494 U.S. 325 (1990)
On February 3, 1986, two men committed an armed robbery of a Godfather's Pizza restaurant in Prince George's County, Maryland.1 One of the robbers was wearing a red running suit.2 That same day, Prince George's County police obtained arrest warrants for respondent Jerome Edward Buie and his suspected accomplice in the robbery, Lloyd Allen.3 Buie's house was placed under police surveillance.4
On February 5, the police executed the arrest warrant for Buie.5 They first had a police department secretary telephone Buie's house to verify that he was home.6 The secretary spoke to a female first, then to Buie himself.7 Six or seven officers proceeded to Buie's house.8 Once inside, the officers fanned out through the first and second floors.9 Corporal James Rozar announced that he would "freeze" the basement so that no one could come up and surprise the officers.10 With his service revolver drawn, Rozar twice shouted into the basement, ordering anyone down there to come out.11 When a voice asked who was calling, Rozar announced three times: "this is the police, show me your hands."12
Eventually, a pair of hands appeared around the bottom of the stairwell and Buie emerged from the basement.13 He was arrested, searched, and handcuffed by Rozar.14 Thereafter, Detective Joseph Frolich entered the basement "in case there was someone else" down there.15 He noticed a red running suit lying in plain view on a stack of clothing and seized it.16
The trial court denied Buie's motion to suppress the running suit, stating in part that the man comes out from a basement and the police do not know how many other people are down there.17 The State introduced the running suit into evidence at Buie's trial.18 A jury convicted Buie of robbery with a deadly weapon and using a handgun in the commission of a felony.19
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.20 The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed by a 4-to-3 vote.21 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
Whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require probable cause to justify a protective sweep of a home during an in-home arrest, or instead permit such a sweep based on a reasonable belief supported by specific and articulable facts that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others?23
A protective sweep is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding.24 The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.25
Yes. The officers entered Buie's home pursuant to an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe he was present, entitling them to search anywhere he might be found.26 After Buie emerged from the basement and was arrested and handcuffed, Detective Frolich entered the basement to determine whether anyone else was present.27 The armed robbery charge, the suspected accomplice still at large, and the officers' presence in the home where unseen persons could launch an attack supply specific and articulable facts that would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing the basement might harbor a dangerous individual, satisfying the standard that balances officer safety against the limited nature of the cursory sweep.28
The Fourth Amendment permits a protective sweep of a home during an in-home arrest based on a reasonable belief supported by specific and articulable facts rather than requiring probable cause.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens agreed that reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause supports a protective sweep.30 He emphasized that the standard applies only to protective sweeps.31 Officers must have a reasonable basis for believing that their search will reduce the danger of harm to themselves or of violent interference with their mission.32
Buie offered no resistance when he emerged from the basement.33 Officer Rozar testified that he was not worried about any possible danger when he arrested Buie.34 Officer Frolich supplied no explanation for why he might have thought another person was in the basement beyond having no idea who lived there despite participating in prearrest surveillance.35
Stevens noted that guarding the basement door from above would have been the safer course.36 Entering the stairwell was a surprising choice if safety was the true concern.37 He agreed that remand was appropriate for the state courts to apply the standard.38
Justice Kennedy agreed that the Court adopts the prudent course of explaining the general rule and permitting the state court to apply it in the first instance.39 He viewed the observation that the State has a formidable task on remand as gratuitous.40 Based on his present understanding of the record, he thought the officers’ conduct here was in full accord with standard police safety procedure, and that the officers would have been remiss if they had not taken these precautions.41
This comment is necessary, lest by acquiescence the impression be left that Justice Stevens’ views can be interpreted as authoritative guidance for application of the ruling to the facts of the case.42
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that extending the Terry reasonable-suspicion standard into the home for protective sweeps dispenses with the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable-cause requirements in the setting where privacy interests are strongest.43 He argued that the intrusion is far greater than a limited patdown because officers may enter every room, open closets and containers, and view personal effects throughout the house.44 The danger of ambush during a planned home arrest does not approach the unavoidable risks of on-the-street encounters.45
Brennan would have affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals decision suppressing the evidence because the officers lacked probable cause to fear danger from a hidden confederate.46