411 U.S. 792 (1973)
McDonnell Douglas Corp., an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, employed over 30,000 people.1 Percy Green, a black citizen of St. Louis, worked for the company as a mechanic and laboratory technician from 1956 until August 28, 1964. He was laid off in the course of a general reduction in the work force.2
Green, a long-time activist in the civil rights movement, protested vigorously that his discharge and the general hiring practices of the company were racially motivated.3 Green and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally stalled their cars on the main roads leading to the plant. This blocked access to it at the time of the morning shift change.4 On July 2, 1965, a lock-in took place wherein a chain and padlock were placed on the front door of a building to prevent the occupants, petitioner’s employees working in the building, from leaving. The full extent of Green's involvement remains uncertain.5
Three weeks after the lock-in, on July 25, 1965, the company publicly advertised for qualified mechanics. Green promptly applied for re-employment.6 The company turned down Green. It based its rejection on his participation in the stall-in and lock-in.7 Shortly thereafter, Green filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He claimed that the company had refused to rehire him because of his race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement. This was in violation of sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8
The Commission made no finding on Green's allegation of racial bias under section 703(a)(1). However, it did find reasonable cause to believe the company had violated section 704(a) by refusing to rehire him because of his civil rights activity.9 After the Commission unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate the dispute, it advised Green in March 1968 of his right to institute a civil action in federal court within 30 days.10 On April 15, 1968, Green brought the present action. He claimed initially a violation of section 704(a) and, in an amended complaint, a violation of section 703(a)(1) as well.11
The District Court dismissed the claim of racial discrimination under section 703(a)(1) on the ground that the Commission had failed to make a determination of reasonable cause. The District Court also found that the company's refusal to rehire Green was based solely on his participation in the illegal demonstrations and not on his legitimate civil rights activities.12 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that unlawful protests were not protected under section 704(a). It reversed the dismissal of Green's section 703(a)(1) claim. The court held that a prior Commission determination of reasonable cause was not a jurisdictional prerequisite. It ordered the case remanded for trial.13
Whether the absence of a Commission finding of reasonable cause bars suit under section 703(a)(1) of Title VII?14
The Act does not restrict a complainant’s right to sue to those charges as to which the Commission has made findings of reasonable cause. A prior Commission determination of reasonable cause is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to raising a claim under section 703(a)(1) in federal court.15
No. Percy Green satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action by filing timely charges of employment discrimination with the Commission and by receiving and acting upon the Commission’s statutory notice of the right to sue. The Commission made no finding on Green’s allegation of racial bias under section 703(a)(1), but the District Court erred in dismissing the claim on that ground because the absence of such a finding cannot bar suit.16
The absence of a Commission finding of reasonable cause does not bar suit under section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.17
Whether the order and allocation of proof in a private non-class action challenging employment discrimination under Title VII requires the complainant to establish a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the employer?18
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.19 The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection, after which the complainant must be afforded an opportunity to show that the stated reason was pretext.20
Yes. Percy Green proved a prima facie case because McDonnell Douglas Corp. sought mechanics, Green’s trade, and continued to do so after his rejection, while Green’s qualifications were undisputed and his past work performance was satisfactory.21 The burden shifted to McDonnell Douglas Corp., which articulated Green’s participation in the unlawful stall-in and lock-in as the reason for rejection.22 This reason sufficed to meet the prima facie case, but on remand Green must be given a fair opportunity to show that the reason was pretext, for example by evidence that white employees involved in acts of comparable seriousness were retained or rehired.23
The order and allocation of proof requires the complainant to establish a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the employer, after which the complainant must have an opportunity to demonstrate pretext, and the case is remanded for trial of Green’s claim under section 703(a)(1) under this framework.24