144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024)
Before 1976, unregulated foreign vessels dominated fishing in the international waters off the U.S. coast, which began just 12 nautical miles offshore.1 Recognizing the resultant overfishing and the need for sound management of fishery resources, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.2 The MSA and subsequent amendments extended the jurisdiction of the United States to 200 nautical miles beyond the U.S. territorial sea and claimed exclusive fishery management authority over all fish within that area, known as the exclusive economic zone.3 The National Marine Fisheries Service administers the MSA under a delegation from the Secretary of Commerce.4
The MSA established eight regional fishery management councils composed of representatives from the coastal States, fishery stakeholders, and NMFS.5 The councils develop fishery management plans, which NMFS approves and promulgates as final regulations.6 In service of the statute's fishery conservation and management goals, the MSA requires that certain provisions, such as a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits at a level such that overfishing does not occur, be included in these plans.7 The plans may also include additional discretionary provisions.8 Relevant here, a plan may also require that one or more observers be carried on board domestic vessels for the purpose of collecting data necessary for the conservation and management of the fishery.9 The MSA specifies three groups that must cover costs associated with observers: foreign fishing vessels, vessels in limited access privilege programs, and vessels in the North Pacific Council jurisdiction.10 In the latter two cases, the MSA expressly caps the fees for observers at two or three percent of the value of fish harvested on the vessels.11
The MSA does not contain similar terms addressing whether Atlantic herring fishermen may be required to bear costs associated with any observers a plan may mandate.12 At one point, NMFS fully funded the observer coverage the New England Fishery Management Council required in its plan for the Atlantic herring fishery.13 In 2013, however, the council proposed amending its fishery management plans to empower it to require fishermen to pay for observers if federal funding became unavailable.14 Several years later, NMFS promulgated a rule approving the amendment.15 With respect to the Atlantic herring fishery, the Rule created an industry-funded program that aims to ensure observer coverage on 50 percent of trips undertaken by vessels with certain types of permits.16 If NMFS determines that an observer is required but declines to assign a Government-paid one, the vessel must contract with and pay for a Government-certified third-party observer.17 NMFS estimated that the cost of such an observer would be up to $710 per day, reducing annual returns to the vessel owner by up to 20 percent.18
Petitioners Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc., H&L Axelsson, Inc., Lund Marr Trawlers LLC, and Scombrus One LLC are family businesses that operate in the Atlantic herring fishery.19 In February 2020, they challenged the Rule under the MSA, which incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act.20 The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government.21 A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed.22 The majority addressed provisions of the MSA concerning observer funding requirements and concluded that it was not wholly unambiguous whether NMFS may require Atlantic herring fishermen to pay for observers.23 Because there remained some question as to Congress's intent, the court proceeded to Chevron's second step and deferred to the agency's interpretation as a reasonable construction of the MSA.24
Petitioners Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC own two vessels that operate in the Atlantic herring fishery.25 These vessels use small-mesh bottom-trawl gear and can freeze fish at sea, so they can catch more species of fish and take longer trips than other vessels.26 The District Court, like the D.C. Circuit, deferred to NMFS's contrary interpretation under Chevron and thus granted summary judgment to the Government.27 The First Circuit affirmed.28 It relied on a default norm that regulated entities must bear compliance costs, as well as the MSA's sanctions provision.29 The court ultimately concluded that the Agency's interpretation of its authority to require at-sea monitors who are paid for by owners of regulated vessels does not exceed the bounds of the permissible.30 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, limited to the question whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified.31
Whether the Chevron doctrine established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. should be overruled or clarified?32
Yes. The lower courts in both the Loper Bright and Relentless cases applied Chevron's two-step framework after concluding that the Magnuson-Stevens Act was ambiguous on whether NMFS could require Atlantic herring fishermen to pay for observers.36 The facts show that the Act expressly authorizes industry funding in three discrete contexts but is silent as to the Atlantic herring fishery, and that NMFS had previously funded observers itself in that fishery.37 Because the APA commands that the reviewing court decide all relevant questions of law, those courts could not defer to the agency's construction even if reasonable.38
Independent judicial interpretation of the statute is required instead.39
Chevron is overruled. The judgments of the D.C. Circuit and the First Circuit are vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the requirement that courts exercise independent judgment.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas joined the majority but wrote separately to underscore that Chevron deference also violates the Constitution's separation of powers.41 He explained that Chevron curbed the judicial power afforded to courts and simultaneously expanded agencies' executive power beyond constitutional limits.42 The judicial power requires judges to exercise independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws, yet Chevron prevents judges from exercising that judgment and allows the Executive to dictate the outcome of cases through erroneous interpretations.43
Justice Gorsuch concurred to address stare decisis.44 He argued that the doctrine supports overruling Chevron because it contravenes the law Congress prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act.45 He detailed how Chevron represents a break from traditional common-law understandings of the judicial role and has led to systematic bias in favor of the government, undermining due process and the rule of lenity.46
He concluded that the lessons of experience counsel against continued reliance on Chevron's stray and unconsidered digression.47
Joined by Justice Sotomayor And Justice Jackson (as To No. 22-1219)
Justice Kagan dissented, arguing that Chevron is a cornerstone of administrative law rooted in a presumption of legislative intent.48 She contended that Congress generally wants agencies to resolve ambiguities in statutes they administer because agencies possess subject-matter expertise, historical familiarity with regulatory schemes, and political accountability that courts lack.49 She maintained that the majority's decision disregards stare decisis, as Chevron has been relied upon for decades in thousands of cases, and that overruling it will produce large-scale disruption by casting doubt on many settled constructions of statutes.50