373 Md. 672, 821 A.2d 22 (Md. 2003)
In August 2000, petitioner Messing came into possession of a check in the amount of $976 drawn by Toyson J. Burruss on an account at Bank of America.1 On August 3, 2000, Messing presented the check for payment over the counter at a Bank of America branch in Baltimore City rather than depositing it at his own bank.2 The teller confirmed sufficient funds in the drawer's account, stamped the check with transaction data, and obtained Messing's endorsement along with information from his driver's license and a major credit card.3
When the teller learned that Messing was not a Bank of America customer, she requested that he place an inkless thumbprint on the check as required by the bank's Thumbprint Signature Program for non-customers.4 Messing refused the request. The branch manager likewise declined to cash the check without the thumbprint, and Messing departed the bank still holding the check.5 The teller then released the hold on the drawer's funds and voided the transaction.6
Two months later, on October 10, 2000, Messing filed a declaratory judgment action against Bank of America in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.7 He sought declarations that he had provided reasonable identification, that the thumbprint requirement was unlawful and violated privacy, that the bank had accepted and wrongfully dishonored the check, and that it had converted the proceeds, along with injunctive relief to end the thumbprint program.8 The bank moved for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted, dismissing the complaint with prejudice.9
Messing appealed. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of the bank but remanded for entry of a proper declaratory judgment.10 Messing then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on June 10, 2002.11
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in construing the requirement of giving reasonable identification under the Annotated Code of Maryland, Commercial Law Article, Section 3-501(b)(2) to require a thumbprint if demanded by a drawee to whom presentment of a check is made, notwithstanding the proffer of reasonable and customary documentary forms of identification?12
Under Maryland Code Commercial Law Article § 3-501(b)(2), upon demand of the person to whom presentment is made, the person making presentment must give reasonable identification.13 Under § 3-501(b)(3)(ii), without dishonoring the instrument, the party to whom presentment is made may refuse payment or acceptance for failure of the presentment to comply with other applicable law or rule.14 The UCC policies in § 1-102(2)(b) permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.15
No. The established facts show that after Messing presented his driver's license and credit card, the teller requested an inkless thumbprint pursuant to the Thumbprint Signature Program for non-customers.16 Messing refused.17 The thumbprint requirement assists identification after the fact if the check proves bad and deters fraud, thereby expanding commercial practices consistent with UCC policy.18 Because the identification was reasonable, the bank's refusal did not constitute dishonor.19
The Court of Special Appeals did not err in construing the thumbprint as reasonable identification under § 3-501(b)(2).20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Judge Bell
Judge Eldridge concurred in the judgment that a declaratory judgment was required but dissented from the majority's conclusion that the thumbprint requirement was reasonable.21 He noted that honest citizens are already burdened with providing numerous forms of identification such as drivers' licenses, photo identification cards, social security numbers, and account numbers.22 In his view, requiring thumbprints and fingerprints in addition goes too far.23
The petitioner's irritation with the program was the most reasonable aspect of the case.24
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding the Respondent did not accept the particular check at issue, as acceptance is defined in the Annotated Code of Maryland, Commercial Law Article, Section 3-409(a)?25
Under Maryland Code Commercial Law Article § 3-409(a), acceptance means the drawee's signed agreement to pay a draft as presented.26 It must be written on the draft and becomes effective when notification pursuant to instructions is given or the accepted draft is delivered for the purpose of giving rights on the acceptance to any person.27
No. The established facts show that the teller placed the check in the computer printer slot which stamped data on the back but then returned the check to Messing so he could provide a thumbprint.28 The teller and branch manager informed Messing that the bank would not cash the check without the thumbprint.29 No notification of acceptance was ever given to Messing.30
The Court of Special Appeals did not err in finding that Bank of America did not accept the check under § 3-409(a).31
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that the Respondent did not dishonor the particular check at issue, as dishonor is defined in the Annotated Code of Maryland, Commercial Law Article, Section 3-502(d)(1)?32
Under Maryland Code Commercial Law Article § 3-502(b)(2), if a draft is payable on demand and paragraph (1) does not apply, the draft is dishonored if presentment for payment is duly made to the drawee and the draft is not paid on the day of presentment.33 Section 3-501(b)(3)(ii) provides that refusal for failure to give reasonable identification does not constitute dishonor.34
No. The established facts show that Messing refused the reasonable thumbprint request.35 Because the presentment failed to comply with the reasonable identification requirement under § 3-501(b)(2), the bank's refusal did not amount to dishonor under § 3-502(b)(2).36 Section 3-502(d)(1) applies only to accepted drafts and no acceptance occurred.37
The Court of Special Appeals did not err in finding that Bank of America did not dishonor the check.38
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding the Respondent did not convert the cash proceeds of the particular check at issue, as conversion is set out in the Annotated Code of Maryland, Commercial Law Article, Section 3-420?39
Under Maryland Code Commercial Law Article § 3-420, conversion of an instrument occurs when a bank makes or obtains payment for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument.40 Conversion requires the exercise of unauthorized dominion and control to the complete exclusion of the rightful possessor.41
No. The established facts show that Messing voluntarily gave the check to the teller who returned it for the thumbprint.42 The bank never accepted the check under § 3-409(a) and therefore never became obligated to pay under § 3-413(a).43 Messing left the bank still holding the check so the bank never exercised dominion and control to his exclusion.44
The Court of Special Appeals did not err in finding that Bank of America did not convert the check or its proceeds.45
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in its application of section 3-111 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, Commercial Law Article?46
No. The established facts show that Messing presented the check at a Bank of America branch which is a place of business of the drawee.49 Section 3-111 governs only the location of presentment and does not obligate the bank to accept the check or pay it absent compliance with reasonable identification requirements.50
The Court of Special Appeals did not err in its application of § 3-111.51
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in vacating the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remanding the case to the Circuit Court for the entry of a written declaration of the rights of the parties consistent with the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion?52
No. The established facts show that Messing's complaint included multiple requests for declaratory relief.55 The circuit court granted summary judgment without entering a written declaration of the parties' rights.56 The Court of Special Appeals correctly vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a proper declaration consistent with its opinion.57
The Court of Special Appeals did not err in vacating and remanding for entry of a declaratory judgment.58
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Judge Bell
Judge Eldridge concurred in the judgment that a declaratory judgment was required but dissented from the majority's conclusion that the thumbprint requirement was reasonable. He noted that honest citizens are already burdened with providing numerous forms of identification such as drivers' licenses, photo identification cards, social security numbers, and account numbers. In his view, requiring thumbprints and fingerprints in addition goes too far.
The petitioner's irritation with the program was the most reasonable aspect of the case.