386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967)
The petitioner was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, on the morning of January 16, 1964, for possession of narcotics.1
The Chicago police officers who made the arrest found a package containing heroin on his person and he was indicted for its unlawful possession.2 Prior to trial he filed a motion to suppress the heroin as evidence against him, claiming that the police had acquired it in an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.3
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the petitioner testified that up until a half hour before he was arrested he had been at "a friend's house" about a block away, that after leaving the friend's house he had "walked with a lady from 48th to 48th and South Park," and that, as he approached 49th Street and Calumet Avenue, "[t]he Officers stopped me going through the alley."
"The officers," he said, "did not show me a search warrant for my person or an arrest warrant for my arrest."4
The petitioner did not identify the "friend" or the "lady," and neither of them appeared as a witness.5 The arresting officers, Jackson and Arnold, then testified about receiving information from a confidential informant that morning.6 The informant, whom the officers had known for one to two years and who had provided reliable information leading to multiple arrests and convictions, stated that the petitioner was selling narcotics and had them on his person near 47th and Calumet.7
The officers drove to the area, the informant pointed out the petitioner, and after observing him separate from a woman, meet briefly with a man, and then hurry between two buildings upon seeing the police car, the officers approached, informed him of the information, placed him in the vehicle, and searched him, finding the heroin in a cigarette package.8 When defense counsel asked for the informant's name and address on cross-examination, the prosecution objected and the court sustained the objections.9
The trial court denied the motion to suppress.10 The petitioner was convicted based on the heroin evidence.11 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.12 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the claim regarding the suppression hearing.13
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state court to order disclosure of a confidential informant's identity at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence?14
The Due Process Clause does not compel disclosure of an informant's identity at a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for an arrest or search.15 States may recognize the informer's privilege when the officers have testified under oath in open court about the details of the information and the basis for its reliability.16 The trial judge must be satisfied that the officers are telling the truth after cross-examination.17
No. In this case the arresting officers Jackson and Arnold testified in open court, fully and in precise detail as to what the informer told them and as to why they had reason to believe his information was trustworthy.18 Each officer was under oath.19 Each was subjected to searching cross-examination regarding the informant's year-long or two-year relationship with them and the fifteen to twenty-five prior tips that produced arrests and convictions.20 The judge was obviously satisfied that each was telling the truth.21
For that reason he exercised the discretion conferred upon him by the established law of Illinois to respect the informer's privilege by sustaining objections to questions seeking the informant's name and address.22 Nothing in the Due Process Clause requires a state court judge in every such hearing to assume the arresting officers are committing perjury.23 The Illinois evidentiary rule is consistent with the law of many other States that likewise protect the identity of reliable informants at suppression hearings.24
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state court to order disclosure of a confidential informant's identity at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented on Fourth Amendment grounds.26 He argued that normally an arrest should be made only on a warrant issued by a magistrate on a showing of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.27 The police instead acted on their own without a warrant.28
Without disclosure of the informant's identity there is no way for the defense or the court to test the reliability of the information supplied.29 This leaves the Fourth Amendment exclusively in the custody of the police.30 Douglas maintained that disclosure is normally required in non-warrant cases under the rule of Roviaro v. United States so that the defense can show an absence of probable cause.31
The majority's decision encourages arrests and searches without warrants contrary to the Amendment's command that a judicial mind be interposed between the police and the citizen.32
Whether the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires disclosure of a confidential informant's identity at such a suppression hearing?33
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not require disclosure of an informant's identity at a suppression hearing.34 The right is not violated by recognition of the informer's privilege when the officers themselves are cross-examined under oath.35 No witness may be compelled to reveal information protected by a valid testimonial privilege.36 The state is not required to produce the informant as a witness against the defendant at the hearing.37
No. The petitioner does not explain precisely how he thinks his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination was violated by Illinois' recognition of the informer's privilege in this case.38 If the claim is that the State violated the Sixth Amendment by not producing the informer to testify against the petitioner, then the contention is absolutely devoid of merit.39 On the other hand, the claim may be that the petitioner was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the arresting officers themselves because their refusal to reveal the informer's identity was upheld.40 It would follow from this argument that no witness on cross-examination could ever constitutionally assert a testimonial privilege.41
This includes the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution itself.42 The Court has never given the Sixth Amendment such a construction.43 The Court declines to do so here.44
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not require disclosure of a confidential informant's identity at a suppression hearing.45