435 U.S. 618 (1978)
In 1796 Tennessee adopted a constitutional provision stating that no minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination shall be eligible to a seat in either house of the legislature, and this language remained unchanged as Article 9, section 1 of the state constitution.1 In 1976 the Tennessee legislature enacted chapter 848, section 4, which provided that any citizen who could qualify for membership in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly could become a candidate for delegate to the 1977 limited constitutional convention.2
Paul A. McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in Chattanooga, filed as a candidate for delegate.3 Selma Cash Paty, an opposing candidate, sued in the Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified from serving and for an order striking his name from the ballot.4
Chancellor Franks of the Chancery Court held that the disqualification violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, declared McDaniel eligible, and left his name on the ballot.5 In the ensuing election McDaniel was elected by a vote almost equal to that of three opposing candidates.6
After the election the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court judgment.7 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.8
Whether a Tennessee statute barring ministers of the gospel or priests of any denomination from serving as delegates to the state's limited constitutional convention deprives an ordained minister of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments?9
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits government from conditioning the availability of a civil right such as eligibility for public office upon the surrender of a protected religious status or practice.10 This protection applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.11 The state must demonstrate a compelling interest of the highest order that cannot be served by other means to justify any burden.12
Yes. The Tennessee statute conditions McDaniel's eligibility to seek and hold the office of delegate on his surrender of his status as an ordained minister.13 This status constitutes protected religious activity.14 The state failed to demonstrate that its asserted interest in preventing the establishment of religion justifies this burden.15 The American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office will be less faithful to anti-establishment interests than their unordained counterparts.16
The Tennessee statute violates McDaniel's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.17
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.18 He concluded that the provision violates both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.19 The disqualification establishes a religious classification by penalizing those who exhibit a defined level of intensity of involvement in protected religious activity.20
It imposes an unconstitutional penalty on the exercise of religion by forcing a choice between ministry and office, as in Sherbert v. Verner.21 Brennan further concluded that the state's justification manifests patent hostility toward religion rather than neutrality.22
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment. He concluded that Torcaso v. Watkins controls this case.23 The offense against the First and Fourteenth Amendments lay not simply in requiring an oath, but in limiting public offices to persons who have, or profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept.24
Tennessee bases its disqualification not on a person's statement of belief, but on his decision to pursue a religious vocation as directed by his belief.25 That sole distinction is without constitutional consequence, making the cases indistinguishable.26
Justice White concurred in the judgment but would have held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Free Exercise Clause.27 He noted that the absolute disqualification on its face burdens the important right of an individual to seek elective office.28 The state's asserted interest in maintaining separation between church and state is legitimate but not reasonably necessary to be accomplished by this means, as all other states achieve the objective without burdening ministers' rights to candidacy.29
Moreover, the statute is both underinclusive, applying only to legislative positions, and overinclusive, applying even to ministers whose beliefs would not interfere with their duties.30