171 F.2d 800 (D.C.Cir. 1948)
In 1939, while stationed at Wright Field near Dayton, Ohio, Bennett E. Meyers organized Aviation Electric Corporation under Ohio law and paid $500 into its treasury for 250 shares of common stock with a par value of $2 each.1
At his direction a certificate for 224 shares was issued to Miss June Ballaou, an employee at Wright Field, and the remaining shares were divided between David Johnson and Robert L. Pine.2 Late in 1939 Meyers recruited Bleriot H. Lamarre, whom he had known since 1936 or 1937, to join the company in an executive capacity.3 In January 1940 Lamarre became secretary-treasurer and the Ballaou shares were transferred to him without valuable consideration; a few months later he became president.4
The company obtained contracts to supply airplane parts to large manufacturers and expanded rapidly.5 Meyers advanced substantial sums for working capital and received the company's promissory notes secured by pledges of all its capital stock certificates endorsed in blank.6 By the end of 1942 all Meyers' loans had been repaid.7 Large profits were earned as long as the war continued, but the termination of actual hostilities so reduced the demand for its products that the corporation was dissolved in September, 1946.8
During the years involved, salaries credited to Lamarre on the books (varying from $20,000 to $30,000 annually) and to his brother-in-law T. E. Readnower ($18,600) were largely remitted to Meyers in cashiers' checks.9 Company funds were used to purchase a Cadillac automobile for Meyers' personal use and to pay for decorating and furnishing his Washington apartment.10 The United States Senate created a committee to investigate the national defense program.11
In the course of its inquiry Lamarre was subpoenaed and testified before a subcommittee on Saturday, October 4, and Monday, October 6, 1947.12 His testimony concerned Meyers' financial interest in or connection with Aviation Electric Corporation, the purchase and use of the Cadillac, and the payment for decorating Meyers' apartment.13 Lamarre pleaded guilty to three counts of perjury based on that testimony.14
Meyers was jointly indicted with Lamarre on three counts of suborning the perjuries.15 After Lamarre's guilty plea, Meyers pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury in the District Court for the District of Columbia.16 At the close of the government's evidence Meyers moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied.17 Meyers did not testify or introduce evidence.18 The jury found him guilty on all three counts.19 The court imposed a single sentence covering all counts.20
The government called William P. Rogers, counsel to the Senate committee, who testified in substance about Lamarre's testimony before the subcommittee.21 Two weeks later the government introduced the full stenographic transcript of Lamarre's testimony and read portions to the jury; defense counsel also read portions.22 Lamarre testified at trial that his subcommittee statements were false and that Meyers had instructed him what to say the day before his first appearance.23 Other witnesses, including the garage manager at Hotel 2400 and Corporal Calvin Mettee, corroborated the falsity of the testimony concerning the Cadillac and the apartment.24 Meyers appealed the judgment of conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.25
Whether the trial court erred in permitting the government to introduce oral testimony from a Senate committee counsel summarizing the substance of a witness's prior testimony before introducing the stenographic transcript of that testimony?26
No. The government called William P. Rogers, counsel to the Senate committee, who testified in substance about Lamarre's testimony before the subcommittee on the second day of trial.29 Two weeks later the government introduced the full stenographic transcript of Lamarre's testimony and read portions to the jury.30
This procedure was permissible because the issue was what Lamarre had said, not what the transcript contained.31 Rogers' testimony was equally competent whether given before or after the transcript was received in evidence.32 The court correctly held that the best evidence rule did not apply to bar the oral testimony, as the rule does not require exclusion of live-witness accounts when a transcript exists.33
The trial court did not err in admitting the oral testimony of Rogers.34
Related opinions on this issue
Prettyman dissented vigorously from the majority's approval of the procedure.35 He argued that allowing Rogers to give a short summation of Lamarre's testimony at the outset of the trial, before the transcript was introduced, was preposterously unfair.36 Rogers' recollection closely mirrored the indictment's language, giving the government an improper advantage.37
When the transcript was later introduced, it prevented effective cross-examination of Rogers because the court ruled the record speaks for itself.38 Prettyman contended that the transcript constituted the accurate stenographic record and best evidence of what Lamarre had said, while human memory is subject to infirmities and bias.39 He urged the court to establish a new rule requiring the use of the accurate transcript when available rather than perpetuating an outmoded doctrine that permits less reliable oral summaries.40
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Lamarre made the specific statement charged in the first count of the indictment that Meyers was not financially interested in or connected with Aviation Electric Corporation during the years 1940 through 1947?41
Yes. Lamarre testified before the subcommittee that Meyers had no actual or beneficial stock ownership after 1940, that Meyers was merely a creditor after that date, and that Meyers had no sort of interest after 1942.44 Although Lamarre at one point agreed Meyers owned the business for all practical purposes, the context showed he was referring only to the initial 1940 pledge period, and he repeatedly affirmed Meyers had no interest after the notes were paid.45
Lamarre later pleaded guilty and testified at trial that the statements were false and that Meyers was the real owner throughout.46
The evidence was sufficient to prove that Lamarre made the statement charged in the first count.47
Related opinions on this issue
Prettyman dissented on the sufficiency of the evidence for the first count.48 He maintained that Lamarre never uttered the precise statement alleged in the indictment that Meyers had no financial interest or connection during any of the years 1940 through 1947.49 Instead, Lamarre repeatedly testified that Meyers had put up all the money, owned the stock for all practical purposes, and was the sole creditor supplying funds to the corporation.50
Prettyman concluded that the government failed to prove Lamarre made the charged statement. The testimony affirmatively showed Meyers had substantial interests in multiple years. The indictment required proof of a denial covering all the years listed. The majority's approach improperly rewrote the indictment by focusing on falsity rather than whether the specific statement was made.5152
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Lamarre made the specific statement charged in the second count of the indictment that the Cadillac automobile had been purchased for the use of Aviation Electric Corporation?53
A perjury conviction may rest on testimony that is false in substance even if the witness does not use the exact words of the indictment, provided the overall testimony conveys the charged meaning.54
Yes. Lamarre told the subcommittee that the company bought the Cadillac, that it was the company car used by him and Curnutt, that it remained in Washington for several weeks due to weather, and that Curnutt later bought it at book value because the company had no further use for it.55
At trial Lamarre admitted these statements were false. The car was purchased for Meyers' personal use on his instructions. Corroboration came from the hotel garage manager and Corporal Mettee who confirmed Meyers' exclusive personal use and storage.56
The evidence was sufficient to prove that Lamarre made the statement charged in the second count.57
Related opinions on this issue
Prettyman also dissented regarding the second count.58 He observed that Lamarre testified to a series of true elemental facts about the Cadillac's purchase, title, and possession without clearly distinguishing between use by the corporation and personal use by Meyers.59 The indictment drew a sharp distinction between purchase for the corporation's use and for Meyers' personal use as the basis for perjury.60
Prettyman concluded that this distinction could not support a perjury conviction when the facts recited by Lamarre were consistent with either inference. The testimony did not affirmatively convey the charged false meaning.61
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Lamarre made the specific statement charged in the third count of the indictment that the cost of decorating Meyers' apartment was a gift from Lamarre?62
A perjury conviction may rest on a witness's characterization of a transaction when the characterization is knowingly false and the underlying facts establish the falsity.63
Yes. Lamarre voluntarily told the subcommittee that he paid for the decoration and furnishings of Meyers' apartment as a moral obligation and later agreed under questioning that it could be considered a gift in a legal sense.64
At trial he admitted the payment came from company funds and was not his personal gift. Corroboration came from the decorator who dealt only with Meyers and from the corporate books showing the charge was shifted to a fictitious salary account.65
The evidence was sufficient to prove that Lamarre made the statement charged in the third count.66
Related opinions on this issue
Prettyman dissented on the third count as well.67 He noted that Lamarre testified truthfully to the elemental facts that the decorating cost was paid by corporate checks drawn on corporate accounts and initially charged as a business expense before being shifted to Lamarre's salary account.68 The indictment alleged that Lamarre falsely characterized the payment as a gift from himself when the truth was that it was paid from corporate funds.
Prettyman concluded that the facts recited by Lamarre matched the truth alleged in the indictment.69 The characterization as a gift was an inference drawn by the questioners rather than a knowingly false statement of fact by Lamarre, and the underlying facts did not establish perjury under the indictment as drawn.
Whether the Senate subcommittee before which Lamarre testified was lawfully constituted and had a quorum present on the dates of his testimony?70
A subcommittee of the Senate is lawfully constituted when created and appointed according to the Senate's unvarying practice, and a quorum must be present for the body to transact business other than adjournment.71
Yes. The subcommittee was lawfully constituted because the Senate follows the practice of the chairman creating and appointing subcommittees and announcing the names to the full committee.72 A quorum was present on October 4 when the perjurious statements in all three counts were made.73
Only two senators were present on October 6, rendering testimony that day invalid.74 However, the October 4 testimony alone supported the convictions.75
The subcommittee was lawfully constituted, and the presence of a quorum on October 4 rendered the convictions valid.76
Whether the District of Columbia perjury statute applies to perjury committed in testimony before a subcommittee of the United States Senate?77
The District of Columbia perjury statute applies to perjury committed before a Senate subcommittee sitting in the District of Columbia.78
Yes. The District of Columbia Code provision denouncing perjury and subornation applies to testimony before a Senate subcommittee sitting in the District of Columbia. The court had previously held in O'Brien v. United States and Behrle v. United States that the local statute governs such proceedings. The federal perjury statute does not preempt application of the District of Columbia law when the perjury occurs before a Senate subcommittee in the District.
The subcommittee sat in Washington and the local statute therefore controlled.79
The District of Columbia perjury statute applies to the testimony at issue.80