512 U.S. 753 (1994)
Respondents operate a medical clinic in Melbourne, Florida, that offers abortions among other services.1 The clinic is located on Dixie Highway, a major traffic artery in the city.2 The clinic property occupies less than one acre and is bounded on the north and south by other commercial property, on the west by a two-lane road, and on the east by a parking lot and an intersecting street.3
In September 1992, a group of antiabortion protesters began picketing the clinic.4 The protesters, whose number varied from 10 to 40 on any given day, engaged in a variety of activities near the clinic.5 They sang, chanted, and carried signs and banners.6 They also distributed literature to, and engaged in conversations with, people approaching the clinic.7 Although the protesters were generally nonviolent, they occasionally trespassed onto clinic property and blocked access to the clinic.8 They also picketed the nearby residences of some of the clinic's employees.9
In response to these activities, the clinic obtained an injunction from the Florida Circuit Court.10 The initial injunction prohibited trespassing on or entering clinic property, blocking or interfering with access to or egress from the clinic, physically or verbally abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic, making loud or raucous noise within earshot of the clinic during specified hours, physically approaching any person seeking clinic services within 300 feet unless the person indicates a desire to communicate, using any images observable by patients inside the clinic, and picketing or demonstrating within 300 feet of clinic employees' residences.
After the initial injunction proved insufficient, protesters continued to impede access to the clinic by congregating on the paved portion of Dixie Way and marching in front of the clinic's driveways.11 Sidewalk counselors approached vehicles heading toward the clinic.12 The number of people congregating varied from a handful to 400, and the noise varied from singing and chanting to the use of loudspeakers and bullhorns.13 The trial court issued a broader amended injunction that established a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway, noise restrictions during surgical procedures and recovery periods, a 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic, a 300-foot buffer zone around employees' residences, and an in concert provision. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the amended injunction.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.15
Whether the state court injunction is subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment as a content- or viewpoint-based restriction on speech?16
No. The state court issued the amended injunction after petitioners' activities substantially hindered patients' access to the clinic and caused patients to miss appointments.19 Protesters congregated on the paved portion of Dixie Way, marched in front of the clinic's driveways, and used sidewalk counselors to approach vehicles.20 The purpose was to restrain petitioners' prior unlawful conduct of blocking access and trespassing, not to suppress their antiabortion message.21 The restrictions are imposed for reasons unrelated to the content of petitioners' speech.22
The state court injunction is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment as a content- or viewpoint-based restriction on speech.23
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Joined by Kennedy, Thomas
Justice Scalia contended that the injunction is viewpoint based because it targets only those demonstrating the pro-life position.24 He pointed to the trial judge's statements at the April 12, 1993 hearing that the injunction applies in effect only to people demonstrating the pro-life position. The judge explained that the word in concert with means in concert with those who had taken a position adverse to the clinic.
Scalia argued that this selective enforcement demonstrates that the injunction was tailored to restrain persons distinguished not by proscribable conduct but by proscribable views. He maintained that the injunction therefore demanded strict scrutiny rather than the diluted standard applied by the majority.
Whether the 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and exits burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake?25
A content-neutral injunction restricting speech in a public forum must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest such as ensuring public safety, protecting a woman's freedom to seek medical services, and ensuring the free flow of traffic on public streets.26
No. The 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway is supported by the record showing that petitioners' activities substantially hindered patients' access to the clinic.27 Protesters congregated on the paved portion of Dixie Way and marched in front of the clinic's driveways, causing vehicles to slow or stop.28 The state court originally issued a narrower injunction without a buffer zone that failed to protect access.29 The 36-foot zone is a reasonable restriction that places protesters no more than 10 to 12 feet from approaching cars while still allowing them to be seen and heard from the clinic parking lots.30
The 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and exits does not burden more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake.31
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Justice Stevens joined the majority in upholding the 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway.32 He emphasized that the trial judge heard three days of testimony and found that petitioners had repeatedly violated the earlier injunction. Stevens argued that the buffer zone was a remedy tailored to proven unlawful conduct rather than a legislative proscription applicable to the general public.
He stressed that injunctive relief should be judged by a more lenient standard than legislation because injunctions apply solely to individuals who have engaged in illegal conduct and have been judicially deprived of some liberty.
Whether the noise restriction during surgical procedures burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake?33
A content-neutral injunction may impose limited noise restrictions that are narrowly tailored to serve the significant governmental interest in protecting patients from excessive noise during surgery and recovery periods at a medical facility.34 The restriction applies only during specified hours.
No. The noise restriction during the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays during surgical procedures and recovery periods is narrowly tailored to the significant governmental interest in protecting patients from excessive noise.35 Noise from singing, chanting, and bullhorns could be heard inside the clinic causing stress to patients during procedures and recovery.36 The restriction burdens no more speech than necessary because it applies only during specified hours and only to sounds audible inside the clinic.37
The noise restriction during surgical procedures does not burden more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake.38
Whether the 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake?39
A content-neutral injunction may not impose a 300-foot no-approach zone around a clinic that prohibits all uninvited approaches of persons seeking services.40 The prohibition is invalid unless the record contains sufficient justification showing that the protesters' speech is independently proscribable or so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat.41
Yes. The 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic burdens more speech than necessary because the record contains no evidence that petitioners engaged in stalking, shadowing, or any independently proscribable conduct such as fighting words or threats.42 The zone instead prohibits peaceful approaches and sidewalk counseling within 300 feet even when the contact is non-threatening.43 The record shows only that protesters distributed literature and engaged in conversations, which does not justify banning all uninvited approaches on public ways on both sides of the street.
The 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake.44
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Justice Kennedy dissented from the majority's treatment of the 300-foot zones.45 He argued that the injunction's broad restrictions on speech in traditional public forums lacked sufficient justification in the record. Kennedy maintained that the Court should have applied strict scrutiny to this speech-restricting injunction rather than a diluted standard because injunctions lend themselves to targeted suppression of particular ideas and are the product of individual judges.
He concluded that the 300-foot zones swept too broadly and violated the First Amendment.
Whether the 300-foot buffer zone around the residences of clinic employees burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake?46
A content-neutral injunction may not impose a 300-foot buffer zone around the residences of clinic employees that bans all picketing and demonstrating in the neighborhoods.47 The record must contain sufficient justification, and a narrower limitation on time, duration, and number of pickets could accomplish the goal of protecting residential privacy.
Yes. The 300-foot buffer zone around the residences of clinic employees burdens more speech than necessary because the record shows only that petitioners picketed in front of clinic employees' residences, shouted at passersby, and provided literature identifying employees as baby killers.48 There was no evidence of violence or sustained harassment that would justify banning all picketing within 300 feet of any employee's home.49 The zone sweeps in too much protected speech by prohibiting general marching through residential neighborhoods.50
The 300-foot buffer zone around the residences of clinic employees burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake.51
Whether the in concert provision of the injunction is overbroad?52
An in concert provision in an injunction is not overbroad when it applies only to persons acting in concert with the named defendants who have actual notice of the injunction.53 The provision is narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest in protecting the health and safety of clinic patients and staff.
No. The in concert provision is not overbroad because the Florida Supreme Court held that it applies only to persons acting in concert with the named defendants who have actual notice of the injunction.54 The provision was designed to prevent evasion by unnamed protesters who joined the named petitioners in blocking access and creating noise at the clinic.55 The provision is a content-neutral time, place, and manner limitation that burdens no more speech than necessary.56
The in concert provision of the injunction is not overbroad.57
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Justice Souter joined the Court's opinion and wrote separately to clarify two matters in the record. First, the trial judge made reasonably clear that the issue of who was acting in concert with the named defendants was a matter to be taken up in individual cases, and not to be decided on the basis of protesters' viewpoints. Second, petitioners themselves acknowledge that the governmental interests in protection of public safety and order, of the free flow of traffic, and of property rights are reflected in Florida law.
Souter emphasized that the injunction was not designed to suppress viewpoints but to address specific conduct that had violated prior court orders.
Whether the images observable provision burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake?58
A content-neutral injunction may not impose a blanket ban on all images observable inside a clinic when the record does not show that the images constitute threats or when the clinic can simply pull its curtains to avoid any anxiety caused by disagreeable expression.59
Yes. The images observable provision burdens more speech than necessary because the record contains no evidence that the images used by petitioners constituted threats or veiled threats to patients.60 The blanket ban on all images observable from the clinic property instead prohibits protected expression that patients could avoid by pulling curtains.61 The provision is not narrowly tailored to any significant governmental interest in preventing intimidation.62
The images observable provision burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake.63