335 U.S. 469 (1948)
In 1947 Solomon Michelson stood trial in federal court on a charge of bribing a revenue agent.1 The government introduced evidence that Michelson had made a substantial cash payment to the agent.2 Michelson testified in his own defense, admitting the payment but claiming the agent had demanded, threatened, and induced it.3
On direct examination Michelson's counsel brought out that he had been convicted in 1927 of a misdemeanor involving counterfeit watch dials.4 Cross-examination further showed that in 1930, when applying for a license to deal in second-hand jewelry, Michelson had answered "No" to a question asking whether he had ever been arrested or summoned for any offense.5
Michelson called five character witnesses who had known him for fifteen to thirty years.6 Each witness testified on direct examination that Michelson's reputation for honesty, truthfulness, and being a law-abiding citizen was very good, based on conversations with others in the community.7
On cross-examination the prosecutor asked four of the witnesses whether they had ever heard that Michelson had been arrested on October 11, 1920, for receiving stolen goods.8 None of the witnesses had heard of the incident.9 Outside the presence of the jury the prosecutor assured the trial judge that the arrest had occurred and produced a supporting record that defense counsel did not challenge.10
The trial judge gave the jury limiting instructions on three separate occasions concerning the purpose of the questions.11 Michelson was convicted on the bribery count.12 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.13
Whether the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant's character witnesses by asking whether they had heard that the defendant was arrested in 1920 for receiving stolen goods?14
When a defendant opens the door by calling character witnesses to testify to his good reputation in the community, the prosecution may cross-examine those witnesses about whether they have heard of specific prior arrests, even if the arrests did not result in conviction. The purpose is to test the foundation and extent of the witnesses' knowledge of the defendant's reputation.15
No. Michelson called five character witnesses who had known him for fifteen to thirty years.16 Those witnesses testified on direct examination that his reputation for honesty, truthfulness, and being a law-abiding citizen was very good based on community conversations.17 The prosecution asked four of those witnesses whether they had heard of the 1920 arrest for receiving stolen goods.18 The trial court had confirmed outside the jury's presence that the arrest had occurred and that defense counsel did not challenge the supporting record.19
The trial judge delivered limiting instructions on three separate occasions explaining that the questions tested only the witnesses' standards and that the jury was not to assume the incident occurred.20 These steps satisfy the rule permitting such cross-examination to prevent a defendant from gaining an unfair advantage through unchallenged reputation testimony.21
The trial court did not err in permitting the cross-examination.22
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Justice Frankfurter concurred in the Court's opinion even though his feelings aligned with the concerns raised by Justice Rutledge in dissent.23 He concluded that it would be unprofitable for appellate courts to formulate rigid rules excluding evidence that would not be clearly irrelevant outside the courtroom.24 This Court has rarely ventured into such evidentiary rulemaking, and state trial judges routinely exercise discretion over the scope of cross-examination.25
Federal district judges possess the professional competence, good sense, fairness, and courage necessary to control such matters appropriately.26 Rejecting the accumulated experience of state courts would require a wisdom that appellate review cannot reliably supply.27
Whether the dissimilarity of the 1920 arrest to the charged bribery offense or the twenty-seven-year passage of time since the arrest made the cross-examination improper?28
Cross-examination about a prior arrest remains proper even when the prior offense is not identical to the charged crime provided the asserted reputation traits encompass the conduct at issue. The passage of time does not automatically bar the inquiry when the witnesses' period of acquaintance reaches back to the era of the 1920 arrest and the trial court exercises sound discretion after verifying the incident.29
No. The character witnesses testified to Michelson's reputation for honesty and law-abiding conduct.30 Those traits are incompatible with both bribery and receiving stolen goods, so the 1920 arrest was relevant to testing the breadth of the reputation claim.31 Although the arrest occurred twenty-seven years before trial, two witnesses dated their acquaintance with Michelson to thirty years earlier.32 Michelson himself had voluntarily testified about a twenty-year-old conviction.33 The inquiry was therefore appropriate within the trial court's discretion.34
Neither the dissimilarity of the offenses nor the passage of time rendered the cross-examination improper.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Murphy
Justice Rutledge, joined by Justice Murphy, dissented because the cross-examination about the remote 1920 arrest for receiving stolen goods allowed the prosecution to inject prejudicial innuendo and gossip into the trial without affording the defendant any opportunity to rebut it.36 The form of the question itself notified the jury of the arrest, and the limiting instructions could not prevent the jury from assuming the incident occurred.37 This practice turned the trial for a specific bribery offense into an inquiry into the defendant's entire past life and misconduct, violating fundamental fairness and due process.38
Although the majority trusted trial court discretion, Rutledge believed standards were needed and preferred either the Illinois rule limiting inquiries to similar offenses or, ideally, foreclosing specific incident inquiries altogether to place prosecution and defense on equal footing regarding character evidence.39