521 U.S. 424, 117 S. Ct. 2113, 138 L.Ed.2d 560 (1997)
Michael Buckley worked as a pipefitter for Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company.1 From 1985 to 1988 his job exposed him to asbestos for about one hour per working day while he removed insulation from pipes, often covering himself with insulation dust that contained asbestos.2
In 1987 Buckley attended an asbestos awareness class and thereafter feared he would develop cancer.3 His two expert witnesses testified that even after accounting for his now-discarded fifteen-year habit of smoking up to a pack of cigarettes per day, the exposure created an added risk of death due to cancer or other asbestos-related diseases.4 The risk was either one to five percent or one to three percent. Since 1989 Buckley has received periodic medical checkups for cancer and asbestosis that have not revealed any evidence of disease.5
Buckley sued Metro-North under the Federal Employers' Liability Act seeking damages for emotional distress and the cost of future medical checkups.6 Metro-North conceded negligence but did not concede that Buckley had actually suffered emotional distress and argued that the statute did not permit recovery for injuries of either sort without physical harm.7 After hearing Buckley's case, the District Court dismissed the action, finding that Buckley did not offer sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that he suffered a real emotional injury and that, in any event, Buckley suffered no physical impact.8
Buckley appealed and the Second Circuit reversed.9 The court held that Buckley's contact with the insulation dust was massive, lengthy, and tangible and would cause fear in a reasonable person, thereby constituting a physical impact that permitted recovery for accompanying emotional distress.10 The Second Circuit also found sufficient expression of worry in Buckley's workplace statements to permit sending the emotional distress claim to a jury.11 It held that Buckley could recover medical monitoring costs because a reasonable physician would prescribe a monitoring regime different from the one that would have been prescribed in the absence of the exposure.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Second Circuit's holdings.12
Whether a railroad worker negligently exposed to a carcinogen but without symptoms of any disease can recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for negligently inflicted emotional distress?13
Under the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51, recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress is permitted only when the plaintiff sustains a physical impact as a result of the defendant's negligent conduct or is placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.14 The term physical impact does not encompass mere exposure to a substance that might cause disease at a substantially later time where the substance threatens no harm other than that disease-related risk.15
No. The precedents cited in Gottshall involved sudden traumatic events such as car accidents and train collisions that placed plaintiffs in immediate risk of physical harm.1617 Buckley's exposure to asbestos dust created only a future risk of disease without any immediate physical harm or traumatic contact of the sort recognized in those cases.18 The policy concerns identified in Gottshall of difficulty separating valid from trivial claims, unlimited liability, and a flood of cases apply directly because contacts with carcinogens are common in the workplace and society.19 Buckley's own evidence of distress was limited to his testimony and workplace complaints while he continued working with the material and smoking cigarettes.20
The statistical uncertainties surrounding increased cancer risk make objective evaluation of emotional harm especially problematic.21 These facts fall outside the zone-of-danger test as interpreted and applied.22
Buckley cannot recover damages for emotional distress under the FELA.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment on the emotional distress claim but on distinct grounds.24 She concluded that Buckley's extensive contact with asbestos particles constituted physical impact under Gottshall yet the claim failed because Buckley presented no objective evidence of severe emotional distress, sought no professional help, and offered no medical testimony concerning his mental health.25 She contrasted this with the unquestionably genuine and severe distress shown by other plaintiffs who suffered nervous breakdowns or hospitalizations.26
This approach diverges from the majority by accepting the physical impact characterization while imposing an evidentiary requirement of objective corroboration beyond mere expressions of fear.27
Whether a railroad worker negligently exposed to a carcinogen but without symptoms of any disease can recover the costs of future medical monitoring under the Federal Employers' Liability Act?28
Under the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51, a plaintiff without symptoms or disease cannot recover lump-sum damages for the economic costs of future medical monitoring as a separate negligently caused injury because such recovery lacks sufficient support in the evolving common law, which imposes special limitations such as court-supervised funds rather than traditional lump-sum awards.29
No. The established facts show that Buckley has received periodic medical checkups since 1989 with no evidence of disease found and that his experts testified only to an increased statistical risk of one to five percent or one to three percent.30 The Second Circuit held that a reasonable jury could award the costs of medical monitoring because a reasonable physician would prescribe a different regime due to the exposure.31 The rule requires that any medical monitoring recovery be limited to incremental costs over ordinary care and must account for existing regulatory and insurance sources of payment.32 Buckley's claim sought a traditional lump-sum award for future expenses estimated at nine hundred fifty dollars annually for thirty-six years without demonstrating that such an unqualified remedy aligns with common-law limitations that favor supervised funds to avoid uncertainty in testing needs, potential floods of claims from the millions exposed to carcinogens, and interference with collateral sources such as OSHA-mandated monitoring.33
The facts illustrate the difficulties in identifying justified extra monitoring because Buckley's expert was equivocal about the necessity of additional tests beyond those already recommended for smokers and the general population.34 These considerations confirm that the FELA does not authorize the broad recovery sought.35
Buckley cannot recover lump-sum damages for future medical monitoring costs under the FELA.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Ginsburg dissented from the disposition of the medical monitoring claim.37 She would have affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling that Buckley stated a triable claim for the incremental costs of monitoring made necessary by his negligent exposure.38 She emphasized that the elements of such a claim are satisfied here because Metro-North stipulated to negligent exposure that substantially increased Buckley's risk of disease and expert testimony established the need for a different monitoring regime.39
She argued that recovery aligns with the evolving common law and FELA's humanitarian purpose, that OSHA regulations demonstrate the non-trivial nature of monitoring, and that fears of a flood of claims or unlimited liability are overstated because only negligently exposed employees with proven increased risk would qualify.40 She further noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) permits courts to award appropriate relief such as a court-supervised fund even if not demanded in the pleadings.41