125 U.S. 190
David S. Maynard and Lydia A. Maynard were husband and wife when David left their home in Ohio to seek opportunities in the western territories.1
Upon his arrival in the Territory of Oregon, David settled upon public land under the donation act of Congress of September 27, 1850, claiming 640 acres as a married settler to obtain the grant for himself and his wife.2
Subsequently, on December 22, 1852, the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Oregon passed a special act declaring the bonds of matrimony between David S. Maynard and his wife dissolved.3 David subsequently remarried another woman after the divorce took effect.4 Lydia received no notice of the legislative proceeding and received no support from David after his departure from Ohio, leaving her without resources during this period.5
Lydia A. Maynard filed a bill of complaint in the courts of the Territory asserting rights to the east half of the donation claim and alleging that no cause existed for the divorce.6
Whether the act of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Oregon of the 22d of December, 1852, declaring the bonds of matrimony between David S. Maynard and his wife dissolved, was valid and effectual to divorce the parties?7
The legislative power vested in the Assembly of the Territory of Oregon extended to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.8 The granting of divorces was a rightful subject of legislation because legislatures had historically exercised this power with the consent of the people, as evidenced by long-standing practice in England and the American colonies and states.9
Yes. The act was within the legislative power because David S. Maynard was a resident of the Territory at the time the act was passed, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement for the Assembly to act upon his status.10 The organic act granted broad legislative authority similar to that in other territorial organic acts, and historical practice confirmed that divorce was a proper subject for legislative action rather than being reserved exclusively to the judiciary.11
Furthermore, marriage is not a contract within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution, as it creates a status or relation that the legislature may alter in the public interest, and the act did not impair any vested property rights at the time of its passage.12
The act of the Legislative Assembly was valid and effectual to divorce the parties.13
Whether, if valid and effectual for that purpose, such divorce defeated any rights of the wife to a portion of the donation claim?14
Yes. The divorce defeated Lydia's rights.17 At the time of the divorce David had only a possessory right and no vested interest in the land.18 The conditions of residence and cultivation had not been fully performed to perfect the title under the donation act.19
Lydia's potential interest was derivative of her status as David's wife.20 Once the marriage was dissolved she had no relation to him that could confer any interest in the title he later acquired.21 Therefore she was not entitled to the east half of the donation claim.22
The divorce defeated any rights of the wife to a portion of the donation claim.23