477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)
In 1974 Mechelle Vinson met Sidney Taylor, a vice president and branch manager of what is now Meritor Savings Bank.1 Taylor provided Vinson an employment application, hired her the next day as a teller-trainee, and supervised her subsequent promotions to teller, head teller, and assistant branch manager over four years at the same branch, all based on merit alone.2
In September 1978 Vinson notified Taylor she was taking indefinite sick leave.3 The bank discharged her on November 1, 1978, for excessive use of that leave.4 Vinson sued Taylor and the bank, alleging she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor throughout her employment.5
At the eleven-day bench trial Vinson testified that Taylor initially acted in a fatherly manner.6 He soon invited her to dinner and suggested they go to a motel for sexual relations, which she eventually agreed to out of fear of losing her job.7 She further testified that Taylor made repeated demands for sexual favors at the branch.8 They had intercourse some forty or fifty times over several years.9 He fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom, exposed himself, and forcibly raped her on several occasions.10 These activities stopped after 1977 when she began a steady relationship.11
Taylor denied all allegations of sexual activity or advances and claimed the accusations arose from a business dispute.12 The bank denied any knowledge of such conduct.13 The District Court denied relief without resolving whether a sexual relationship existed between Vinson and Taylor.14 It found instead that any such relationship would have been voluntary and unrelated to her employment, advancement, or promotions.15 The court concluded that Vinson was not the victim of sexual harassment or discrimination and determined that the bank lacked notice of Taylor's alleged actions and therefore could not be held liable.16 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings on a hostile-environment theory.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1985.18
Whether claims of sexual harassment that create a hostile or offensive working environment violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?19
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's sex.20 The phrase terms, conditions, or privileges of employment evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.21 The EEOC Guidelines specify that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII when such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.22
Yes. The established facts show that Vinson testified that Taylor made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, both during and after business hours.23 She had intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times.24 He fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.25
Respondent’s allegations in this case, which include not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature, are plainly sufficient to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment.26 These activities, if they occurred as described, are sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.27
Claims of sexual harassment that create a hostile or offensive working environment violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.28
Whether a finding that a sexual relationship between a supervisor and subordinate was voluntary precludes a Title VII sexual harassment claim?29
The fact that sex-related conduct was voluntary in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII.30 The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.31 The correct inquiry is whether the complainant by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.32
No. The District Court found that if Vinson and Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual relationship during the time of Vinson's employment with the bank, that relationship was a voluntary one having nothing to do with her continued employment at the bank or her advancement or promotions at that institution.33 The fact that sex-related conduct was voluntary in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The District Court erroneously focused on the voluntariness of Vinson's participation rather than whether the advances were unwelcome.34
A finding that a sexual relationship between a supervisor and subordinate was voluntary does not preclude a Title VII sexual harassment claim.35
Whether evidence of a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is admissible in a Title VII sexual harassment case to determine whether advances were unwelcome?36
While voluntariness in the sense of consent is not a defense to a sexual harassment claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome.37 To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant.38 The trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of the record as a whole and the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.39
Yes. The District Court admitted testimony about Vinson's dress and personal fantasies into evidence.40 The Court of Appeals concluded that this testimony had no place in this litigation.41 That conclusion was based upon the erroneous categorical view that testimony about provocative dress and publicly expressed sexual fantasies had no place in this litigation.42
To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant. The District Court must carefully weigh the considerations of relevance and prejudice in deciding whether to admit evidence of this kind, but there is no per se rule against its admissibility.43
Evidence of a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is admissible in a Title VII sexual harassment case to determine whether advances were unwelcome.44
Whether agency principles govern an employer's liability under Title VII for sexual harassment by a supervisor?45
Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area.46 While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define employer to include any agent of an employer surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.47 Employers are not always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors.48 Absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability.49 The mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with the employee's failure to invoke that procedure, must not necessarily insulate the employer from liability.50
Yes. The Court of Appeals held that an employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the misconduct.51 The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors. The court declined to issue a definitive rule on employer liability but agreed that agency principles should guide the determination.52
Petitioner's general nondiscrimination policy did not address sexual harassment in particular, and the bank's grievance procedure apparently required an employee to complain first to her supervisor, in this case Taylor.53
Agency principles govern an employer's liability under Title VII for sexual harassment by a supervisor, and employers are not automatically liable for such acts.54
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall fully agrees with the Court's conclusion that workplace sexual harassment is illegal and violates Title VII.55 He believes the question of employer responsibility is properly before the Court.56 He would adopt the standard set out by the EEOC Guidelines.57
This standard holds an employer responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence.58 The Solicitor General's position is untenable because a supervisor is charged with the day-to-day supervision of the work environment and abuse of that authority should have the same consequences as abuse of hiring or firing authority.59
Justice Stevens concurs with both the majority opinion and Justice Marshall's concurrence.60 He does not see any inconsistency between the two opinions.61 He believes the question of statutory construction that Justice Marshall has answered is fairly presented by the record in this case.62
Accordingly, Justice Stevens joins both the Court's opinion and Justice Marshall's opinion.63