flynn, who was a public figure holding a very sensitive position, behaved inappropriately towards Lokhova. Lokhova has not alleged how a statement that clearly focuses on Flynn behaving inappropriately harms her own reputation or makes her appear "odious, infamous, or ridiculous." As Lokhova herself has acknowledged, at most she is "collateral damage" of the "scandal" surrounding Halper and Flynn.
Nor can the statements in the article, considered either separately or in the context of the article as a whole, be read to imply that Lokhova was a "Russian spy" or a "traitor to her country," that she "had an affair with General Flynn on the orders of Russian intelligence" or "compromised General Flynn," or that the Post was "privy to facts about" Lokhova "that are unknown to the general" reader. The article focuses on Halper's activity, and includes the allegations about Flynn's behavior at the 2014 event as one of a series of stories about Halper's time at Cambridge. The only brief portions of the lengthy article that even remotely relate to Lokhova are those discussed above. Reading the article as Lokhova suggests would "stretch" it "well beyond its ordinary and common meaning.... Although we must construe inferences and innuendo in [plaintiff's] favor, we may not introduce new matter, nor extend the meaning of the words used, or make that certain which is in fact uncertain." Even when reviewing the article in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it cannot reasonably be construed to include innuendo that is simply not there. For these reasons, the Post article does not defame plaintiff.
Lokhova has not yet served defendant Nance with her complaint, and he has not appeared. Therefore, his tweets are relevant only to the extent Lokhova has adequately pleaded NBCUniversal's liability for these tweets through the doctrine of respondeat superior. She has failed to plead sufficient facts to support such liability.
Most of the support for Lokhova's allegation that NBCUniversal is vicariously liable for Nance's tweets comes in the form of conclusory assertions. The complaint asserts that "[a]t all times relevant to this action, NBCUniversal/MSNBC acted by and through its authorized agents, including" Nance, and that "NBCUniversal is liable for Nance's false and defamatory tweets under the doctrine of respondeat superior." Legal conclusions like these are "insufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face."
The complaint adds that Nance "is the chief terrorism analyst on MCNBC,'" and a "regular contributor to the business of MSNBC, appearing in hundreds of videos over many years," who "maintains and operates an official Twitter account on which he conducts the business of NBC/MSNBC.'" The complaint appears to presume that because Nance is associated with NBCUniversal in some capacity, listed "NBC/MSNBC" as the last of many identifiers in his biography, and issued the allegedly defamatory tweets "during normal business hours," his tweets were necessarily issued "while performing the business of MSNBC," for which NBCUniversal must be liable.
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that a rebuttable presumption of vicarious liability may be created when a complaint contends that an employer-employee relationship exists; however, plaintiff's complaint does not specifically allege that Nance was an NBCUniversal employee. Instead, it suggests that Nance "holds himself as an agent of MSNBC." To the extent Lokhova is attempting to allege that NBCUniversal is liable for Nance's tweets through a theory of apparent agency, this claim fails under Virginia law, which Lokhova argues should apply, because although Virginia courts have applied the theory of apparent agency to contract cases, it appears that the theory "has never been used in Virginia to impose vicarious liability on an employer for the negligent acts of an independent contractor." Moreover, regardless of which law applies and whether Nance is an NBCUniversal employee or agent, relying on the respondeat superior doctrine to hold NBCUniversal liable for every tweet issued by one of its employees or agents during business hours, without requiring more specific allegations from the plaintiff, would lead to undesirable consequences. The complaint lacks any non-conclusory allegations that Nance's tweets promoted NBCUniversal's interests, and in fact, one of the allegedly defamatory tweets appears in a string of tweets that began with a tweet promoting Nance's personal book. Because Lokhova has not adequately pleaded that NBCUniversal may be held vicariously liable for Nance's tweets, her claim against NBCUniversal based on those tweets will be dismissed.
Lokhova's tortious interference claim is effectively duplicative of her defamation claim. In addition, the claim is inadequately pleaded. For example, one key component of a tortious interference claim, whether applying the law of Virginia, the District of Columbia, or New York, is the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's contractual or business relationship or expectancy. Apart from vague and conclusory language, the complaint has failed to allege facts indicating that any defendant, particularly any media defendant, was aware of any specific contracts or business expectancies Lokhova may have had, let alone that they wrongfully or intentionally interfered with any specific such relationships or that Lokhova lost specific business opportunities as a result of their actions. Moreover, one component of Lokhova's tortious interference claim is illogical. Although Lokhova seems to be claiming that defendants interfered with her book deals with Basic Books and Penguin, according to the complaint, those deals ended in 2016 before the alleged defamation, because Andrew "walked away." For these reasons, the tortious interference claim will be dismissed.
Lokhova's common law conspiracy claim also fails no matter which jurisdiction's law applies. Under Virginia law, a conspiracy claim "generally requires proof that the underlying tort was committed." Moreover, in Virginia, "[t]he limitations period for a civil conspiracy is based on the statute of limitations for the underlying act." Under New York law, courts do not recognize a "freestanding claim for conspiracy," and "[a]llegations of conspiracy are permitted only to connect the actions of separate defendants with an otherwise actionable tort." Similarly, under District of Columbia law, "[s]ince liability for civil conspiracy depends on performance of some underlying tortious act, the conspiracy is not independently actionable; rather, it is a means for establishing vicarious liability for the underlying tort." Because the statements underlying Lokhova's defamation claim are either time-barred, non-actionable, or unattributable to a served defendant, and her tortious interference claim is duplicative of her defamation claim and inadequately pleaded, neither tort can serve as the basis for a civil conspiracy claim against the served defendants.
In addition, Lokhova has not adequately pleaded that the served defendants are liable for other parties' publications through a theory of civil conspiracy, because her conspiracy allegations are too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss. For these reasons, plaintiff's common law conspiracy claim will be dismissed.
In addition to moving to dismiss the claims against him, Halper has also moved for sanctions against Lokhova and her attorney Steven S. Biss, alleging that they have litigated this action in bad faith. Halper argues that sanctions are warranted in part because Lokhova and her counsel have "(i) us[ed] this Court to make, publicize and disseminate vulgar and degrading accusations against Defendant Halper; (ii) ma[de] meritless accusations of defamation based solely on alleged statements that are not actually contained in the media publications they cite; [and] (iii) claim[ed] defamation based upon obviously untimely allegedly defamatory statements." Halper objects, for example, to the language used in plaintiff's complaint and briefing, and to Lokhova's alleged posting of a link to her complaint on her fundraising webpage. Halper has also filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum in support of sanctions, which references an opinion issued by another judge in this district warning Biss not to engage in ad hominem attacks, and argues that notwithstanding that judge's opinion, Biss "has continued to file a series of lawsuits, including in this Court, disparaging parties, witnesses, and their counsel." Biss has opposed both of these motions on Lokhova's behalf.
The record is clear that Biss filed an excessively long complaint and amended complaint on Lokhova's behalf directing unprofessional ad hominem attacks at Halper and others. For example, the complaint calls Halper a "ratf***er," and refers to the media defendants as "stooges." Such language adds nothing but unnecessary heat to this litigation. Moreover, the complaint exaggerates the nature and content of the allegedly defamatory statements. In addition, Biss and Lokhova had to have known that most of her claims were time-barred, as she had previously filed an unrelated defamation lawsuit in the United Kingdom, which was dismissed as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations applicable in that jurisdiction.
Whether to impose sanctions based on litigation conduct "ought to be exercised with great caution." Although the Court does not condone the tactics employed by Biss and Lokhova in this action, their conduct is not sufficient to warrant the draconian measure of imposing sanctions at this time. The allegations of improper behavior by Biss are undoubtedly more severe than those by Lokhova, and should Biss file further inappropriate pleadings or pursue frivolous post-judgment litigation against any of these defendants, sanctions might well be justified. For these reasons, Halper's motions for sanctions and to supplement that motion will be denied without prejudice.
For the above-stated reasons, the defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted, Halper's motion for sanctions and motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum in support of sanctions will be denied without prejudice, and the claims against all named defendants will be dismissed by an Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.
Justice Dept. Watchdog's Review of Russia Inquiry Is Nearly Done, Barr Says
The Justice Department inspector general is examining the steps that law enforcement officials took to get a court's permission to secretly wiretap Carter Page, a former Trump campaign foreign policy adviser. Pavel Golovkin/Associated Press
By Adam Goldman and Charlie Savage April 9, 2019
WASHINGTON — The Justice Department's internal watchdog intends to complete by May or June his investigation into aspects of the Russia inquiry, including whether law enforcement officials abused their powers in surveilling a former Trump campaign aide, Attorney General William P. Barr told lawmakers on Tuesday.
The department's inspector general, Michael E. Horowitz, has been examining how law enforcement officials obtained a warrant in October 2016 to wiretap Carter Page, a former foreign policy adviser to the Trump campaign with links to Russia. Mr. Horowitz's investigators have also asked witnesses about informants that the F.B.I. turned to in the early stages of the investigation, according to people familiar with his inquiry.
"The office of the inspector general has a pending investigation of the FISA process in the Russia investigation," Mr. Barr said in testimony before a House appropriations subcommittee, using shorthand for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. "I expect that will be complete in probably May or June, I am told. So hopefully we'll have some answers from Inspector General Horowitz on the issue of the FISA warrants."
A spokesman for Mr. Horowitz declined to comment on the timing of the expected report. But the inspector general has previously confirmed that he was looking into the early stages of the Russia inquiry, including wiretap applications, informants and whether any political bias against Mr. Trump influenced investigative decisions.
Mr. Horowitz's findings could once again upend the Justice Department and F.B.I., which have been at the center of a political firestorm since the 2016 presidential election over their handling of separate investigations into both Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server and ties between Russia and the Trump campaign. The highly anticipated results of the Russia inquiry are due to be made public "within a week," Mr. Barr said on Tuesday.
In the Russia investigation, Republicans have accused law enforcement officials of improperly obtaining the Page warrant because the application relied in part on Democratic-funded opposition research compiled into a dossier by Christopher Steele, a former British intelligence officer who was also an F.B.I. informant.