588 F.2d 626 (1978)
On March 23, 1973, three-year-old Daniel Mahlandt was sent by his mother to retrieve his older brother from a neighbor's home on an adjoining street.1 His path took him along a walkway next to the Poos residence, where a five-foot chain-link fence separated the walkway from the area in which the wolf Sophie was chained with a six-foot chain.2
Sophie was an eleven-month-old wolf born at the St. Louis Zoo and later transferred to the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc.3 Kenneth Poos, the Center's Director of Education, had been keeping Sophie at his home to take her to schools and institutions for educational programs about wolves.4 The evening before the incident, Sophie had jumped the fence and attacked a beagle running along the fence.5
A neighbor who was ill in bed heard a child's screams, went to his window, and saw a boy lying on his back within the enclosure with a wolf straddling him.6 Within about fifteen seconds the neighbor saw seventeen-year-old Clarke Poos run around the house, get the wolf off the boy, and carry the child away.7 Clarke found Daniel lying inside the enclosure about three feet from the fence, with Sophie standing back the length of her chain and wailing.8 Daniel's mother reported that Clarke told her a wolf had gotten Danny and he was dying, though Clarke denied making that statement.9 Kenneth Poos arrived home while Daniel and his mother were still in the kitchen.10
Within an hour after arriving home, Poos went to Washington University and left a note on the door of Center president Owen Sexton stating that Sophie had bitten a child that came into the backyard.11 Later that same day Poos found Sexton at the Tyson Research Center and told him that Sophie had bitten a child that day.12 A meeting of the directors of the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc. was held on April 4, 1973, at which Mr. Poos was not present.13 The minutes of that meeting recorded a great deal of discussion about the legal aspects of the incident of Sophie biting the child.14
Daniel sustained lacerations of the face, left thigh, left calf, and right thigh, along with abrasions and bruises of the abdomen and chest.15 No witness saw or knew how Daniel was injured, and examinations of the fence and the wounds raised questions about whether the injuries were caused by the fence rather than by the wolf.16 The case was tried to a jury in federal district court, which returned a verdict for the defendants.17 The trial judge had excluded the note, the oral statement to Sexton, and the reference in the corporate minutes on the ground that none of the declarants had personal knowledge of the underlying facts.18 The matter reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on appeal from those three evidentiary rulings.19
Whether the note left by Kenneth Poos stating that Sophie bit a child was properly excluded from evidence at trial?20
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if offered against a party and is his own statement in either his individual or representative capacity or a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment made during the existence of the relationship. The freedom which admissions have enjoyed from technical demands of searching for an assurance of trustworthiness in some against-interest circumstances, and from the restrictive influences of the opinion rule and the rule requiring first hand knowledge, calls for generous treatment of this avenue to admissibility.21
No. Kenneth Poos left the note on Owen Sexton's door within an hour after arriving home on March 23, 1973 stating that Sophie bit a child that came into the backyard.22 This note constitutes Poos's own statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) because it was written by him and manifested his adoption or belief in its truth.23 The note also qualifies under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) as a statement by an agent concerning a matter within the scope of his employment.24 Poos served as Director of Education for the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center Inc. and maintained custody of Sophie at his home for educational programs.25
The trial court excluded the note solely because Poos lacked personal knowledge yet the rule contains no such requirement.26 Rule 403 does not warrant exclusion given the absence of unfair prejudice beyond ordinary relevance.27 The note therefore should have been admitted against both Poos and the corporate defendant.28
The trial court erred in excluding the note and the judgment must be reversed on this ground.29
Whether Kenneth Poos's oral statement to Owen Sexton that Sophie had bitten a child was properly excluded from evidence at trial?30
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if offered against a party and is his own statement in either his individual or representative capacity or a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment made during the existence of the relationship. Communication to an outsider has not generally been thought to be an essential characteristic of an admission.
No. Later the same day Poos found Sexton at the Tyson Research Center and stated that Sophie had bit a child that day.31 This oral statement is Poos's own statement admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and qualifies independently under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) because it concerned the custody of Sophie, a matter within the scope of Poos's agency as Director of Education, and was made while the agency relationship existed.32 The trial court's hearsay and personal-knowledge objections do not apply because the rule treats the statement as non-hearsay and imposes no personal-knowledge prerequisite.33 Rule 403 supplies no basis for exclusion because the probative value of the admission is not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice.34
The trial court erred in excluding the oral statement and the judgment must be reversed on this ground.35
Whether the reference in the minutes of the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center board meeting to the incident of Sophie biting the child was properly excluded from evidence at trial?36
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if offered against a party and is a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth or a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject. A party's books or records are usable against him without regard to any intent to disclose to third persons.37
Yes. The minutes of the April 4, 1973 board meeting recorded a great deal of discussion about the legal aspects of the incident of Sophie biting the child.38 The directors possessed authority to include their conclusions in the corporate records so the entry falls within Rule 801(d)(2)(C) as an authorized statement and is admissible against the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center Inc.39 The entry is not admissible against Poos individually because no agency or servant relationship existed that would bind him to statements made at a meeting he did not attend.40 Although the minutes satisfy Rule 801(d)(2), the trial court properly excluded them under Rule 403 because their limited admissibility against only the corporation, their repetitive nature, and their low probative value justified exclusion.41
The trial court properly excluded the corporate minutes under Rule 403 although they were admissible against the corporation under Rule 801(d)(2)(C).42
Whether any of the three excluded statements were admissible against defendant Kenneth Poos individually?43
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if offered against a party and is his own statement in either his individual or representative capacity. None of the conditions of Rule 801(d)(2) cover the claim that minutes of a corporate board meeting can be used against a non-attending non-participating employee of that corporation.44
Yes. The note left on Sexton's door and the oral statement made later the same day were both Poos's own statements and therefore admissible against him under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).45 The corporate minutes however were not admissible against Poos because he neither attended the April 4, 1973 meeting nor participated in the discussion and no agency relationship bound him to the directors' recorded conclusions.46 The trial court's uniform exclusion of all three items on personal-knowledge grounds therefore was incorrect as to the note and the oral statement but correct as to the minutes when offered against Poos.47
The note and the oral statement were admissible against Kenneth Poos individually while the corporate minutes were not.48
Whether any of the three excluded statements were admissible against defendant Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc.?49
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if offered against a party and is a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment made during the existence of the relationship. Once agency and the making of the statement while the relationship continues are established the statement is exempt from the hearsay rule so long as it relates to a matter within the scope of the agency.50
Yes. Both the note and the oral statement were made by Poos while he served as Director of Education and concerned his custody of Sophie, a matter within the scope of his employment, so both statements are admissible against the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center Inc. under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).51 The corporate minutes are admissible against the corporation under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) because the directors possessed authority to record their conclusions yet the minutes remain excludable under Rule 403 for the reasons already stated.52 The trial court's exclusion of the note and oral statement therefore was error as to the corporate defendant.53
The note and the oral statement were admissible against the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center Inc. while the corporate minutes although satisfying Rule 801(d)(2)(C) were properly excluded under Rule 403.54