427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976)
This case presents the question whether the provision of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a) (1966), that a uniformed state police officer "shall be retired . . . upon his attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Robert Murgia served as an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police until the Board of Retirement retired him on his fiftieth birthday.2
Murgia filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging that the retirement statute denied him equal protection and requesting a three-judge court.3 The district judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to present a substantial constitutional question.4 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set aside the dismissal and remanded with directions to convene a three-judge court.5
On a record consisting of depositions, affidavits, and other documentary material, the three-judge court declared the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.6 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument.7
The primary duties of the Uniformed Branch include controlling prison and civil disorders, responding to emergencies and natural disasters, patrolling highways, investigating crime, apprehending suspects, and supporting local law enforcement.8 Officers undergo comprehensive physical examinations every two years until age forty and more rigorous annual examinations thereafter that include electrocardiograms and tests for gastrointestinal bleeding.9 Murgia passed such an examination four months before his retirement and remained capable of performing all required duties.10
Three physicians testified on the relationship between aging and the capacity to perform under stress. The testimony established that the risk of physical failure increases with age and that the proportion of individuals unable to perform stress functions grows with each age cohort.11 A 1938 special legislative commission report observed that the division requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique because the duties are arduous in all weathers.12
Whether the provision of Massachusetts law requiring retirement of uniformed state police officers upon attaining age fifty denies equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment?13
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a legislative classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Strict scrutiny applies when the classification burdens a fundamental right or involves a suspect class.14
No. The Court determined that the age classification neither burdens a fundamental right of governmental employment nor creates a suspect class of persons over age fifty.15 Applying the rule to the established facts, the classification rationally furthers the state's interest in assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police because physical ability generally declines with age.16
The mandatory retirement provision does not deny equal protection of the laws.17
Whether the age-fifty classification for mandatory retirement of police officers is subject to strict scrutiny because it burdens a suspect class or interferes with a fundamental right?18
Strict scrutiny applies to equal protection claims only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.19
No. Governmental employment is not a fundamental right.20 The class of officers over age fifty is not a suspect class because the aged have not experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment akin to race or national origin.21 The facts show that the classification draws a line at middle age and marks a stage each person will reach if living a normal span.22
The classification is not subject to strict scrutiny.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's adherence to the rigid two-tier equal protection model.24 He argued that the inquiry should focus on the character of the classification, the importance of the benefits denied, and the state interests asserted.25 Marshall viewed the right to work as vital to personal freedom under the Fourteenth Amendment.26
He cited congressional findings that older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment.27 Therefore, legislation denying them employment requires a more probing review than mere rationality.28 Marshall concluded that the classification merited careful judicial attention given the significant deprivation involved.29
Whether the age-fifty mandatory retirement classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in maintaining physical fitness of uniformed officers?30
Under rational basis review, a classification is valid if it rationally furthers a legitimate state interest, and perfection in classification is not required.31
Yes. The state's purpose of protecting the public by assuring physical preparedness is legitimate.32 Mandatory retirement at age fifty rationally removes officers whose fitness presumptively diminishes with age.33 The facts establish that the risk of physical failure increases with age and that the legislature sought to ensure vigorous physique for arduous duties.34
The age-fifty classification is rationally related to the legitimate state interest.35
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall agreed that the purpose of assuring physical fitness is legitimate and compelling.36 He concluded that the means chosen are overinclusive because the officers have repeatedly passed rigorous physical examinations demonstrating their fitness.37 Marshall observed that the Commonwealth already individually tests its police officers for physical fitness and concedes that ability may continue after age fifty.38
Therefore, automatic termination at age fifty is irrational in these circumstances.39 He would have affirmed the judgment of the District Court.40