84 Wash. 2d 975, 530 P.2d 254 (1975)
William L. Maltman, serving as administrator of the estates of John M. Rudock, Gary Charles Nistler, and Gerald Rybacki, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Peter H. Sauer and his father Gerd Sauer.1 The suit sought recovery for the surviving family members of the decedents following the helicopter crash.2
That evening, Peter Sauer’s car, registered to Gerd Sauer, crashed east of North Bend, Washington.3 State Trooper W. P. Isom reached the scene at 9:10 p.m. and arranged for emergency transport using the MAST military helicopter program by contacting Fort Lewis.4
The dispatched helicopter carried army personnel Rudock, Nistler, Rybacki, and Lieutenant Curt Heady.5 The aircraft crashed while flying toward the accident site pickup location, resulting in the deaths of the entire crew.6 No determination of the crash cause appears in the case record.7
Maltman’s complaint asserted liability based on the rescue doctrine.8 On February 13, 1973, the defendants obtained summary judgment from the trial court under CR 56.9 The Court of Appeals, Division One, received the appeal but transferred the case directly to the Washington Supreme Court on June 21, 1974.10
Whether the rescue doctrine applies to professional rescuers such as military helicopter crew members responding to an accident?11
The proper test for determining a professional rescuer’s right to recovery under the rescue doctrine is whether the hazard ultimately responsible for causing the injury is inherently within the ambit of those dangers which are unique to and generally associated with the particular rescue activity.12 It is the business of professional rescuers to deal with those hazards.13 Such an individual cannot complain of the negligence which created the actual necessity for exposure to those hazards.14 When the injury is the result of a hazard generally recognized as being within the scope of dangers identified with the particular rescue operation, the doctrine will be unavailable to that plaintiff.15
No. The decedents Rudock, Nistler, and Rybacki were active members of the United States Army serving as the crew of a helicopter dispatched under the MAST program in response to the defendant's automobile accident.16 A danger unique to helicopter rescues is the possibility of a mechanical malfunction in the airplane or pilot error, either of which could cause a crash.17 Therefore, a helicopter crew is specially trained to meet these known hazards.18 These hazards are inherently within the ambit of those dangers unique to and generally associated with this particular rescue operation.19
Conversely, these hazards are not hidden, unknown, and extra hazardous dangers which would not be reasonably anticipated or foreseen by the decedent professional rescuers.20 The court therefore held as a matter of law that the rescue doctrine was not available to the decedents.21
The rescue doctrine does not apply to the professional rescuers in this case because the helicopter crash resulted from an inherent hazard of their rescue activity.22
Whether the risk of mechanical malfunction or pilot error in a helicopter constitutes an inherent hazard of military rescue operations?23
Those dangers which are inherent in professional rescue activity, and therefore foreseeable, are willingly submitted to by the professional rescuer when he accepts the position and the remuneration inextricably connected therewith.24 The professional rescuer does not assume all the hazards that may be present in a particular rescue operation.25 It does not follow that a professional rescuer must be deemed as a matter of law to have voluntarily assumed all hidden, unknown, and extrahazardous dangers which in the existing conditions would not be reasonably anticipated or foreseen.26
Yes. A danger unique to helicopter rescues is the possibility of a mechanical malfunction in the airplane or pilot error, either of which could cause a crash.27 Therefore, a helicopter crew is specially trained to meet these known hazards. They are hazards inherently within the ambit of those dangers unique to and generally associated with this particular rescue operation.28
The court applied this principle to conclude that the decedents could not recover under the rescue doctrine for injuries resulting from such a hazard.29
The risk of mechanical malfunction or pilot error constitutes an inherent hazard of military helicopter rescue operations that bars application of the rescue doctrine.30
Whether the defendant's automobile accident created a foreseeable peril that encompassed the subsequent helicopter crash under traditional tort duty analysis?31
The hazard that brought about or assisted in bringing about the result must be among the hazards to be perceived reasonably and with respect to which defendant’s conduct was negligent.32 The harm sustained must be reasonably perceived as being within the general field of danger covered by the specific duty owed by the defendant.33 There is no dispute that some duty did exist on behalf of the defendant, since the danger created by the defendant’s negligence did invite rescue.34 However, the accident suffered by the helicopter crew was too remote from the actual realm of peril created by the defendant’s original negligence to come within that duty.35
No. Some duty existed because the danger created by the defendant’s negligence did invite rescue.36 However, the accident suffered by the helicopter crew was too remote from the actual realm of peril created by the defendant’s original negligence to come within that duty.37 The defendant’s duty only encompassed those hazards which were legally attributable to that conduct which initiated the rescue activity.38 Under the facts of this case, it is inconceivable that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to assure against a helicopter crash en route to the predetermined pickup point.39
The court agreed with the defendant that the facts failed to meet the requirements of duty and foreseeability.40
The defendant's automobile accident did not create a foreseeable peril that encompassed the subsequent helicopter crash under traditional tort duty analysis.41
Whether the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the helicopter crew deaths when the crash occurred en route to the scene?42
Regardless of whether a plaintiff is a voluntary or professional rescuer, he must show that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate and legal cause of his injury.43 A finding of proximate cause is premised upon proof of cause in fact, as well as the legal determination that liability should attach.44 Cause in fact requires proof that there was a sufficiently close, actual, causal connection between defendant’s conduct and the actual damage suffered by plaintiff.45 The original negligence of the defendant, which placed him in his present imperiled predicament, must be an active factor in the course of events which ultimately culminates in injury to the plaintiff.46 The plaintiff’s injury must not be the result of an intervening cause which came into active operation after the negligence of the defendant has ceased.47
No. The injuries resulted not directly from the defendant’s negligence but, rather, from an intervening cause only tenuously related and totally unforeseeable, in a causal sense, to the original condition attributable to the defendant’s conduct.48 The record fails to show a sufficiently close, actual causal connection between the tragedy which struck the decedents and the original negligence of the defendant in causing an automobile accident.49 To invoke the doctrine the defendant must be guilty of some negligence toward the rescuer after he, the rescuer, has begun to attempt the rescue.50 The court concluded that neither the record actually presented, nor any inference logically attributable thereto, could, in law, lead to a result favorable to the plaintiff on the issue of proximate cause.51
The defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the helicopter crew deaths when the crash occurred en route to the scene.52
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the rescue doctrine and traditional tort claims?53
In summary, the plaintiff should be denied recovery in this case for the reasons that the decedents, as professional rescuers, did not come within the rescue doctrine under the facts of the case and that as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to establish a right to recovery under the traditional formula of tort law.54 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.55
Yes. The decedents as professional rescuers did not come within the rescue doctrine under the facts of the case because the helicopter crash was an inherent hazard.56 As a matter of law, the plaintiff also failed to establish a right to recovery under the traditional formula of tort law on the separate grounds of duty, foreseeability, and proximate cause.57 The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to CR 56, and the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment.58
The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants because the rescue doctrine did not apply and the traditional elements of tort recovery were not satisfied as a matter of law.59