426 U.S. 67 (1976)
In August 1972 appellee Diaz filed a class action complaint.1 He is a Cuban refugee over age 65 who had been lawfully admitted to the United States less than five years earlier.2 The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.3 It challenged the denial of his application for enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program.4 The complaint alleged that the denial rested on his failure to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) as a noncitizen.5 It sought relief on behalf of a class of persons denied enrollment for the same reasons.6
On September 28, 1972, the District Court granted leave to add appellees Clara and Espinosa as plaintiffs and to file an amended complaint.7 Clara is another Cuban refugee in similar circumstances who remained in the country at the discretion of the Attorney General.8 Espinosa is an alien admitted for permanent residence since 1971 who had not applied because he could not meet the five-year residence requirement.9 The amended complaint sought relief on behalf of a class represented by Diaz and Clara and a subclass represented by Espinosa.10
On October 24, 1972, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had exhausted administrative remedies under the Social Security Act.11 Two days later Espinosa filed his application for enrollment.12 Although none of the appellees completely exhausted available administrative review, the Secretary acknowledged that the applications of Diaz and Clara raised no disputed issues of fact and treated the interlocutory denials as final, satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).13 The Secretary also stipulated that Espinosa’s application could not be allowed under the statute.14
The District Court overruled the motion to dismiss and, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held that the five-year residence requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and could not be severed from the permanent residence requirement, enjoining the Secretary from refusing to enroll members of the represented classes.15 The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.16
Whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Espinosa’s claim?17
Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act establishes filing of an application as a nonwaivable condition of jurisdiction.18 It requires a final decision by the Secretary after a hearing.19 Yet the Secretary may waive the exhaustion requirements when the only issue presented is the constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security Act and no facts remain in dispute.20
Yes. Espinosa filed his application for enrollment with the Secretary on October 26, 1972.21 This occurred while the case was pending in the District Court, thereby satisfying the nonwaivable filing condition.22 The Secretary moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies but then stipulated at the hearing on the motion that no facts were in dispute, that the case was ripe for disposition by summary judgment, and that the only issue before the District Court was the constitutionality of the statute.23 This stipulation is beyond the Secretary’s competence to decide and is tantamount to a decision denying the application, operating as a waiver of the exhaustion requirements under the precedent of Weinberger v. Salfi.24
The District Court therefore possessed jurisdiction over Espinosa’s claim, as well as the claims of Diaz and Clara whose applications raised no disputed issues of fact and were treated as final.25
The District Court had jurisdiction over Espinosa’s claim.26
Whether Congress may discriminate in favor of citizens and against aliens in providing welfare benefits?27
The Fifth Amendment protects all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.28 Yet Congress possesses broad power over naturalization and immigration that permits it to make rules treating aliens differently from citizens, including rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.29 The decision to share welfare benefits may take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country.30
Yes. The three appellees are resident aliens over age 65 who were lawfully admitted to the United States less than five years earlier and were denied enrollment in the Medicare Part B program under 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2).31 Congress has provided some welfare benefits for citizens.32 It has no constitutional duty to provide like benefits for all aliens.33
The decision to condition eligibility on admission for permanent residence and five years of continuous residence reflects a permissible judgment that an alien’s tie to the United States grows stronger over time.34 The class of aliens is heterogeneous.35 Distinctions between citizens and aliens are routinely drawn in numerous constitutional and statutory provisions without implying invidious discrimination.36
Congress may discriminate in favor of citizens and against aliens in providing welfare benefits.37
Whether the specific discriminatory provisions in § 1395o (2) (B) are constitutional?38
A statutory classification that conditions an alien’s eligibility for federal medical insurance on admission for permanent residence and five years of continuous residence does not deprive the alien of liberty or property without due process of law.39 This holds when the line drawn by Congress is not wholly irrational.40 Some line is essential to any benefits program.41 Those who qualify may reasonably be presumed to have a greater affinity with the United States than those who do not.42
Yes. The requirement of admission for permanent residence and five years of continuous residence in 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2)(B) is applied to appellees Diaz and Clara, who are Cuban refugees remaining at the discretion of the Attorney General, and to appellee Espinosa, who was admitted for permanent residence in 1971 but had not yet satisfied the durational requirement.43 The District Court held the five-year residence requirement unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and found it nonseverable from the permanent-residence requirement.44 But the classification is not wholly irrational because it distinguishes among aliens on the basis of the character and duration of their residence.45 The political branches of the Federal Government are entrusted with regulating the relationship between the United States and alien visitors.46 Any rule of constitutional law inhibiting flexibility in response to changing world conditions, such as the arrival of over 440,000 Cuban refugees between 1961 and 1972, should be adopted only with the greatest caution.47
Appellees have identified no principled basis for prescribing a different standard than the one selected by Congress.48
The specific discriminatory provisions in § 1395o (2) (B) are constitutional.49