367 U.S. 643 (1961)
Dollree Mapp stood trial in an Ohio state court for the possession of obscene materials.1 On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at appellant's residence pursuant to information that a person was hiding in the home who was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing and that there was a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home.2 The appellant, after consulting with her attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant.3
The officers returned with additional officers and forcibly entered the home by breaking a door.4 They conducted a thorough search of the home including the appellant's bedroom, her child's bedroom, the living room, kitchen, and basement.5 The search yielded the obscene materials for which the appellant was later charged and convicted, and no search warrant was produced at the trial.6
The appellant was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County.7 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction.8 The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal from that decision.9
Whether the evidence seized from the appellant’s home was admissible in the state court?10
All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in a state court.11 The exclusionary rule is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy made enforceable against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Wolf v. Colorado is overruled in part.13
No. On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at Dollree Mapp's residence pursuant to information that a person was hiding in the home who was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing and that there was a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home. The appellant, after consulting with her attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant. The officers returned with additional officers and forcibly entered the home by breaking a door.
They conducted a thorough search of the home including the appellant's bedroom, her child's bedroom, the living room, kitchen, and basement. The search yielded the obscene materials for which the appellant was later charged and convicted, and no search warrant was produced at the trial. These facts establish an unreasonable search and seizure that requires exclusion of the evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment.14
The evidence is inadmissible in the state court and the conviction must be reversed.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black concurred in the judgment and in the opinion of the Court.16 He explained that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure be excluded from state criminal proceedings.17 The decision today overrules Wolf v. Colorado in part and brings the States into line with the federal rule.18
Black further reasoned that the close interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provides a constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule that justifies its application to the States.19
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment.20 He emphasized that this criminal proceeding started with a lawless search and seizure when police entered a home forcefully and seized documents later used to convict the occupant.21 Douglas argued that without judicial action making the exclusionary rule applicable to the States, Wolf reduced the Fourth Amendment guarantee to a dead letter.22
He noted that other remedies such as internal police discipline or trespass actions are illusory and fail to protect the right to privacy.23 Douglas viewed the overruling of Wolf as necessary to restore meaningful force to the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in state proceedings.24
Joined by Justices Frankfurter And Whittaker
Justice Harlan dissented.25 He argued that the Court today overrules Wolf v. Colorado and imposes the federal exclusionary rule upon the States as a matter of constitutional compulsion.26 Harlan viewed this as an unwarranted extension of federal authority into the domain of state criminal procedure.27
He maintained that the States should be free to develop their own rules of evidence and procedure so long as they do not violate fundamental fairness.28 Harlan concluded that the judgment should be affirmed.29
Justice Stewart dissented.30 He agreed fully with Part I of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion but expressed no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue which the Court today decides.31 He would, however, reverse the judgment in this case, because he was persuaded that the provision of § 2905.34 of the Ohio Revised Code, upon which the petitioner's conviction was based, is not consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.32
Stewart would reverse the conviction on that ground and not reach the Fourth Amendment question decided by the Court.33
Whether the exclusionary rule applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment?34
Yes. Since the decision in Wolf, half of the States have adopted the exclusionary rule.37 The experience of these States has demonstrated that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of the right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.38 The Court holds that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.39
The rule that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search is inadmissible in a federal court is no longer to be deemed a rule of evidence only.40 It is a constitutional command.41 The same command applies to the States.42
The exclusionary rule applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.43
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black concurred in the judgment and in the opinion of the Court. He explained that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure be excluded from state criminal proceedings. The decision today overrules Wolf v. Colorado in part and brings the States into line with the federal rule.
Black further reasoned that the close interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provides a constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule that justifies its application to the States.
Joined by Justices Frankfurter And Whittaker
Justice Harlan dissented from the imposition of the exclusionary rule on the States.44 He argued that Wolf represented sounder constitutional doctrine and that the Court had forgotten judicial restraint in overruling it.45 Harlan maintained that the exclusionary rule is a remedy rather than a constitutional command and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the States to adopt the precise federal mechanism for enforcing privacy rights.46
He concluded that the States should remain free to choose their own evidence rules provided they satisfy due process.47
Whether the Ohio statute under which the appellant was convicted is unconstitutionally vague?48
A state criminal statute must be consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.49
No. The Court did not reach or decide this question because it resolved the case on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule ground.50 Although the statute's validity was raised in the jurisdictional statement and briefed by the parties, the majority chose to address the admissibility of the seized evidence instead.51 Justice Stewart would have reversed on vagueness grounds without reaching the search-and-seizure issue.52
The Court did not decide whether the Ohio statute is unconstitutionally vague.53
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart dissented. He agreed fully with Part I of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion but expressed no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue which the Court today decides. He would, however, reverse the judgment in this case, because he was persuaded that the provision of § 2905.34 of the Ohio Revised Code, upon which the petitioner's conviction was based, is not consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stewart would reverse the conviction on that ground and not reach the Fourth Amendment question decided by the Court.