424 U.S. 319 (1976)
George Eldridge was first awarded Social Security disability benefits in June 1968.1 In March 1972 he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition.2 He completed and returned the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying recent medical sources.3 The state agency obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant.4
After reviewing those reports and other information in his file, the agency sent Eldridge a letter stating that it had made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972.5 The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination and advised Eldridge that he could request time to submit additional information.6 Eldridge responded in writing, disputing one characterization of his medical condition and asserting that the agency already possessed sufficient evidence of his disability.7
The state agency then made a final determination that Eldridge had ceased to be disabled in May 1972; the Social Security Administration accepted that determination.8 In July 1972 Eldridge received written notice that his benefits would terminate after that month and that he could seek reconsideration by the state agency within six months.9
Instead of requesting reconsideration, Eldridge filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.10 He challenged the constitutionality of the Secretary's termination procedures and sought an injunction barring termination of benefits until a pretermination evidentiary hearing was provided, together with immediate reinstatement of benefits.11 The District Court held that the existing procedures violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, ordered the Secretary to provide Eldridge a pretermination hearing, and directed reinstatement of benefits pending that hearing.12 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.13 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.14
Whether the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) over Eldridge's claim despite his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies?15
Section 405(g) requires a final decision by the Secretary after a hearing for jurisdiction.16 This requirement has two elements: a nonwaivable requirement that the claim for benefits be presented to the Secretary, and a waivable requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.17 A constitutional challenge collateral to the substantive claim of entitlement can be reviewed if the claim was presented and if the interest in prompt resolution outweighs deference to the agency.18
Yes. Eldridge presented his claim for continued benefits through his responses to the state agency questionnaire and his letter disputing the tentative determination.19 The constitutional claim to a pretermination hearing is entirely collateral to the substantive claim of entitlement.20 The Secretary made a final determination accepting the state agency's decision that Eldridge was no longer disabled.21 The claim that the procedures are constitutionally inadequate is ripe for decision without further administrative development.22
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).23
Whether the administrative procedures established by the Secretary for terminating Social Security disability benefits satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?24
The interest in continued receipt of Social Security disability benefits is a statutorily created property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.25 To determine what process is due, the court must weigh three factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.26
Yes. The private interest in continued disability benefits is significant but not as weighty as the interest of a welfare recipient in Goldberg v. Kelly.27 Eligibility for disability benefits is not based on financial need.28 The recipient may have access to other sources of income or seek retroactive benefits if he prevails.29
The risk of erroneous deprivation is not high.30 The determination is based on medical reports and documentary evidence.31 The recipient is given notice and an opportunity to submit written evidence.32 The decision is made by a state agency team including a physician.33
An evidentiary hearing prior to termination would not significantly reduce the risk of error.34 It would impose substantial fiscal and administrative burdens on the government.35 The existing procedures provide notice, an opportunity to respond in writing, and review by the SSA before termination.
The administrative procedures established by the Secretary for terminating Social Security disability benefits satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the decision is inconsistent with Goldberg v. Kelly.37 He maintained that the interest of a disability beneficiary in continued benefits is no less than that of a welfare recipient, as both are dependent on the benefits for their livelihood.38 Brennan rejected the distinction based on financial need, noting that the disability beneficiary may be just as dependent.39
He also argued that the use of medical reports does not reduce the need for an evidentiary hearing, as the recipient should have the opportunity to confront the evidence against him and present his own evidence.40 Brennan would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals requiring a pretermination evidentiary hearing.41 He further observed that the potential hardship from termination can be severe, as illustrated by foreclosure on the recipient's home and repossession of furniture, and that the availability of other public assistance does not justify denying a hearing.42