401 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2005)
Marvin Lumber and Cedar Company manufactures wood windows and doors.1 PPG Industries, Inc. supplied Marvin with primers, topcoats, and other coatings from the 1960s until 1997.2 In 1983, the parties entered into a Customer Agreement that governed their relationship.3 The agreement contained a warranty limited to conformance with published specifications at shipment.4 It also included a four-year limitations provision for any action for breach of warranty or other claim relating to the materials.5
In 1995, Marvin began to experience problems with its wood windows.6 Customers complained of wood rot, delamination, and other defects.7 Marvin investigated and determined that the problems were caused by PPG's coatings, which allegedly permitted water to penetrate the wood.8 Marvin notified PPG of the problems in 1997.9 PPG denied responsibility. Marvin filed this action on December 29, 2000, asserting claims for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act.10
In 1994, Marvin filed a separate diversity suit against PPG claiming that PILT, a wood preservative used from 1985 to 1988, had failed to prevent premature rot and decay in its products.11 After an initial appeal remanded the express warranty of future performance claim for trial, a four-month bifurcated jury trial was held.12 The jury found that PPG had given Marvin a warranty of future performance that formed part of the basis of the bargain, that the warranty was breached, and awarded $53.6 million for out-of-pocket costs, $25.2 million for past lost profits, $27 million for future lost profits, and $30 million for loss of goodwill, resulting in a judgment of $156,118,625.92 with interest.13
PPG appealed the judgment entered after trial, challenging the notice determination, the refusal to enforce the damages limitation in order acknowledgments, the sufficiency of evidence for the lost goodwill and lost profits awards, the admission of expert testimony, the equitable estoppel instruction, and other trial rulings.14 Marvin cross-appealed on the denial of preverdict interest on all pecuniary damages from the commencement of the action and on the refusal to revive its consumer protection claims.15 In the 2000 action, the district court granted summary judgment to PPG on all claims based on the contractual limitations provision, and Marvin appealed.16
Whether the four-year contractual limitations provision barred Marvin's warranty claims in the 2000 action?17
Minnesota has adopted Uniform Commercial Code section 2-725, which provides that an action for breach of a contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues.18 The parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year by original agreement.19 Such limitations provisions are enforceable unless they are unconscionable.20
Yes. The Customer Agreement between Marvin Lumber and Cedar Company and PPG Industries, Inc. contained a four-year limitations provision.21 The provision required that any action for breach of warranty or any other claim relating to the materials must be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues.22 Marvin filed the 2000 action on December 29, 2000, more than four years after PPG's last delivery to Marvin in 1997.23
The provision is enforceable because the contract was between two sophisticated business entities.24 Marvin has not shown that it lacked a meaningful choice or that the provision is so one-sided as to be oppressive.25 The provision does not eliminate all liability but merely requires that claims be brought within four years.26
The four-year contractual limitations provision barred Marvin's warranty claims in the 2000 action.27
Whether the contractual limitations provision applied to Marvin's Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act claim?28
No. Marvin asserted a claim under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, Minn. Stat. § 325F.69.3132 The act contains its own three-year statute of limitations.33 The contractual limitations provision in the Customer Agreement does not apply to this claim.34 A contractual limitations provision cannot shorten a statutory limitations period that is intended to protect the public.
The contractual limitations provision did not apply to Marvin's Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act claim.35
Whether Marvin provided timely and adequate notice of breach to PPG?36
Under Minnesota law, after acceptance of goods, a buyer must within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 336.2-607(3)(a).37 The notice need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched.38
Yes. Marvin's duty to give notice to PPG arose when Marvin discovered or should have discovered the breach.39 The undisputed evidence at trial showed that Marvin had some concerns about wood deterioration before 1993.40 Company employees did not know that the rot problems correlated with the switch to PILT until 1993.41
Marvin's 1993 notice to PPG advised PPG that the common factor in the spate of rot complaints it was receiving was wood pretreatment with PILT.42 A December 28, 1993, internal PPG memorandum demonstrates that PPG knew full well that Marvin was claiming warranty, breach, and damages.43
Marvin provided timely and adequate notice of breach to PPG.44
Whether the damages limitation term in PPG's order acknowledgments became part of the contract?45
Under Minnesota law and the U.C.C., a written order acknowledgment from one merchant to another that contains terms in addition to those originally agreed upon by the parties will be considered part of the agreement unless the new terms materially alter the agreement.46 An agreement is materially altered if an addition would result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other party.47
No. PPG sent Marvin sixty-six acknowledgments of Marvin purchase orders for PILT.4849 The acknowledgments contained a damages limitation term on the back in fine print.50 Enforcement of the damages limitation provision would result in both hardship and surprise to Marvin.51 The $1.6 million PPG says it owes is a fraction of the out-of-pocket costs to Marvin resulting from PILT's failure.52
The provision was not negotiated.53 It was boilerplate language in small print on the back side of a form.54 Marvin witnesses testified concerning their surprise that a damages limitation clause may have become part of the contract with PPG.55
The damages limitation term in PPG's order acknowledgments did not become part of the contract.56
Whether the evidence supported the jury's award of damages for lost goodwill?57
No. Marvin presented evidence of the importance to a wooden window and door manufacturer of a good reputation.6061 Marvin also presented detailed accounts of the problems Marvin encountered with its customers and the damage to its goodwill caused by the PILT problems.62 However, Marvin did not point to any evidence in the record separate and apart from its evidence of future lost profits to support an award of $30 million in lost goodwill.63 There was no testimony that any Marvin entity was worth less because of the problems with PILT.64
There was no evidence giving a measure of, or a way of measuring, how much less.65
The evidence did not support the jury's award of damages for lost goodwill.66
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Bye would affirm the award of lost goodwill damages.67 Reputational damages are often difficult to quantify.68 A plaintiff alleging lost goodwill need not prove such damages with exacting precision. Marvin's evidence was clearly sufficient to prove a loss of goodwill.69 The company's principal officers established the importance of the company's well-deserved reputation for manufacturing premium, high-quality products.70 The jury heard detailed accounts of the problems Marvin encountered with its customers and the damage to its goodwill caused by the PILT problems.71
The strength of evidence presented by Marvin was equal to or exceeded the type of evidence found sufficient to support the jury's award in Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.72 This court is in a far less favorable position than the district court or the jury in the determination of lost goodwill damages.73 The award should be sustained as determined by the jury.74
Whether the evidence supported the jury's award of damages for past and future lost profits?75
Yes. There was evidence that Marvin's profits had suffered since the problems with PILT began to surface.78 The profits likely would remain flat.79 The testimony of Marvin senior executives Susan Marvin and Jake Marvin was based on their review of the company's financial records.80
PPG had the opportunity to cross-examine Marvin's witnesses on these points using the demonstrative exhibit prepared by Marvin that noted profits for all the years in question.81 The evidence before the jury proved lost profits, past and future, and the amounts thereof, with the required degree of certainty.82
The evidence supported the jury's award of damages for past and future lost profits.83
Whether expert testimony on statistical studies of wood rot was admissible?84
Yes. Martin was a statistician who conducted a series of statistical studies analyzing wood-rot data.87 PPG challenged the methodology and reliability of the studies.88 The factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility.
To the extent PPG's complaints about Martin's studies were well-founded, they went to the weight to be accorded his opinions by the jury.89 It was PPG's responsibility at trial through cross-examination to alert the jury to the weaknesses in the factual basis of Martin's opinion.90
Expert testimony on statistical studies of wood rot was admissible.91
Whether the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on equitable estoppel?92
No. There was some evidence that PPG early on, when PILT was suspected as the wood-rot culprit, made representations to Marvin about making things right.9596 Given the close and long-standing relationship between PPG and Marvin, and among individual employees of each company, a jury could easily find that Marvin would rely on those representations.97 It was not an abuse of discretion to give the equitable estoppel instruction.98
The district court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on equitable estoppel.99
Whether Marvin was entitled to preverdict interest on damages not yet incurred when suit was filed?100
Under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, preverdict interest on pecuniary damages shall be computed from the time of the commencement of the action, except as otherwise provided by contract or allowed by law.101 The statute serves the purposes of compensating prevailing parties for the true cost of money damages incurred and promoting settlements.102
Yes. The statute provides that preverdict interest on pecuniary damages is to be computed from the time of commencement of the action.103 The Minnesota Supreme Court would read the plain language of § 549.09. It would hold that Marvin was entitled to preverdict interest on all pecuniary damages except future profits from the inception of the litigation.104 This holds regardless of when the damages were incurred.105
Both purposes of the statute are served by starting the clock running on preverdict interest when suit is filed.106
Marvin was entitled to preverdict interest on damages not yet incurred when suit was filed.107
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Beam concurs in the court's opinion except for its conclusion that Marvin is entitled to preverdict interest on unincurred damages.108 A plain reading of the preverdict interest statute indicates that interest may be assessed on damages only after they are actually incurred after commencement of the action.109 The ordinary meaning of the statute's reference to pecuniary damages has been addressed by Minnesota courts as monetary damages.110 Interest is a sum paid for the use of money.111 Before damages are incurred they are only hypothetical.112
Charging interest on possible damages for a period of time before they even exist is unreasonable.113 The court's interpretation transfers nearly $14 million of PPG's assets to Marvin simply because PPG had the temerity to submit an extremely close products liability question to the district court for its adjudication.114 This raises serious constitutional concerns under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions regarding access to the courts and the Takings Clause.115
Whether intervening precedent required revival of Marvin's consumer protection claims?116
A prior decision will be revisited if an intervening decision from the state's highest court clearly demonstrates that the law of the case is wrong.117
No. In Marvin I, the court held that Marvin's statutory claims did not survive dismissal because Marvin is a merchant, not a consumer.118119 In Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court answered a certified question regarding whether plaintiffs must be purchasers of defendants' products.120 The case involved plaintiffs who were, in effect, indirect consumers of the defendant's products, not merchants.121 Group Health does not clearly undermine the earlier rulings on the Minnesota statutory law issues.122
The law of the case from Marvin I prevails.123
Intervening precedent did not require revival of Marvin's consumer protection claims.124