558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978)
In 1970 the Clerics of St. Viator owned eighty acres in Arlington Heights zoned R-3 for detached single-family homes.1
The Clerics agreed on November 7, 1970 to sell fifteen acres in the southeast corner of the property to the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation for $300,000, with the sale contingent on obtaining R-5 rezoning and federal financing under section 236 of the National Housing Act.2 MHDC planned to build 190 connected townhouse units in twenty two-story buildings for low- and moderate-income residents; the project, called Lincoln Green, would have to be racially integrated to qualify for the federal subsidy.3
On September 28, 1971 the Village Board of Trustees denied MHDC's petition for rezoning.4 MHDC and three black individuals then filed suit against the Village in the Northern District of Illinois, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated rights under the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, and the Fair Housing Act.5
After trial the district court held in 1974 that the Village's action did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs had failed to prove the decision adversely affected members of racial minorities as opposed to poor people generally.6 The court also found that the decision was motivated by a desire to protect property values rather than by racial discrimination.7 This court initially reversed, but the Supreme Court reversed that constitutional holding in 1977 on the ground that discriminatory intent is required under the Equal Protection Clause and remanded for consideration of the Fair Housing Act claim.8
Arlington Heights had a population of 64,884 in 1970, of whom only twenty-seven were black, while black people constituted eighteen percent of the Chicago metropolitan area population.9 The Village had taken no affirmative steps to construct low-cost housing.10 The original section 236 subsidy for Lincoln Green was suspended by the federal government in 1973, and plaintiffs assert that alternative subsidization may be available under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937.11
Whether the plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claim is barred by the statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a)?12
A claim that the statute of limitations bars a lawsuit is an affirmative defense, and it must be pleaded or it will be considered waived under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).13
No. The Village failed to raise the statute of limitations defense in its pleadings despite having the opportunity to do so after the complaint was filed.14 Because the defense is affirmative in nature, the failure to plead it results in waiver, allowing the court to reach the merits of the Fair Housing Act claim without addressing timeliness under section 3612(a).15
The Fair Housing Act claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.16
Whether a showing of discriminatory effect without discriminatory intent is ever sufficient to establish a violation of section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act?17
Yes. The court rejects the narrow view of the phrase 'because of race' that would require proof of intent.20 Instead it adopts the broad view under which the natural and foreseeable consequence of an action can establish liability.21 This approach aligns with the congressional goal stated in section 3601.22
It avoids permitting municipalities to systematically deprive minorities of housing opportunities simply by acting discreetly without overt bigotry.23 The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis is distinguished because it addressed the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Fair Housing Act.24 Title VII precedent supports allowing effect-based claims under civil rights statutes with similar language.25
A showing of discriminatory effect without discriminatory intent is sufficient under some circumstances to establish a violation of section 3604(a).26
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Judge Fairchild concurs in the result but does not subscribe to all the principles and analytical steps in the majority opinion.27 He frames the ultimate question as whether the refusal of the zoning change made a dwelling unavailable to plaintiff Ransom because of race under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).28 Fairchild notes that after trial the district court found sixty tracts zoned for R-5 use with some still vacant and available, including nine undeveloped tracts in excess of fifteen acres, though suitability under federal standards was not established.29
He accepts that the Supreme Court mandate justifies a second inquiry but maintains that traditional principles allocate the burden to plaintiffs rather than the Village.30 Fairchild concludes that if on remand it is demonstrated that no suitable site with proper zoning is available, the denial of the zoning change was unlawful under section 3604(a). This conclusion follows given the near-total confinement of housing to white persons in a community of substantial size where minority persons are employed.31
Whether conduct that produces a discriminatory impact violates section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act under particular factual circumstances?32
Four critical factors determine whether conduct producing a discriminatory impact violates section 3604(a). They are: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs' showing of discriminatory effect, including both disparate impact and perpetuation of segregation. (2) The presence of some evidence of discriminatory intent though insufficient for constitutional purposes. (3) The defendant's interest in taking the action complained of. (4) The nature of the relief sought, with greater reluctance when plaintiffs seek affirmative provision of housing rather than restraint from interference.33
Yes. The court applies these factors to the established facts and finds the case close.34 The showing of discriminatory effect is relatively weak in the disparate-impact sense because sixty percent of those eligible for subsidized housing were white.35 It is stronger in the segregation-perpetuation sense given Arlington Heights' overwhelming whiteness and the project's potential to integrate the community.36 There is no evidence of discriminatory intent, which weakens plaintiffs' position though this factor is discounted as the least important.37
The Village acted within its legitimate zoning authority, favoring deference.38 Plaintiffs seek only to enjoin interference with their own land rather than affirmative steps by the Village, which favors relief.39 The resolution turns on whether the refusal effectively precludes all low-cost housing in the Village.40
Conduct producing a discriminatory impact violates section 3604(a) when the four factors, particularly a strong showing that the action forecloses low-cost housing and thereby perpetuates segregation, weigh in favor of relief.41
Whether the Village's refusal to rezone the Clerics' property violated section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act by producing a racially discriminatory effect?42
If there is no land other than plaintiffs' property within Arlington Heights which is both properly zoned and suitable for federally subsidized low-cost housing, the Village's refusal to rezone constituted a violation of section 3604(a), and the district court should grant plaintiffs the relief they request.43
Yes. The Village's action had a racially discriminatory effect by precluding construction of integrated low-cost housing in a virtually all-white community that had taken no steps to remedy segregation.44 Because the case is close under the four factors, the outcome depends on clarification of whether the refusal effectively assures that Arlington Heights will remain segregated.45 The district court must place the burden on the Village to identify any other properly zoned and suitable parcel.46 If the Village fails, the refusal violated the Act.47
The court further directs the district court to determine mootness in light of the suspension of section 236 subsidies, whether section 8 funding is available, and whether the project would be racially integrated.48
The case is remanded for determination of whether other suitable land exists; if not, the refusal violated section 3604(a).49
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Judge Fairchild accepts the conclusion that the denial was unlawful under section 3604(a) if no suitable site with proper zoning is available.50 He emphasizes that Arlington Heights is a community of substantial size.51 Housing there is almost totally confined to white persons.52 Zoning is appropriate for regulating the location of land use within a community.53 With exceptions which are rare in this context, it is not appropriate for total exclusion.54
Fairchild notes the improbability that existing segregation represents free choice given the substantial percentage of minority persons in the metropolitan community and their employment in Arlington Heights.55 He would allocate the burden to plaintiffs under traditional principles but agrees that the Supreme Court mandate supports further inquiry.56 If no suitable site is demonstrated the denial was unlawful.57