165 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892)
McAuliffe filed a petition for mandamus in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts seeking restoration to his office as a policeman in New Bedford.1 The mayor had removed him after a written complaint and a hearing, finding him guilty of violating Rule 31 of the police regulations of the city.2
The portion of Rule 31 that the petitioner violated provided that no member of the department shall be allowed to solicit money or any aid, on any pretence, for any political purpose whatever.3 There was also evidence that McAuliffe had been a member of a political committee, which the rule likewise prohibited.4 The city had accepted chapter 319 of the Acts of 1890, by virtue of which the members of the police force held office during good behavior and until removed by the mayor for cause deemed by him sufficient, after due hearing.5
McAuliffe attended the initial hearing on notice but asked for no specifications and offered no evidence.6 He admitted to the mayor that he was guilty and inquired about the penalty, and in another interview indicated that if he was going to be removed he would like to know so that he could resign.7 At an adjourned hearing, McAuliffe appeared with counsel who requested specifications, which the mayor refused, after which McAuliffe refused to proceed and the mayor closed the hearing.8
McAuliffe challenged the hearing's fairness, citing testimony that the mayor had said he did not care about the evidence because he knew what McAuliffe had been doing and knew all about it.9 He also argued that the charges were not stated specifically, that no notice was given that removal was intended, and that the case should first have been investigated by the committee on police under Rule 24 of the police regulations before the mayor heard it.
Whether the mayor's finding warranted the removal of the petitioner?10
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute to prevent the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a condition to the office of policeman, and making it part of the good conduct required.11
Yes. After a written complaint and hearing the mayor found McAuliffe guilty of violating Rule 31 of the police regulations.12 The statute authorized removal for cause deemed sufficient by the mayor after due hearing.13 The rule violation supplied such cause because the city could condition the office on obedience to the political activity prohibition as part of the good conduct required.14
The mayor's finding warranted the removal of the petitioner.15
Whether the part of the rule violated was invalid as invading the petitioner's right to express his political opinions?16
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute to prevent the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a condition to the office of policeman, and making it part of the good conduct required. The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.17 On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.18
No. McAuliffe was removed after the mayor found him guilty of violating Rule 31 by soliciting money for political purposes and serving on a political committee.19 The city had accepted chapter 319 of the Acts of 1890, under which police officers held office during good behavior subject to removal for cause deemed sufficient after due hearing.20 Because McAuliffe had no constitutional right to the position of policeman, the city could lawfully condition the office on compliance with the political solicitation ban as part of required good conduct.21
The part of the rule violated was not invalid as invading the petitioner's right to express his political opinions.22
Whether a breach of the rule was a cause sufficient under the statute?23
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute to prevent the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a condition to the office of policeman, and making it part of the good conduct required.
Yes. The mayor found McAuliffe guilty of violating Rule 31 after a hearing, and the statute permits removal for cause deemed sufficient by the mayor.24 Because the city could attach compliance with the rule as a condition of holding the office, a breach constituted good conduct grounds for removal under the 1890 act.25
A breach of the rule was a cause sufficient under the statute.26
Whether the petitioner had due hearing?27
The judge was well warranted in finding that the mayor did all that justice required.28 The petitioner attended on notice at the first day appointed for a hearing, and asked for no specifications, and offered no evidence.29 There was evidence that he said to the mayor at the hearing, "I admit I am guilty; what's the penalty?"30
Yes. McAuliffe received notice, attended the initial hearing without requesting specifications or offering evidence, admitted guilt to the mayor, and later appeared with counsel at an adjourned hearing.31 Although the mayor refused further specifications and closed the hearing after counsel's request, the circumstances showed the mayor provided all that justice required under the statute.32
The petitioner had due hearing.33
Whether the case should first have been investigated before the committee on police?34
Since the passage of the Act of 1890, if not before, we have no doubt of the power of the mayor to hear all cases on the removal of a police officer in the first instance himself.35
No. McAuliffe argued that Rule 24 required prior investigation by the committee on police before the mayor heard the removal case.36 Since the passage of the Act of 1890 the mayor possessed the power to hear all cases on the removal of a police officer in the first instance himself.37 The mayor therefore properly conducted the hearing without preliminary committee review under Rule 24.38
The case did not first have to be investigated before the committee on police.39