453 U.S. 490 (1981)
San Diego enacted Ordinance No. 10795 prohibiting outdoor advertising display signs.1 The California Supreme Court defined such signs as rigidly assembled signs permanently affixed to the ground or attached to buildings or other permanent structures and used for displaying a commercial or other advertisement to the public.2
The ordinance created exceptions for onsite signs designating the name of the owner or occupant or advertising goods manufactured or services rendered on the premises.3 It also exempted twelve additional categories that included government signs, signs at public bus stops, commemorative historical plaques, religious symbols, for-sale and for-lease signs, signs on public and commercial vehicles, time-temperature-news signs, approved temporary off-premises subdivision directional signs, and temporary political campaign signs.4
Appellants Metromedia, Inc. and other companies engaged in the outdoor advertising business owned approximately 500 to 800 billboards within San Diego.5 All were located in areas zoned for commercial and industrial use, and most were situated on property leased specifically for maintaining the signs.6 Each billboard had a remaining useful income-producing life exceeding 25 years and a fair market value between $2,500 and $25,000.7
Space on the signs was made available to all comers, with copy changed regularly, usually monthly.8 The billboards had been used to convey both commercial messages and a broad range of noncommercial political and social messages.9 The parties entered a stipulation of facts stating that enforcement of the ordinance as written would eliminate the outdoor advertising business in San Diego.10 The stipulation also stated that outdoor advertising increases sales of products and produces numerous public benefits, that valuable commercial, political, and social information reaches the public through such displays, and that many businesses and politicians rely on outdoor advertising because other forms are insufficient, inappropriate, and prohibitively expensive.11
Appellants brought suit in state court to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance.12 After extensive discovery the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.13 The trial court held the ordinance unconstitutional as an exercise of police power and an abridgment of First Amendment rights.14 The California Court of Appeal affirmed on the police power ground alone.15 The California Supreme Court reversed, upholding the ordinance as a proper exercise of municipal zoning authority.16 Appellants sought review in the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.17
Whether San Diego's ordinance prohibiting most offsite outdoor advertising signs while permitting onsite commercial signs and specified categories of noncommercial signs is facially invalid under the First Amendment?18
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects both commercial and noncommercial speech.19 Commercial speech receives a lesser degree of protection under the four-part Central Hudson test.20 Noncommercial speech may not be subjected to content-based distinctions that favor commercial messages or allow government to select permissible subjects for public discourse.21
Yes. The ordinance bars offsite signs while permitting onsite commercial signs and a limited set of noncommercial exceptions.22 This inverts the required hierarchy by affording greater protection to commercial speech than to noncommercial speech.23 The stipulation that enforcement would eliminate the outdoor advertising business and that billboards have conveyed political and social messages demonstrates the ordinance's broad reach into protected expression.24
Because the regulation distinguishes among signs based on their content and location, it fails to satisfy the requirement that any restriction on noncommercial speech be justified without reference to the message conveyed.25
The ordinance is facially invalid under the First Amendment.26
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Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment on the ground that the ordinance functions as a total ban on billboards as a medium of communication.27 He would require the city to demonstrate that a substantial governmental interest is directly furthered by the ban and that narrower alternatives would not suffice.28 Brennan observed that the stipulation of facts was silent on traffic safety.29
He also observed that the varied character of commercial and industrial areas in San Diego prevented a showing that aesthetics interests were sufficiently substantial to justify the restriction.30
Whether the ordinance's distinction between onsite and offsite commercial advertising violates the First Amendment?31
Under the Central Hudson test, a restriction on commercial speech must concern lawful activity that is not misleading.32 It must seek to implement a substantial governmental interest.33 It must directly advance that interest.34 It must reach no further than necessary to accomplish the objective.35 Distinctions between onsite and offsite commercial signs may be sustained when the city reasonably concludes that onsite advertising serves a stronger interest than offsite advertising.36
No. The ordinance's distinction between onsite and offsite commercial signs satisfies the Central Hudson criteria.37 The prohibition on offsite commercial advertising directly advances the substantial interests in traffic safety and aesthetics without reaching further than necessary.38 The facts show that appellants' billboards are located in commercial and industrial zones.39 The city permits signs identifying premises or goods produced there while barring identical signs advertising goods or services elsewhere.40
The city may value onsite commercial messages more highly than offsite ones without violating the First Amendment.41
The ordinance's distinction between onsite and offsite commercial advertising does not violate the First Amendment.42
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Justice Stevens dissented in part and joined the portions of the opinion upholding the distinction between onsite and offsite commercial signs.43 He concluded that appellants lacked standing to raise hypothetical claims concerning onsite signs.44 He also concluded that the ordinance's impact on the outdoor advertising market could be judged independently of any effect on property owners.
Stevens emphasized that the record contained no evidence that onsite signs had ever been used for noncommercial messages.45 He emphasized that the central question was the ordinance's application to appellants' own businesses.
Whether the ordinance's treatment of noncommercial speech, including its exceptions for specified noncommercial signs, renders the regulation unconstitutional?46
When a municipality permits commercial speech in a given medium it may not prohibit noncommercial speech in the same medium.47 Exceptions that permit some noncommercial messages while forbidding others constitute impermissible content-based distinctions.48 Such exceptions allow government to choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse.49
Yes. The ordinance permits onsite commercial signs and a range of specified noncommercial exceptions such as government signs, religious symbols, and temporary political campaign signs while generally prohibiting other noncommercial messages on offsite billboards; applied to the facts that billboards have carried political and social messages and that the ordinance would eliminate the outdoor advertising business, this treatment improperly favors commercial speech and allows the city to select permissible topics for public discourse, rendering the regulation unconstitutional.50
The ordinance's treatment of noncommercial speech renders the regulation unconstitutional.51
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Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the ordinance represented a legitimate exercise of municipal authority to address traffic safety and aesthetic concerns.52 He argued that the limited exceptions were narrowly tailored to special public needs.53 He argued that the exceptions did not endanger freedom of speech because they were not conditioned on agreement with any speaker's message.54
Burger maintained that the plurality's approach forced cities into an all-or-nothing choice that ignored the practical realities of urban planning.55
Whether the ordinance constitutes a valid time, place, and manner restriction on protected speech?56
A time, place, and manner restriction is valid only if it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.57 It must serve a significant governmental interest.58 It must leave open ample alternative channels for communication.59 An ordinance that distinguishes between permissible and impermissible signs by reference to their content falls outside this category.60
No. The ordinance distinguishes between permissible and impermissible signs at particular locations by reference to their content.61 It allows onsite commercial messages and specified noncommercial exceptions while banning other noncommercial and offsite commercial speech.62 Applied to the facts, the stipulation that many businesses and politicians rely on outdoor advertising because other forms are insufficient and prohibitively expensive shows that alternative channels are not ample in practice.63 The content-based nature of the distinctions therefore prevents the ordinance from qualifying as a valid time, place, and manner restriction.64
The ordinance does not constitute a valid time, place, and manner restriction on protected speech.65
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Justice Rehnquist dissented and agreed substantially with the views of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens.66 He stated that the aesthetic justification alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of billboards.67 He stated that the limited exceptions, including the political campaign exception, were reasonable and self-limiting.68
Rehnquist expressed the view that judges are not in a better position than city commissions to make aesthetic determinations.69 He expressed the view that allowing individual judges to second-guess legislative judgments loses more in democratic decisionmaking than it gains in constitutional law.70