129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)
In 2001 Boston police officers received a tip that a Kmart employee was engaging in suspicious activity involving repeated short trips in a blue sedan.1 Officers set up surveillance in the parking lot, observed the described sequence of events, detained the employee upon his return, and discovered four clear plastic bags containing a substance resembling cocaine.2
The officers then arrested the two men in the car, one of whom was petitioner Luis Melendez-Diaz.3 The officers placed all three suspects in a police cruiser.4 During the short drive to the police station the officers observed their passengers fidgeting and making furtive movements in the back of the car. After depositing the men at the station they searched the police cruiser and found a plastic bag containing nineteen smaller bags hidden in the partition between the front and back seats.5
The officers submitted the seized substances to the State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, which was required by law to conduct chemical analysis upon police request.6 Analysts at the laboratory performed the tests on November 28, 2001, and prepared three certificates of analysis that reported the weight of the bags and stated that the substance was found to contain cocaine.7 Each certificate was sworn before a notary public by the analysts, as required under Massachusetts law, and reprinted the statutory provision making the certificates prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic analyzed.8
Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing cocaine and trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28 grams.9 At trial the prosecution introduced the bags seized from the codefendant and from the cruiser along with the three certificates.10 Petitioner objected to admission of the certificates, asserting that Crawford v. Washington required the analysts to testify in person.11 The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the certificates pursuant to the state statute.12
The jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty.13 He appealed, contending that admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.14 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, relying on a prior decision of the Supreme Judicial Court that had held forensic analysts are not subject to confrontation.15 The Supreme Judicial Court denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the admission into evidence of certificates of analysis sworn before a notary public by state laboratory analysts, reporting that seized substances were cocaine, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation?17
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. In Crawford v. Washington, this right is violated when the prosecution introduces testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.18
Yes. The certificates at issue here are affidavits made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. They are functionally identical to live in-court testimony doing precisely what a witness does on direct examination.19 The primary purpose of the certificates was to provide evidence at petitioner's trial.20 The established facts show that analysts at the State Laboratory Institute performed tests on November 28, 2001 on substances seized from Melendez-Diaz and prepared sworn certificates reporting that the substance was cocaine.21
The certificates do not qualify as business records under the Confrontation Clause because they were prepared specifically for use at petitioner's trial rather than for the administration of an entity's affairs.22
The admission of the certificates violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's conclusion that the admission of the certificates violated petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause.24 In his view the Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.25
The certificates at issue here fall squarely within that category. They are formalized testimonial materials that were admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted.26 He therefore concurred in the judgment.27
Joined by Roberts, C. J., And Breyer And Alito, Jj.
Justice Kennedy dissented. He argued that the certificates at issue here are not testimonial statements within the meaning of Crawford.28 They are business records prepared in the ordinary course of business by a state laboratory.29
They were not prepared in response to interrogation by law enforcement for the primary purpose of establishing facts for use at trial.30 The analysts who prepared the certificates were not witnesses against the defendant within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment because they performed routine scientific tests using standard laboratory procedures.31 Their work was not accusatory in nature.32
The majority's decision will require States to call every analyst who performed any test in every case or forgo the use of these reliable scientific reports.33 This is an unnecessary and unwarranted expansion of the Confrontation Clause.34
Whether those certificates qualify as testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington?35
Under Crawford v. Washington the Confrontation Clause applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial and to police interrogations. It also applies to formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.36
Yes. The certificates are quite plainly affidavits sworn before a notary public and made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.37 Under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the analyzed substance.38 The established facts show that the certificates were introduced at trial after the substances were seized from the codefendant and the police cruiser.39
The fact that the certificates were prepared pursuant to a statutory duty does not change the analysis. Nor does the fact that the analysts' statements were not prepared in response to interrogation by law enforcement.40
The certificates qualify as testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington.41
Whether the prosecution must produce the analysts for live testimony rather than relying on the certificates as prima facie evidence?42
The Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to produce the witnesses against the defendant, not on the defendant to bring in the witnesses. The defendant is not required to bring in the witnesses himself through subpoena or otherwise.43
Yes. The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.44 The prosecution must produce those witnesses for live testimony.45 The established facts demonstrate that the prosecution introduced the certificates as prima facie evidence without calling the analysts who performed the tests on November 28, 2001 and swore the certificates before a notary public.46
The argument that the defendant could have subpoenaed the analysts is rejected because the Clause places the burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses rather than shifting that obligation to the accused.47
The prosecution must produce the analysts for live testimony rather than relying on the certificates as prima facie evidence.48