552 U.S. 491 (2008)
The United States ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations along with its Optional Protocol in 1969.1 Petitioner José Ernesto Medellín, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death in a Texas state court for capital murder arising from extremely violent crimes.2 Texas authorities did not inform Medellín of his right under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention to request assistance from the Mexican consulate upon his detention.3
Medellín first raised his Vienna Convention claim during state and federal habeas corpus proceedings.4 It was rejected either as procedurally defaulted under state rules or on the merits.5 While Medellín's federal appeal remained pending, the International Court of Justice issued its judgment in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.).6 The ICJ determined that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention with respect to fifty-one Mexican nationals including Medellín.7 It directed the United States to provide review and reconsideration of those convictions and sentences without regard to generally applicable state procedural default rules.8
After the Avena judgment, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum declaring that the United States would discharge its international obligations under Avena by having state courts give effect to the decision.9 Relying on both the Avena judgment and the President's Memorandum, Medellín filed a second application for a writ of habeas corpus in Texas state court.10 He challenged his conviction and death sentence on the ground that he had not been informed of his Vienna Convention rights.11
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellín's second habeas application as an abuse of the writ.12 The court concluded that neither the Avena judgment nor the President's Memorandum qualified as binding federal law capable of displacing the state's limitations on the filing of successive habeas applications.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the questions raised by Medellín's challenge.14
Whether the Avena judgment is directly enforceable as domestic law in state court?15
A treaty is self-executing and operates as domestic law if it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision, as established in Foster v. Neilson.16 The Optional Protocol, U.N. Charter, and ICJ Statute do not create binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation because their language reflects a commitment to take action through political branches rather than vesting immediate legal effect in domestic courts.17
No. The rule requires examining whether the treaties show intention to make ICJ judgments self-executing domestic law.18 The United States ratified the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol, but the phrase 'undertakes to comply' in Article 94 of the U.N. Charter indicates a political commitment.19 Medellín raised his Vienna Convention claim in his second habeas application after the Avena judgment and the President's Memorandum.20 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed it as an abuse of the writ because neither constituted binding federal law displacing state procedural rules.21
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed that Avena does not constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state limitations on successive habeas petitions.22
The Avena judgment is not directly enforceable as domestic law in state court.23
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Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.24 He agreed that the Vienna Convention treaties do not authorize this Court to enforce the ICJ's Avena judgment in this case.25 Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter is most naturally read as a promise to take additional steps to enforce ICJ judgments through the political branches rather than as immediately self-executing domestic law.26
Although the question whether the Vienna Convention is self-executing is close, Stevens concluded that the Charter's enforcement provision referring noncompliance to the Security Council confirms that the President's Memorandum is not binding law.27 He emphasized that the United States' international obligation remains and the Court's judgment does not foreclose further appropriate action by Texas to effectuate that obligation.28
Whether the President's Memorandum independently requires the States to provide review and reconsideration of the claims of the 51 Mexican nationals named in Avena without regard to state procedural default rules?29
The President's authority in foreign affairs must stem from an act of Congress or the Constitution.30 Under the Youngstown framework, actions contrary to the will of Congress are at the lowest ebb, and the President may not unilaterally transform a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law displacing state law.31
No. The rule requires that presidential actions making non-self-executing treaties domestically enforceable fall into Youngstown category three when inconsistent with the Senate's understanding at ratification.32 The United States ratified the treaties without implementing legislation.33 The President's Memorandum attempted to direct state courts to give effect to Avena.34 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the second habeas application as an abuse of the writ.35
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.36 It held that the Memorandum does not independently require States to provide review and reconsideration in disregard of state procedural rules.37 The President lacks unilateral authority to convert international obligations into binding domestic law.38
The President's Memorandum does not independently require the States to provide review and reconsideration of the claims without regard to state procedural default rules.39
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Justice Breyer dissented. He would hold that the ICJ's Avena judgment is enforceable as domestic law under the Supremacy Clause without further legislation.40 Breyer advocated a practical context-specific approach considering text, drafting history, subject matter, and whether the provision confers enforceable individual rights.41
He concluded that the Optional Protocol, Article 94, and the ICJ Statute supply sufficient grounds for judicial enforcement of the judgment as to the individuals whose claims were espoused in Avena.42 The specific remedy ordered by the ICJ is judicial in nature and well suited to state-court processes.43 The President supports enforcement while Congress has not acted to prevent it.44