572 U.S. 185, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
In the 2011–2012 election cycle, businessman Shaun McCutcheon contributed a total of $33,088 to 16 different federal candidates and $27,328 to several noncandidate political committees, all in compliance with the base limits applicable to each.1
He alleges that he wished to contribute an additional $1,776 to each of 12 candidates and $25,000 to each of the three Republican national party committees but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and to noncandidate political committees.2 McCutcheon plans to make similar contributions in future election cycles, including at least $60,000 to additional candidates and $75,000 to non-candidate political committees in the 2013–2014 cycle.3
The Republican National Committee, a national political party committee charged with the general management of the Republican Party, wishes to receive the contributions that McCutcheon and similarly situated individuals would like to make, which are otherwise permissible under the base limits but foreclosed by the aggregate limits.4 Federal law imposes base contribution limits restricting how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, such as up to $2,600 per election to a candidate and $32,400 per year to a national party committee.5 It also imposes aggregate limits restricting how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees, such as $48,600 to federal candidates and $74,600 to other political committees during the 2013–2014 election cycle.6
In June 2012, McCutcheon and the RNC filed a complaint before a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting that the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and to noncandidate political committees were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.7 They moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the challenged provisions, and the Government moved to dismiss the case.8 The District Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss.9 It assumed that the base limits appropriately served the Government’s anticorruption interest.10 It concluded that the aggregate limits survived First Amendment scrutiny because they prevented evasion of the base limits.11
McCutcheon and the RNC appealed directly to the Supreme Court, as authorized by law.12 The Court noted probable jurisdiction.13
Whether the aggregate limits on campaign contributions imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act, as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, violate the First Amendment?14
Contribution limits impinge on protected associational freedoms and are therefore subject to the closest scrutiny. Such limits are permissible only if they are closely drawn to serve a sufficiently important interest, which the Court has identified as preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.15
Yes. The aggregate limits restrict the number of candidates and committees with which a donor may associate.16 They impose a significant burden on protected speech as seen in McCutcheon's inability to contribute to additional candidates and committees in the 2011–2012 cycle despite complying with base limits.17 The base limits already serve the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.18
The aggregate limits are not closely drawn because they do not meaningfully prevent circumvention and instead impermissibly restrict participation in the democratic process.19
The aggregate limits violate the First Amendment.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment but writes separately to express his view that Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny are wrongly decided.21 He maintains that the Government has no legitimate interest in restricting campaign contributions at all.22 In his view, contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin, and the analytic foundation of Buckley has only continued to erode.23
He would subject the aggregate limits to strict scrutiny, which they would fail.24 Justice Thomas would overrule Buckley rather than merely apply its framework to invalidate the aggregate limits.25
Whether the aggregate limits are closely drawn to serve the governmental interest in preventing circumvention of the base contribution limits?26
The Government may take steps to prevent circumvention of its contribution limits, but the aggregate limits must be a closely drawn means of preventing such circumvention.27 The base limits themselves are a substantial barrier to circumvention.28 The Government has not provided evidence that circumvention through multiple contributions is a significant problem.29
No. The aggregate limits impose a significant burden on protected speech by restricting the number of candidates and committees with which a donor may associate.30 McCutcheon was prevented from contributing to 12 additional candidates and the Republican national party committees.31 The base limits already prohibit additional contributions to a candidate and earmarking.32 The Government relies on outdated examples without showing current circumvention risks.33
The aggregate limits are not closely drawn to serve the governmental interest in preventing circumvention of the base contribution limits.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, And Justice Kagan
Justice Breyer dissents on the ground that the aggregate limits are necessary to prevent circumvention of the base limits and to protect the integrity of the electoral process.35 He argues that the plurality misconstrues the constitutional issues by adopting an unduly narrow definition of corruption.36 In his view, the aggregate limits serve important governmental interests in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption as a necessary supplement to the base limits.37
Without them, wealthy donors could contribute massive sums that undermine the base limits upheld in Buckley.38 He would affirm the judgment of the District Court.39
Whether the aggregate limits further a permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance?40
The only type of corruption that justifies contribution limits is quid pro quo corruption.41 The base limits already serve the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The aggregate limits do not further that interest because they ban all contributions once triggered even though Congress selected base limits indicating no cognizable risk below those amounts.42
No. The aggregate limits do not serve the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption because the base limits already address that concern.43 The aggregate limits instead further the impermissible objective of limiting the amount of money in political campaigns.44 McCutcheon's planned contributions in the 2013–2014 cycle would have remained within base limits yet were blocked entirely by the aggregate caps.45
The aggregate limits do not further a permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.46