497 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
In early May of 1978, Maxon Corporation submitted a price quotation to Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. for the sale of two pre-mix blower-mixer units for Tyler's Texas plant, after which Tyler sent Maxon an order for the purchase of the two units.1
The reverse side of Tyler's order included terms stating that no conditions inserted by the seller would be effective if in conflict unless accepted in writing by the buyer, and upon shipment the seller agrees to all terms and conditions set forth.2
Maxon shipped the two units accompanied by an invoice that contained a warranty section as well as a "Warning & Covenants" section providing that by acceptance of the goods the buyer agrees to indemnify the seller against all liability arising out of any claim involving the use or misuse of the goods, including alleged or actual negligence, and the invoice also stated it contained the entire agreement.3
After Tyler installed the units, one exploded injuring a Tyler employee who then sued Maxon in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas; although Tyler had notice of the suit it declined to defend, and Maxon and its insurer Commercial Union Assurance Companies settled the suit for $600,000 before filing suit in Marion County Superior Court seeking indemnification from Tyler and related entities.4
Following pre-trial discovery Tyler filed a summary judgment motion, the cause was submitted for hearing on May 16, 1983, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Tyler after finding among other things that the shipment constituted acceptance of Tyler's offer, that the Warning and Covenants term materially altered the contract and did not become part of it, and that even if it did it did not clearly provide for indemnity for Maxon's own culpability; Maxon appealed the judgment to the Indiana Court of Appeals.5
Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the "Warning and Covenants" section of Maxon's invoice containing an indemnity provision was not a part of Maxon's contract with Tyler?6
Under I.C. 26-1-2-207 a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered.7 Between merchants such additional terms become part of the contract unless they materially alter it.8 A broad indemnification clause that shifts liability from a negligent seller to an innocent buyer constitutes a material alteration as a matter of law because its incorporation without express awareness would result in surprise or hardship.9
No. Tyler's purchase order stated that no conditions inserted by the seller would be effective if in conflict unless accepted in writing by the buyer.10 Upon shipment, the seller agrees to all terms and conditions set forth.11 Maxon shipped the two pre-mix blower-mixer units accompanied by an invoice containing the Warning and Covenants section with the indemnity provision.12 The established facts show no evidence that Tyler employees had read the identical invoice on prior occasions or that any previous dispute had called attention to the indemnification clause.13 The repeated exchange of forms therefore does not establish a common basis of understanding or awareness.14 The clause would impose serious hardship by shifting liability for Maxon's own negligence to Tyler.15 It is therefore a material alteration as a matter of law regardless of surprise.16
The trial court correctly held that the provision did not become part of the contract.17 Tyler satisfied its burden on summary judgment by placing the forms in the record for the court to apply the law to the undisputed facts.18
The trial court did not err in concluding that the indemnity provision was not part of the contract between Maxon and Tyler.19
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Shields concurred in the result to the extent the majority found the indemnification clause unconscionable and violates public policy.20
Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that even if the "Warning and Covenants" section of Maxon's invoice was a part of the parties' contract, it does not state in clear and unequivocal terms that Tyler must indemnify Maxon for Maxon's own culpability?21
An indemnification clause must be entered into knowingly and willingly.22 It must state in clear and unequivocal terms that the indemnitor will indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's own negligence or culpability.23 Indiana precedent such as Norkus v. General Motors Corp. and Loper v. Standard Oil Co. requires this standard.24 The meaning of the contract is determined from an examination of all its provisions.25 Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons could find the contract subject to more than one interpretation.26
No. Even assuming the Warning and Covenants section formed part of the contract, the provision begins with a series of admonitions to the buyer regarding proper installation, wiring, ventilation, maintenance, supervision, and protection of the units.27 Only after this litany does it state that, by acceptance of the goods, the buyer agrees to indemnify the seller against all liability arising out of any claim involving the use or misuse of the goods, including alleged or actual negligence.28 The established facts show that the clause refers to use or misuse which in context refers to Tyler's conduct in integrating and operating the machinery.29 It does not specifically state that Tyler must indemnify Maxon for liability incurred through Maxon's own negligence or breach of warranty in a manner comparable to the clause upheld in Sink & Edwards, Inc. v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. The reference to alleged or actual negligence could reasonably be understood to apply to Tyler's conduct.30 This creates ambiguity that prevents the clause from being clear and unequivocal.31
The trial court therefore correctly granted summary judgment on this independent ground.32
The trial court did not err in concluding that the indemnity clause does not clearly and unequivocally require Tyler to indemnify Maxon for Maxon's own culpability.33
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Shields concurred in the result to the extent the majority found the indemnification clause unconscionable and violates public policy.