457 U.S. 922 (1982)
In 1977, petitioner Lugar, the lessee-operator of a truckstop in Virginia, became indebted to respondent Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., his petroleum supplier.1
When Lugar fell behind in payments, Edmondson filed suit on the debt in Virginia state court and, ancillary to that action, petitioned for prejudgment attachment of Lugar's property under Virginia Code § 8.01-533.2
Acting on an ex parte petition alleging that Lugar was disposing of property to defeat creditors, the state court clerk issued a writ of attachment that the county sheriff executed, sequestering Lugar's property.3 A state trial judge later conducted a hearing on the attachment and ordered it dismissed because Edmondson had failed to establish the statutory grounds alleged in the petition.4
Lugar then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Edmondson and its president.5 His complaint alleged that respondents had acted jointly with the State to deprive him of his property without due process of law, challenging both the constitutionality of the Virginia attachment statute and its application to him.6
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that respondents' actions did not constitute state action as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.7 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed.8 It held that a private party acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 only when there is a usurpation or corruption of official power by the private litigant or a surrender of judicial power to the private litigant in such a way that the independence of the enforcing officer has been compromised to a significant degree.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' construction of the under-color-of-state-law requirement.10
Whether the alleged misconduct of a private party pursuant to a state attachment statute constitutes action under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983?11
A private party’s joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 The state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is identical to the under-color-of-state-law requirement of § 1983 when the claim is directed against a private party.13
Yes. In 1977 petitioner Lugar fell behind on payments to respondent Edmondson Oil, which filed suit in Virginia state court and petitioned for prejudgment attachment under Va. Code § 8.01-533.
The state court clerk issued the writ and the county sheriff executed it, sequestering Lugar’s property. Lugar later sued Edmondson and its president under § 1983, alleging joint action with the State to deprive him of property without due process.
Edmondson invoked the statutory scheme by filing the ex parte affidavit and bond. The clerk and sheriff, both state officials, then issued and executed the writ. This joint participation satisfies the state-action test because the deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right created by state statute and because Edmondson may fairly be said to be a state actor through its participation with state officials.
The Court of Appeals erred by requiring usurpation or corruption of official power beyond the mere invocation of the attachment procedure.
The alleged actions of respondents constituted action under color of state law, so the District Court erred in dismissing the § 1983 claim.14
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the claimed infringement must be fairly attributable to the State.15 He concluded that respondents did no more than invoke a presumptively valid prejudgment attachment procedure available to all litigants.16
Burger emphasized that the subsequent procedural steps taken by state officials do not transform respondents’ private conduct into state action.17 He noted that petitioner’s remedy lies in private suits such as malicious prosecution rather than an expansion of § 1983 beyond congressional intent.18
Burger warned that the majority’s approach would convert routine private litigation into federal constitutional claims.19
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to emphasize that the Court’s decision does not hold that all attachments under the Virginia statute are unconstitutional.20 He stressed that the Court holds only that the private party who invokes the statutory procedure may be held liable under § 1983 if the procedure is found to be unconstitutional.21
Powell noted that the state officials who merely follow the statute are not necessarily liable.22 He cautioned against reading the opinion to impose liability on innocent users of established state procedures.23
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justice Brennan, contending that the mere invocation of a state attachment statute by a private party does not transform that party into a state actor.24 He maintained that only the state officials who issue and execute the writ are state actors.25
Marshall argued that the private creditor has simply used the courts as any litigant may.26 He warned that the decision would open the federal courts to a flood of litigation never intended by Congress when it enacted § 1983.27
Marshall viewed the holding as an unwarranted expansion of the state-action doctrine.28
Justice Stevens dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks.29 He viewed the Court’s decision as inconsistent with Flagg Brothers and as an unwarranted expansion of § 1983 that improperly equates private use of state procedures with state action.30
Stevens argued that the majority’s approach would subject private litigants to federal liability for routine use of state judicial processes.31 He maintained that the holding conflicts with the limits on § 1983 recognized in prior precedent.32
Whether the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the under-color-of-state-law requirement of § 1983 are identical?
In cases under § 1983 the under-color-of-state-law requirement has consistently been treated as the same thing as the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. This identity holds at least when the claim is that a private party jointly participated with state officials.
Yes. The Court has long held that the two requirements are identical, as stated in United States v. Price and applied in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.33
Here the private respondents jointly engaged with the state clerk and sheriff in the seizure of property pursuant to the Virginia statute.34 Because that conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, it also satisfies the statutory requirement of action under color of state law.35
The Court of Appeals’ contrary construction, which treated the requirements as distinct when private parties are involved, is inconsistent with precedent and with the congressional purpose of providing a remedy coextensive with Fourteenth Amendment protections.36
The state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the under-color-of-state-law requirement of § 1983 are identical in this context.
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger maintained that the inquiry remains whether the claimed infringement is fairly attributable to the State regardless of whether the suit is brought under § 1983 or directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.37 He concluded that respondents’ conduct was not attributable to the State because they did no more than invoke a presumptively valid prejudgment attachment procedure available to all.38
Burger viewed the majority’s conflation of the inquiries as erroneous and unsupported by precedent because the subsequent steps by state officials do not transform private conduct into state action.39 He warned that the majority’s approach would convert routine private litigation into federal constitutional claims never intended by Congress.40
Justice Powell argued that the two inquiries mandated by Flagg Brothers must remain separate.41 He faulted the majority for conflating them and for failing to ask whether the private respondent’s own conduct occurred under color of law.42
Powell stressed that the distinction between state action by officials and private conduct under color of law preserves important limits on federal jurisdiction.43 He warned that collapsing the inquiries would expose private litigants to unexpected constitutional liability for merely invoking established judicial processes.44
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall’s dissent implicitly treats the requirements as distinct by concluding that state officials alone perform state action while the private creditor’s invocation of the statute does not rise to action under color of state law.45 He maintained that the private party remains a private litigant even when using state procedures.46
Marshall argued that only official conduct by the clerk and sheriff qualifies as state action.47 He viewed the majority’s equation of the two requirements as an overbroad expansion of § 1983 that would open federal courts to litigation Congress never intended.48
Justice Stevens’ dissent, resting on Flagg Brothers, treats the state-action and under-color-of-state-law inquiries as retaining independent force.49 He viewed the majority’s holding as an expansion beyond what Flagg Brothers permits.50
Stevens argued that the decision improperly equates private use of state procedures with state action.51 He maintained that the two requirements serve distinct purposes in limiting federal jurisdiction over private conduct and that the holding conflicts with established precedent.52
Whether a private party’s joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action are acting under color of law for purposes of § 1983. It is enough that the private party is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.
Yes. Edmondson Oil filed the ex parte petition and bond required by the Virginia statute.53 The clerk issued the writ and the sheriff executed it, thereby sequestering Lugar’s property.54
This sequence demonstrates joint participation between the private creditor and state officials in the seizure.55 The Court has consistently held that such joint participation in prejudgment attachment procedures satisfies the state-action requirement, as in the line of cases from Sniadach through North Georgia Finishing.56
The Court of Appeals’ additional requirement of usurpation or corruption of official power is not supported by precedent and is rejected.57
A private party’s joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a state actor.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell rejected the joint-participation theory as applied to a private party that merely invokes presumptively valid judicial process.58 He argued that the majority’s rule would convert routine litigation into state action without any showing of conspiracy or corruption.59
Powell maintained that the distinction between private and state conduct must be preserved to avoid imposing constitutional liability on innocent litigants.60 He stressed that the holding unjustly subjects private parties to protracted federal suits for following established procedures that had never before been viewed as state action.61
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall maintained that joint participation requires more than filing a petition.62 He argued that only the officials who issue and execute the writ qualify as state actors.63
Marshall concluded that the private creditor remains a private litigant even when using state procedures.64 He viewed the majority’s holding as an unwarranted expansion of the state-action doctrine beyond prior precedent.65
He warned that treating routine use of judicial process as joint participation would flood federal courts with § 1983 claims Congress never intended.
Justice Stevens viewed the majority’s joint-participation holding as inconsistent with Flagg Brothers and therefore insufficient to convert private conduct into state action.66 He argued that the decision improperly equates routine use of state procedures with state action.67
Stevens maintained that the holding conflicts with the limits recognized in Flagg Brothers.68 He warned that the expansion would subject private litigants to federal constitutional claims for ordinary litigation conduct that had previously been treated as purely private.69
Chief Justice Burger concluded that invoking the attachment procedure does not make the private party’s conduct fairly attributable to the State.70 He argued that even though state officials later act on the petition, the private conduct remains private.71
Burger maintained that the majority’s approach would transform routine private litigation into state action.72 He viewed the holding as inconsistent with the requirement that the infringement be fairly attributable to the State and noted that remedies should remain in private suits such as malicious prosecution.73
Whether a private creditor’s mere invocation of a presumptively valid state prejudgment attachment procedure, without collusion or concerted action with state officials, constitutes action under color of state law?
When the State has created a system whereby state officials will attach property on the ex parte application of one party to a private dispute, the private party’s invocation of that system, coupled with the aid of state officials, constitutes joint participation sufficient for state action and action under color of state law.
Yes. Edmondson invoked the Virginia attachment statute by filing the required affidavit and bond alleging that Lugar was disposing of property to defeat creditors.74 The clerk and sheriff then issued and executed the writ.75
Although no prior collusion is alleged, the statutory scheme itself supplies the joint participation because the State has delegated to private parties the ability to trigger official attachment.76 This is the precise situation addressed in the garnishment and attachment cases, and it satisfies both the state-action and under-color-of-state-law requirements.77
The Court of Appeals’ insistence on usurpation or corruption of official power is not required.78
A private creditor’s invocation of the state prejudgment attachment procedure, when executed by state officials, constitutes action under color of state law.
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that merely commencing a lawsuit and obtaining temporary relief through established judicial process does not transform private conduct into state action.79 He argued that even when state officials carry out the attachment, the private party’s conduct remains private.80
Burger maintained that the majority’s rule is inconsistent with the requirement of fair attribution to the State.81 He noted that petitioner’s remedy lies in private suits rather than an expansion of § 1983 beyond anything intended by Congress.82
Justice Powell argued that the majority’s rule is unprecedented and that a private party who files a sequestration petition in good faith under a presumptively valid statute does not act under color of law or become a state actor.83 He stressed that the holding unjustly subjects an innocent litigant to protracted federal litigation.84
Powell maintained that the distinction between private and state conduct must be preserved.85 He viewed the decision as inconsistent with the mode of inquiry prescribed by prior cases that had never treated routine invocation of judicial process as state action.86
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall maintained that the private creditor has done nothing more than use the courts as any litigant may.87 He argued that the state officials alone are the state actors.88
Marshall concluded that the private party’s invocation of the statute does not rise to action under color of state law.89 He warned that the decision would open the federal courts to a flood of litigation never intended by Congress when it enacted § 1983.
Justice Stevens dissented on the basis that the holding expands § 1983 beyond the limits recognized in Flagg Brothers.90 He argued that the majority’s approach improperly equates private use of state procedures with state action.91
Stevens maintained that the decision is inconsistent with Flagg Brothers and represents an unwarranted expansion of federal jurisdiction.92 He viewed the holding as conflicting with established limits on the reach of § 1983 that had previously kept ordinary litigation conduct outside federal constitutional claims.93