504 U.S. 555 (1992)
In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man.1 In 1978 the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior on actions taken in foreign nations.2 In 1986 the Secretary promulgated a revised regulation that limited the consultation obligation to actions within the United States or on the high seas.3
Shortly after the 1986 regulation took effect, Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Secretary of the Interior.4 The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid as to its geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation mandating consultation for foreign projects.5 The complaint alleged that the absence of consultation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species.6 The complaint further alleged that some of the organizations' members observed these species both domestically and abroad.7
Respondents supported their allegations with affidavits from two members.8 Joyce Kelly stated that she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return.9 Kelly further stated that she would suffer harm from the United States role in the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam.10 Amy Skilbred stated that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat of endangered species including the Asian elephant and leopard at the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development, and intended to return.11 Skilbred admitted she had no current plans to return because of a civil war.12
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing.13 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.14 On remand the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing.15 The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the merits and enjoined the Secretary from applying the regulation to foreign countries.16 The Eighth Circuit affirmed.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
Whether respondents have standing under Article III to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's 1986 regulation limiting the geographic scope of the Endangered Species Act consultation requirement?19
The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.20 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.21 Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.22 Third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.23
No. The established facts show that respondents filed suit after the 1986 regulation took effect.24 Respondents alleged increased extinction rates from lack of consultation on foreign projects.25 Respondents alleged that members observed species domestically and abroad.26 The Kelly and Skilbred affidavits described past visits to Egypt and Sri Lanka with vague intentions to return.27
These facts fail the first element because the affidavits establish only past exposure and indefinite future plans rather than imminent concrete injury to the affiants themselves.28 The facts further fail the third element because the agencies funding the projects were not parties.29 The Secretary's regulation was not binding on them according to the Solicitor General's position.30 Any relief against the Secretary alone would not compel consultation or alter project funding decisions by independent actors.31
Respondents lack Article III standing, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Souter
Justice Kennedy agreed that respondents failed to demonstrate they were among the injured.33 The affidavits lacked concrete plans showing imminent harm.34 He concurred that the citizen-suit provision does not itself establish injury in any person by virtue of a violation.35
He emphasized that Congress must identify the injury and relate it to the class of persons entitled to sue.36 He would not reach redressability or the zone of interests under the ESA.37 Kennedy stressed that the concrete injury requirement preserves the adversarial process and confines the Judicial Branch to its proper role.38
He noted that modern litigation requires sensitivity to new rights of action but that the ESA citizen-suit provision fails to meet minimal requirements for establishing injury.39
Whether respondents demonstrated a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury in fact from the regulation?40
To establish injury in fact a plaintiff must show an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.41 Past exposure to illegal conduct does not show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by continuing present adverse effects.42 Some day intentions without concrete plans do not support actual or imminent injury.43
No. The established facts of the Kelly affidavit describe a 1986 visit to Egypt and an intent to return to observe the Nile crocodile without any current plans or description of when the return would occur.44 The Skilbred affidavit describes a 1981 visit to Sri Lanka and an intent to return to observe the Asian elephant and leopard but admits no plans exist because of civil war.45 These facts show only past visits and indefinite future intentions rather than the required imminent concrete and particularized injury to the individual members.46
Respondents failed to demonstrate injury in fact.47
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Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the standing analysis.48 He concluded that respondents had standing because a person who has visited the critical habitat of an endangered species has a professional interest in preserving the species and intends to revisit has standing.49 He measured imminence by the timing of the environmental harm rather than the timing of the next visit.50
He found the affidavits sufficient to show genuine interest.51 Stevens reasoned that injury occurs when action harms the species and habitat and that the likelihood of injury is not speculative if respondents intend to study or observe the animals.52 He viewed the professional backgrounds and past visits as evidence that the affiants would return and suffer harm from species destruction.53
Whether any alleged injury is fairly traceable to the challenged regulation and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision?54
Causation requires that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.55 Redressability requires that it be likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.56
No. The established facts show that respondents challenged only the Secretary's regulation rather than specific funding decisions by AID and other agencies.57 Those agencies were not parties to the suit.58 The agencies supplied only a fraction of project funding while foreign governments retained ultimate control.59 These facts render any causal link attenuated and redressability speculative because an order requiring the Secretary to revise the regulation would not bind the nonparty agencies or guarantee termination of funding or modification of foreign projects.60
Respondents failed to demonstrate causation and redressability.61
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
Justice Blackmun dissented and would have held that respondents raised genuine issues of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment on both injury and redressability.62 He argued that the affidavits and deposition testimony created a triable issue whether Kelly and Skilbred would return to the sites.63 He argued that the action agencies had sufficient involvement in the litigation to be bound by principles of collateral estoppel, making redressability likely.64
Blackmun contended that a reasonable finder of fact could conclude from past visits, professional backgrounds, and testimony that the affiants would return.65 He criticized the majority for demanding detailed future plans and for ignoring the agencies' participation that bound them to the outcome.66
Whether the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act confers standing on the basis of a procedural injury without any showing of concrete harm to the plaintiffs?67
A plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the laws does not state an Article III case or controversy.68 Congress may not convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an individual right vindicable in the courts.69
No. The established facts show that respondents relied on the ESA citizen-suit provision to assert a procedural right to consultation.70 Respondents did so without identifying any particular project causing particularized harm to particular members.71 They also failed to identify any discrete injury flowing from the failure to consult.72 These facts present only an abstract procedural grievance shared by all citizens rather than a concrete injury to the respondents themselves.73
The citizen-suit provision does not confer standing on the basis of procedural injury alone.74
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
Justice Blackmun dissented from the majority's rejection of procedural injury standing.75 He argued that the ESA citizen-suit provision supplies a concrete procedural right tied directly to the protection of endangered species and that the consultation requirement functions as an action-forcing mechanism to prevent substantive environmental harm. Blackmun contended that the majority's approach unduly restricts Congress's constitutional authority to authorize citizen suits enforcing statutory procedures designed to avert concrete harm to protected interests.
He maintained that procedural duties are so enmeshed with the prevention of substantive injury that breach of those duties alone can establish the requisite likelihood of injury for standing purposes.76 In his view the decision transfers power from Congress to the Executive and threatens to render many congressionally mandated procedural safeguards unenforceable in federal court.77 Blackmun would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.78